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ABSTRACT

A discussion of relations between

tlrie

United States and Indj
iia

is dependent, on an investigation into
the structure of super power

relationships, because only from such relationships,
can there issue
any real threat to the national security and power
positions of any
country.

The two countries' policies towards each other have
been

primarily influenced by other concerns.

Each has had different per-

ceptions of the key issues in world affairs.

A consideration of major

trends in world affairs is essential for they profoundly influence
not only what the United States does on the subcontinent but also

how Americans view their role and responsibilities in the world.

Accordingly the major variables in this analysis would be
comprising the system,

b)

a)

environment surrounding the units,

units
c)

rela-

tionship between the units and the environment, i.e., inputs and outputs.

Conceptual tools like national interest, foreign aid and balance

of power have been frequently used.
We shall be using the Systems Analysis approach to the study of
Indo-U.S. relations.

This paradigm has its limitations in the sense

that it cannot account for certain intervening variables between the

onset of an environmental distxirbance, and the formation of a national
decision.

We shall however make some intuitive projections by focusing

on a few historical trends

One of the ironies of international politics in the time period

under study i.e. 1965-75, is that India along with many other countries

ii

comprising the non-aligned community, worked
endlessly for detente, but

when it came, it was found to be not an
unmixed blessing.

It aroused

the suspicion that detente between big
powers would not necessarily mean

world peace.

It led to fears that great powers while
relaxing tensions

among themselves, might like to pursue their
global objectives through

perpetuation of tension in other regions.
There are superficial similarities between the political
systems
of India and the United States, but there has been a
psychological rejection by the United States of India, and a corresponding inability
in the

United States to accept India as a country worthy of serious attention.
The work discusses the differences in the economic and social

perspectives of the two countries and the contradictions in their political beliefs.

It also discusses in the paranthesis the basic impulses of

India's foreign policy and its evolution, the decline of non-alignment,

and the ritualistic allegiance to it, the obscuring of India in the

world arena by China and the effect on India of the end of the bi-polar

confrontation in the world.
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INTRODUCTION

A Study of relations between India, and the United States,

is

an attempt to take a close look at the paradox of relationships
be-

tween two countries, their divergent perspectives, and common
aspirations, which through a perversion of circumstcinces have been in
discord.

Foreign policy is an instrument by which nations conduct their
relations, but it is a dependent variable to be explained by certain

independent variables, such as strategic considerations, ideologies,
economic conditions, super-power positions, and others.

Thus an

examination of foreign policy issues alone is not always useful for
gaining an insight into relations between countreis.

U.S. foreign

policy towards a given country has derived its logic not in reference
to that country as such, but in reference to one or more super-powers.

The basic thesis of this work is that Americcin foreign policy
towcurds India, must be understood in the light of the universal ap-

plication of the grand strategy rooted in the structure of super-power
relationships.

U.S. policy towards India is merely the application

of this global strategy, which has nothing to do with India specifically,

except in so far as India is seen as an available instrximent, or an

unnecessary obstacle in the execution of that strategy.
Relations between the two countries were first conducted under
cold war conditions, and then against a background of a decline in

biopolarity, and a weakening of the Soviet and Western alliance systems.

1

2

India with no foreign policy experience, soon after independence,
was

forced to discover and further her national interests, in a fast and

changing international environment, through the policy of non-

alignment

^
.

The universal application of American global strategy, in re-

lation to India, is unrelieved by the presence of any particular
factors that may have significance for the American elite.

There is

no influential group in the domestic policits of the U.S., as in

relation to Israel, that would make for any modification in respect of
India.

Americam foreign policy towards India, is consequently exclu-

sively governed by its universal grand design; no particular factors
inherent in India, other than India's own attitude towards the

structure of super-power relationships

,

seem so far to have had any

bearing on Americcui foreign policy.
That both India,

cuid

the United States have been political

democracies over the post-war period has been largely irrelevant to

American decision makers.

It will be the second thesis of this work

to prove that U.S. foreign policy has been one or Realpolitik, designed

basically to serve its own national interests

,

its own national se-

curity and power position, its own economic welfare, and the preserva-

tion of its own socio-political patterns, not to their tramsfer to or
maintenance in other lands.

^Norman D. Paler, South Asia and United States Policy Boston;
Houghton Miffline Co., 1966; also see william J. Bamds, India
Pakistan, and the Great Powers New York; Praeger Publishers, 1972;
Chester Bowles, "America and Russia in India." Foreign Affairs , July
October
1971; Internview with Professor Howards Wriggins, India Abroad,
,

,

,

1,

1972, p. 2

3

Ideology has been made use of abundantly in the pursuit of
power, and importantly for support mobilisation, both at home and
abroad.

The same Realpolitik basis of U.S. foreign policy also explains

why its basic framework is derived from the structure of super-power
relationships

,

because only from such relationships can there issue

any real threat to the national security and power positions of the
country.
U.S. foreign policy has been made use of abundantly in the

pursuit of America's national interest,

cuid

because of its power posi-

tion in the world, it affects every coxantry in the world.

In its

implementation the U.S. has been quite adamant with its allies,
ruthless with its foes, and both scornful and

stem

fowards neutrals.

India has been the recipient of the fury of this global strategy, as

applied to the sxibcontinent of south Asia.
However in its application to India, U.S. foreign policy has

often encountered a stiibbom resistance, rooted in the country's
virtue
self perception as a potential major power in its own right, by
from time to time
of its own size and distinct civilisation, moderated

by realisation of its capabilities.

It has been the determined opera-

II, to see that no
tive policy of the U.S. since the end of World War

shoudl arise, and
new centers of power other than the United States

international politics, while
that the U.S. remain the sole subject of
objects.
all others continue or be rendered as

This policy has been

powers that despite
reluctantly modified, only to accomodate those

American opposition have overcome it

by demonstrating primarily by

capabilities, that their claims
the acquisition of appropriate military

4

to being subjects in international politics, cannot be denied any

more since they now possess the capacity to injure the interest of the
U.S., if not directly, at least in regions proximate to it.

Indo-D.S. relations need therefore to be examined in the con-

text of the persistent Indian aspiration to be a subject of inter-

national politics, but lacking in capabilities and the U.S. aim to
render other countries as objects in the pvirsuit of its national interest.

It is in this dynamic interaction that the explanation lies

for the state of Indo-U.S. relations at any particular period rather

than the personal cinimosity towards India on the part of specific
Americcui leaders or the personality characteristics of this or that

ambassador.
India's weaik capabilities were a decided limitation in playing
a major role in the world.

She atten^Jted to overcome this limiatation

by a political mobilisation of other Asian and African nations, and by
assuming for herself for sometime the leadership of the bloc of non-

aligned nations.

In the process, it came to be viewed by American

decision makers as a claimant to a subject role in international politics .

The Americcui decision to arm Pakistan, has to be seen in the

light of this perspective.

It served the double purpose of eliminating

India's claim to a siibject role as spokesman of the thrid world, and
Union
removing it as an obstacle to American policy, towards the Soviet

and China.

of
We shall see in the subsequent chapters that a study

Pakistan.
relations between the United States and India must include

frequently.
An allusion to Pakistan will therefore be made very

5

Having once neutralised India militarily from
its dominant

position in South Asia by building Pakistan up with
massive military
aid, the U.S. could then act as if South Asia
was of peripheral stra-

tegic importance.

But this peripheral nature of the region, was
not

inherent in the region, but the result precisely of
American action.
We shall also see as the work proceeds that American
foreign

policy on the subcontinent is based on two main pillars.

Military

parity between India and Pakistan happens to be the first pillar.
The second pillar has been economic aid, through which the United
States tried to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a dominant

position of influence in India.
Economic aid became an important element in American foreign

policy towards India in the later half of the 1950 's and in the 1960's.

Even though on a per capita basis, India has been at the bottom of the
list of foreign aid recipients among new nations.

This aid has been

extremely important to India, in providing resources for general economic development.

significant.

However, one feature of American aid policy is highly

Even while extending aid to India, the U.S. has seen to

it that another centre of power is not created in the world, with a

claim to a sxibject role; significantly on a per capita basis, India
was provided only half the economic aid given to Pakistan.

Apparently in respect of South Asia, the American aid program
was oriented more towards sustenemce, than the rapid development of a

new independnet centre of economic power.

Half of the American aid

to India consisted of siirplus agricultural commodities.

In its origin

6

the commodities aid program was designed
to relieve America's own pro-

blems of accumulating surpluses. The United
States absolutely refused
to have anything to do with building heavy
industry, which Indians

recognised as essentail to their economic independence,
military security and political sovereignity.

Once early in the 1950 's Indian

officials had been laughed out of the State Department,
when seeking

help to build up the steel industry in India; later in the
early 60 's
they voluntarily withdrew their assistance for the Bokaro
steel project, when opposition in the U.S. Congress proved to be stubborn.

However demands on American resoiarces for the Vietnam war, the

resulting political txirmoil, the increasing salience of the racial
issues, the sumulative urban deterioration, and the increasing crime
rate, all these began to seriously impair the U.S., ability to exercise
its power and influence all over the globe.

The U.S. now moved towards

bringing its commitments into balance with resources and capabilities.
Economic aid to underdeveloped countreis met with opposition in Congress
and outside.

Aid weariness set in as regards India.

It was obvious

that the U.S. has lost the stamina and the resolve to engage in com-

petition with the Russians in the Indian economic field.

Near the end

of the period the U.S. seemed reconciled to a reduced role in the sub-

continent, but this was not equivalent to withdrawal.

Nixon's 1971 foreign policy report stated:
"we will try to keep our activities in the area
in balance with those of the other major powers
concerned. The policy of the Soviet Union appears
to be aimed at creating a compatible area of stability
on its southern borders and at countering Chinese
communist influence. The People's Republic of China
,
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for its part has made a major effort to build a
strong relationship with Pakistan. We still do
nothing to harm legitimate Soviet and Chinese
interests in the area. We are equally clear that
no outside power has a claim to a predominant influence and that each can serve its own interests,
and the interests of South Asia, by conducting its
activities in the region accordingly."
In the aftermath of the Bangladesh war, India had created
a

new strategic environment, and stood forth as the hegemonic power in
the STJbcontinent.

American anger at India was well founded, since

India had destroyed the first pillar of American foreign policy towards

South Asia, so deligently maintained over the previous two decades,
and also had rendered diabious some of the more recent assumptions about
the place of South Asia in the Nixon engineered international order.

Importance of India to the United States

Just how important to the United States is India?

Is it vital

to national security that the subcontinent not be hostile towards the

United States?

Or is it a matter of indifference?

portamt in some other respects?

Or is the area im-

Should we treat India and Pakistan

differently, or is their future linked in a way that they are to be

treated similarly?
It is hard to answer these questions with any precision.
is obviously somewhere in between.

India

Furiihermore , the iit^^ortance of South

Asia depends partly on conditions elsewhere in the world.

For example

hostility between India and Pakistan is vital to American security, but
not a threat to national security, if the United States enjoyed friendly

relations with the Soviet Union and China.

The view that India and

8

Pakistan are vital to American security was set forth by Defense
Secretary McNamcira in March 1966:
"South Asia has become, through a combination of
circumstances and geography, a vital strategic
area in the present contest between the expansionist and non-expansionist power centres. In friendly
hands or as non-aligned States, South Asia can
be a bridge between Europe and the Far East, and
a major physical barrier to the southward expansion of Red China and the U.S.S.R. in hostile
hands, it would seal the long term hopes of
building a free Asia coalition, able to provide
adequate coxinterweight to ein expansionist China.
;

This judgement however overstates the importance of South
Asia.

American interests are pcirtially a fxinction of the interests

and activities of other countries.

It seems unlikely that either

the Soviet Union or China has the capability of taking over a sub-

continent, and so organising the area that it would

meike a

positive

contribution to Soviet or Chinese power rather than be a drain on
their energies or resources.

To be literally vital would mean that

the U.S. could not sxirvive if a nation beccime friendly with her

enemies and hostile to her.

A Sino-Soviet-South Asia axis hotile to the West, would require the settlement of the Sino-Soviet, the Sino-Indian,

cind

the IndO'

Pakistani disputes, plus rapid enough economic progress in South Asia,
so that the two countries would contribute to such a grouping.

developments however seem so unlikely to

msike it

These

unwise to base

American policies on preventing them.
2Testimony of March 30, 1966. Foreign Assistance Act of 1966
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Rep resentatives p. 269.
:

,
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As far is known South Asia contains no natiiral resources that
cire

truly vital to the West.

routes.

The Middle East

Ccin

Nor is it vital in terms of communication
be reached from Europe and the Mediterranesin

and Southeast Asia from Australia

cind

the Pacific.

Even if India and

Pakistam were actively hostile to the West, they could not prevent

Western vessels from crossing the Indian ocean.

While it is fool-

hardy to regard South Asia as vital to American national security, it

would certainly be a serious mistake to regard the area as being of
little or no concern.

The futiire of the Western position in South-

east Asia and the Middle East is not bright, which increases the

importance of South Asia.

The United States has moral and humanitarian

interests in the political, economic and social progress of India
Pakistan.

aind

These considerations are related to U.S. interests in a

sound world order, although the motivations are distinct.

A development seriously adverse to American interests would be
if South Asia were to descend into chaos as the result of internal

upheavals dues to frustrations over the lack of domestic progress, to

political strife or insurgency, or because of new
conflicts between India and Pakistan.

cind

more serious

Violent change and intense

national rivalries stimulate outside intervention.

A chaotic situation

in South Asia could lead to deeper involvement or intervention by

outside intervention.

A chaotic situation in South Asia could lead

to deeper involvement or intervention by outside powers.

That the

by a desire
actions of each outside power might be motivated as much
as by a desire to
to keep other powers from improving their position,

10

enhance its own position.

One need not overdramatise the dangers

inherent in such a development, to conclude that it is worth trying
to forestall chaos and avoid intervention.

This was clearly de-

monstrated by the struggle in East Pakistam.
There is also a growing, if yet imperfect recognition that
the rich nations of the world in general, and the U.S. in particular,

have a real stake in building a more just and less dangerous world
commiinity.

American policies in Asia have been the product of diverse

considerations.

India has been seen as an iit^joverished country

struggling bravely, but probeOaly futilely to govern itself through

democratic institutions, for which the Americans have felt obligated
to assist.

American aid of all kinds has totalled $10 billion dollars

since independence, more than to any other nation

so far.

Policies towards any country or area has to be considered in
J

i

the light of global policies.

American relations with India are in-

evitably affected and sometimes shaped by some larger considerations.
There are some basic interests, which America did seem to have in the
First they were interested in seeing that politics in the area

region.

has
be.

cui

opportiinity to remain autonomous, and as coherent as they can

The massive American aid to India, was also occasioned by the

recognition of the great stake which the U.S. has in the stirvival
of the developing nations of the non-communist world.

Secondly since

the economic difficulties of the region were and are massive, they

figured that it ought to be the role of the wealthy countries to make
some contribution towards easing those economic scarcities, which are

I

-

.

.
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acute
Besides, India is big in size and has many things in common

with America.
tutions.

Both countries value democracy, and democratic insti-

Both consider liberty an important value to be cherished.

Both are interested in creating a new world order in which people could

pursue these ends in a manner they consider most fit.

Why this Period (1965-75

)

Periodisation is always a hazardous task in international
politics.

In this case it is possible only in reference to super

power relationships, which lends logic and structure to American
foreign policy actions towards India

cis

well.

Several factors have

influenced the author in choosing this decade for study.

First, it

would enable us to view India's foreign policy from two perspectives,
the phase of non-alignment and the changing phase of the seventies.

Not much work on the later period of Indo-U.S. relations has been
conducted.

Besides this decade has been significant in the evolution

of Indian and U.S. foreign policies.

The Bangladesh war and the con-

equent splitting up of Pakistan, the nuclear explosion in May 1974,
some crucial settlements with the neighboxiring countries, the challenge

posed by the oil crisis, and some positive turns with the United States,
preceded by a period of ups and downs, were some of the developments

which enabled India to demonstrate, or reassert the validity of its
foreign policy ideals.
The United States also had to recast its role in the world.
The basic conceptual framework of Nixon's foreign policy involved

12

essentially a traditional balance of power approach, but more

Bismarckian than Mettemichian.

Unlike the static Metternichian

balcuice resting on a conservative ideological laniformity , the

Bismarchian balance was based on movement and flexibility, on taking
by sxirprise both friends and enemies alike.

This is why the organi-

sational set up requires such contraction of decision making, and the

exclusion of institutionalised bureaucracies, both from the action
of foreign policy and from the making of foreign policy.

India and

the U.S., then were faced with new realities of the seventies.

Major Irritants

The United States enjoyed great prestige in India as indepen-

dence dawned.

However anti-American feelings began to mount due to

U.S. policy towards China and Indo-China, and its stand on the Kashmir

question, its limited economic assistance in the early days, always

extended with strings, its failure to appreciate the Asian view point,
cuid

to take cognizance of Asian sensibilities and inept propaganda.

Indo-American relations have been characterised by sharp
fluctuations, rather than consistent hostility or cooperation.

This

suggests that the two coxmtries' policies towards each other have been

primarily influenced by other concerns, which their governments regard
as more important.

Each has had different perceptions of the key

issues in world affairs.

A newly independent India accorded a high

priority to anticolonialism, and freedom from Western influence.

The

a waning
United States was ambivalent on colonialism which it saw as

13

force.

American leaders wanted the cooperation of a revived
Western

Europe, but also saw the need for Asian independence,
so that its

people could have a stake in its own future, and thus not
be vulnerable
to extremist forces.

Independent Asian countries co-operating with

the West, rather than independence as such, was the American
goal.

There are certain impediments to the development of IndoU.S., relations which should be noted.

First there isusually a super

power complex in the American mind, when she is dealing with a country
like India.

In the past serious differences arose because of the

policy of the U.S. administration to encourage some neighvours of India,
like Pakistan for instance, to get stronger in order to fight the
so called "Tide of International communism.

The major obstacles in establishing closer linkes between India

and the United States were the divisions of the cold war, the unconditional U.S. support to Pakistan, India's closeness to the Soviet Union,

her faith in non-alignment, and her opposition to militiary alliances
sponsored by the United States.

Even after the doctrinal rigidities

of the cold war have dissolved and non-alignment has become respectable
in the United States the two countries have no come closer.

What has

kept them apart is the fundamental psychological cleavage between them

which came into bold relief in 1971 when Nixon gave unconditional sup-

port to Pakistan.

Since 1971 marks a watershed in the relationship

3r.S. Gupte, "A Survey of INdo-American Relations till 1964,"
International Review of History and Political Science August 1969,
,

vol. 6

14

between the two countries, the crisis in the siabcontinent in that year
and its impact on India's ties with, the United States are carefully

traced in this work.

Another

airea

of difference is the Indian Ocean, where under

the Anglo-American agreement a military base is being set up in Diego-

Garcia.

India like all the non-aligned countries which are situated

on the littoral of the Indian Ocean is against the setting up of military bases or great power military rivalry, and competition in the

Indian Oceem.

Then American feel that American aid in India has been a sour
experience, because of Indian pride.
Indian ingratitude.

They resent what they see as

While the U.S. has given India billions of dollcurs

in foreign aid, India has refused to act like a poor relation,

cind

in

fact has never hesitated to lecture her benefactor particularly in

regard to the conduct of war in Vietnam.

India on the other hand has

viewed the assistance as a source of humiliation to her, and of political leverage to the United States.

The see food grain assitcince as

motivated chielfy by a need to dispose of American sxirpluses.
protray aid in such

cireas as power, and emphasis

They

American unwilling-

ness after 1962 to provide air support (in co-operation with the United
Kingdom)

,

in the event of a new Chinese attack

,

its unwillingess to

provide large quantities of arms, or the factories to produce them,
as additional evidence.

India must be protected, but not allowed to

House,
4a. P. Jained: India and the World , Delhi: D.K. Publishing

1972

^The Boston Globe, February 5, 1975, p. 27
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protect itself.

American opposition to nuclear
proliferation, supports

this Indian argument.

India's negative attitude towards basic
American policies

"

such as the development of mutual security
arrangements is matched by
a running American criticism of the basic
Indian policy of non-align-

ment, which Americans mostly describe as neutrality
or neutralism.

Indo-U.S. policies towards Pakistan have been
poles apart, and since

relations with Pakistan have been the major concern
of India's foreign
policy, these disagreements have been particularly
vexing.

policies of India and the U.S. have also been divergent.

The China
The Nixon

administration clearly believed that a working relationship with

Peking is much more important, than any American interest in the
subcontinent.^ Both countries placed a high priority on peace, but had
sharply differing judgements about the best means of achieving a

measure of stability in Asia.
U.S. military aid to Pakistam, and her action during the 1971

crisis, led a growing number of Indians to believe that the primary

aim of the U.S. is to prevent India's emergence as a major power.
They look upon this as one element in a general American opposition
to the rise of other power centres capable of limiting the hegemony

of the United States.

Such a conclusion flies in the face of all

^See K. subrahmanycim, "U.S. Policy towards India," China Report ,
vol. 8 March- April 1972; Baldev Raj Nayar, "U.S. Policy," Seminar
Jan. '73; Major General D.K. Pandit, "Can India be a major Power?"
The Overseas Hindustan Times, Feb, 15, 1973
,
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evidence of American support for European and Japanese re-construction,
as well as support for European unification.

impression on many Indians, who

Ccin

These facts make little

find no explanation for what they

interpret as consistent American opposition to India's efforts to

develop its industrial

cind

military strength, and to play a prominent

role in Asia.
It is interesting to note that democratic Presidents have been

more xinderstanding towards Indian policies than have been Republican
Presidents.

Cordial relations between India and the U.S. were at its

peak during President Kennedy's administration.

An End to Antagonism

Given this litany of complaints and misunderstandings

,

the

question frequently asked is, whether there is any prospect for improved relations?

Even if an appraisal of the respective interests

of the two countries reveals no reason for active hostility.

their aim should be no more than the absence of antagonism.

Perhaps
Or are

there considerations which suggest that a more fruitful relationship

should be appropriate, and if so what would be its broad outline?

Both countries should guard against excessive expectations, and to
eschew ambitious goals as they grapple with these issues over the
next few years.

7

Fortunately there are now cleau: indications that both the U.S.

Arthur Lall, "Change and Continuity in India's Foreign Policy,"
Orbis, No. 10 Spring 1966
"7
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and India have reconsidered many of their past assumptions.

In the

case of the U.S., the new era has already had some effect in Southeast

and Eastern Asia.

In India's case, there is a new situation in South

Asia, which she has to face.

Improved substaintially
support.

,

Even if India's economic development

economic development would require external

During 1972 India's assurances of self reliance reflected

the euphoria attendant upon a great victory as well as a deficint re-

action to the cut off of American aid; it also involved a great degree

of self delusion.

A drop in food production, industrial stagnation,

and a large foreign exchange gap for the fifth five year plan (1974-79)
soon brought this reality home.

The Soviet Union has shown little

eagerness to increase its support.

Western Europe and Japan are

willing to continue their assistance, United States' attitude is the
question mark.
In a joint commiinique issued in New Delhi on October 29, 1974

there was a promise for a new era of co-operation, based on equality,

mutual respect and understanding.®

The Communique was released at

the conclusion of Secretairy of State Kissinger's three days of talks
in New Delhi.

It professes the United States' appreciation of India's

policies in the siabcontinent

,

and acceptance of India's reaffirmation

of the peaceful nat\are of her nuclear policy.

Kissinger's recognition

of India as a major power was well received in India.

Methodology

While allusions to authors of some important books will be

Q India News, Nov.

8,

1974, p. 2

,
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made, the study will depend to a large extent
on facts collected

from newspapers, parliamentary debates, activities
in the Foreign

Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress, speeches
and remarks made

by officials of both countries, and on some articles
from leading
journals

We shall be using the Systems analysis approach, since
we
shall be focussing on the environmental antecedents and effects
of

policy decisions.

Because systems analysis can reveal relationships

among variables that may not be intuitively obvious, we shall also
focus on historical trends, and intuitive projections, to determine

the importance of variables thus indentified.

The paradigm, as

applied in this study, is limited in that it is unable to account for

many of the intervening variables, e.g. the organisational setting of
the decision makers, their information network, and ideosyncratic

features of key individuals, between the onset of an environmental

disturbance and the formation of a national decision.
Specifically for our purpose, the analysis consists of

comprising the system,
(c)

(b)

(a)

unit

the environment surrounding the units,

the relationship between units and the environment, i.e. inputs

and outputs.

Through the flucturation of demands and supports, the

environment first affects each unit and ultimately the whole system.

Direction of Chapters

In chapter one we shall deal with the change and continuity
in the foreign policies of India and the United States.

Here we shall

deal at length with the environment surrounding the two countries.
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The fluctuation of demands and support, and the consequent changes
in

their foreign policies.

Chapter two shall discuss the U.S. policy on the subcontinent
at length, and Pakistan as a major determinant in the INdo-U.S. relations.

We shall discuss the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965, and 1971, with

reference to U.S. reaction to them.

Chapter three shall deal with the economic cooperation between the United States and India.

We shall trace the kind of aid

that has been advanced in different sectors, and its impact on the
Indian economy.

Unless the economy of a country is sound and not

dependent on other countries

,

it would not be able to adopt an inde-

pendent foreign policy.
In the fourth chapter we shall examine some of the irritants

in Indo-U.S. relations, like the Indian Ocean, the explosion of the

Bomb by India, the C.I. A.

auid

the Indian reactions to it.

We shall then conclude our work with am evaluation of the

foreign policies of the two countries, stressing the point that foreign

policy disucssions cannot be reduced to a neat formula.
policy is relevant to a given historical period.

A certain

Changes in the

foreign policy of a super power can have its impact on the foreign

policies of other coxintries too.

A foreign policy is not made in a

vacuum but is a response to certain inputs.

Besides it is one thing

to construct a foreign policy model, it is another to have an actual

policy.

This will thus be a macro study of the foreign policies of

the two countries.

CHAPTER

I

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE FOREIGN
POLICIES OF INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES

Introduction

Foreign policies operate in a world of sovereign
states, and
thus would have to depend heavily on the elements
and manifestations of

power of the concerned states, their national
interests, and the wider
interests of the international community.

It is more than a truism to

say that the formulation of foreign policy is essentially
a choice of
ends and means on the part of a nation in an international
setting.

It

is necessary to have a broad end or goal which will give a
sense of pur-

pose or direction to foreign policy.

The states in international re-

lations are guided by the concept of a permanent and universal goal,

namely that of "national interest

.

The minimum essential components

of the national interest of any state are security, national development,

and world order.

Foreign policy is never determined by a single factor, or set
of factors, but is the result of a number of factors, which affect the

formulation of policies in different ways under different circumstances.
Some of the factors are relatively stable and have to be taken as given

by the makers of foreign policy, and therefore can be regarded as the

more basic or unchangeable determinants of policy than others.

'"George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy ,

Ch.

3
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Geo-

(New York, 1962),
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graphy, economic development, political tradition,
the domestic and

international milieu, are the more variable
institutional factors,
and even the personal role of statesmen are no
less important in the

process of decision making.

The basic determinants of foreign policy

vary in importance according to circumstances, and it
is important to
lay down some general rule regarding the relative importance
of each

of these factors, or a scale of priorities, which the leaders
must

permanently adhere to in the making of policy decisions.
Power politics
national affairs.

hcis

•

become an overriding conception in inter-

Hans Morgenthau contends that "international politics

like all politics is a struggle for power."

since power relations

change, the relationsip between units in the international system is

bound to change too.

A given policy decision is therefore relevamt to

a given historical period or to a certain pattern of relationship which
is liable to chemge.

policy decisions.

So the environmental inputs help shape foreign

If the outputs are predominantly supportive the

primary tendency of the system gets strengthened."^
If we describe the power of a state as its ability to exercise

restraining or directing control to make amother state do what it would

otherwise not do, it will be clear that mere influence is not adequate.
Power is distinguished from influence by its reliance on external pres2

(Calcutta, 1966), p. 27;
Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations
Alan James, "Power Politics," Political Studies , Vol. 12, 1964, pp.
(New Haven, 1950), p. 76
307-26; Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society
According to them power politics relies on force, coercion and sanctions
,

,

3

David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life
John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 353

,

(New York:
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sures. i.e., force, as a background threat;
influence is distinguished

from force by its preference for achieving a
desired end without the

actual use of force.

India's power in this sense was marginal, as
she

still had not developed her nuclear potentialities.^

Professor Morgenthau has indicated the three sources of
power
as, raising in the states an expectation of benefits,
i.e., expectation

of military and economic protection, creating in them
the fear of dis-

advantages, e.g., loss of economic and military aid, and nourishing
a
sense of common interests, by the preservation of a way of life
followed
by two nations, say democratic or communist.^

Diplomacy is also impor-

tant in the prosecution of a successful foreign policy, for it is through
a mature diplomacy that the expectations and benefits or the fear of

disadvantages and the recognition of a sense of common interests, may
be appropriately developed in an age when resort to force is fraught

with grave consequences to peace and civilisation itself.

States are

tending to use means besides force to influence others to raise in them
the expectation of benefits and the fear of disadvantages, and in parti-

cular to create a sense of common interests.

Economic aid until recently

was an important tool of foreign policy with the United States.

However,

the colossal economic expenditure in Vietnam, the energy crisis, and the

economic interdependence of states, is making the U.S. aware of the im-

portance of trade as an instrument of foreign policy.
The art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in

^Now however India too is a member of the nuclear club.
^Hans Morganthau, op. cit.
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finding out what is most advantageous to
the country.

Governments
:s can

talk about peace and freedom, and international
goodwill, but in the

ultimate analysis a government functions for the
benefit of the country
it governs.

National interest has to be promoted through
foreign policy.

The protection of territorial integrity and political
independence is
the national interest of every state.

For the economically underdeveloped

countries, economic development becomes an equally important
national

interest

6

In the game of international politics, the key point
to remember
is that each state in the state system is the guardian of its
own se-

curity and independence.^

Each state regards the other state as a po-

tential enemy, who might threaten fundamental interests.

Consequently,

states feel insecure and regard one another with a good deal of appre-

hension and distrust,

so the principal variable explaining a state's

conduct is the balance of power.

In order to prevent an attack, a state

feels it must be as powerful as the potential aggressor.
of power might tempt attack.

Disproportion

Therefore a balance of power becomes the

prerequisits of each nation's security, if not survival, as well as for
the preservation of the system itself.

Power has to be counterbalanced.

States thus have very little or no freedom of action; their range of

choice about the kind of foreign policies they need to adopt is de-

termined by external forces.

As the distribution of power changes, so

does state behaviour and alignment.

The foreign policies of states are

interdependent, so the general principle of action is that: "When any

^Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy

,

^Claude, Power and International Relations,

(Delhi: 1961), p. 28.
p.

43.
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state or bloc becomes powerful or threatens to become
inordinately
powerful, other states should recognise this as a threat
to their

security and respond by taking equivalent measures individually
or

jointly to enhance their power.

Unrestrained power constitutes a menace to everyone; power is
therefore the best antidote to power.

States therefore pursue "balance

of power" policies as the chief means of deterring potential attackers

and assuring their own independence.

States however do not always do what they should do so we look
to other levels of analysis for alternative or supplementary expalana-

tions. We then come to the nation-state level of analysis, which relies

on a state's internal characteristics such as the political system, the

nature of the economy of the social structure for added explanations for
foreign policy of countries.

States however do not make decisions,

certain men who occupy the official political positions make foreign
policy decisions.

So along with the objective environment (national

and international) the policy makers* subjective perception has also to

be accounted for in a study of relations between two nations.
not consider this point in much detail.

We shall

It will suffice to say that

the state system level will be fundamental it cannot by itself suffi-

ciently explain the world politics of the post war era.
This brief reference to recent trends in international politics
is intended to explain some vital questions like: what are the sanctions

^John Spanier, Games Nations Play, Analyzing International Politics
See Ch. 1 and 2 for a clear under(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).
standing of analytical approaches to the study of Internationa Politics.
Also see Arnold Wolfers, "Types of International Actors," in Romano Romani,
The International Political System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972).
,

,
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which states like India have developed or can
develop to safeguard their
national interests?

India adequate?

Was the policy of non-alignment as
practised by

Will alliances with powerful states be
helpful?

What

motive or sense of common interest prompted the
United States to send

assistance to India?

Or what prompted the Soviet Union to sign
a 20

year treaty with India?

In what ways can such identity of common
in-

terests as India has with major and powerful states be
developed?

Indian Foreign Policy

The Nehru era.

"

In the bipolar world that existed until the late 1950
's

and early 1960's, United States and the Soviet Union sought as their

maximum objective, to enhance their respective strengths by taking over
the territory, population, and resources of 'the newly emerged nations,

or at least, the potentially stronger and politically more important
new states; their minimal

aiim

was to prevent these states from joining

the adversary's bloc.

For the new states, all of which were militarily weak and eco-

nomically and politically underdeveloped, non-alignment with either bloc
made tactical sense in the context of this postwar distribution.

An

"in between" or third world postiire presumably allowed them, to maximize

their bargaining influence.

Cold war was secondary to the new nations'

preoccupation with their own development

cind

modernization.

The Indian foreign policy has been a "protest against power politics

^Indian Official, "India as a World Power,
27, 1948-49, p. 550,

"

Foreign Affairs

,

Vol.
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under Nehru's stewardship, India
attempted to play a quiet and
persuasive
role through friendly efforts to
ease the cold war tension.
Her policy
of non-alignment, which was
formulated in 1946-47, bore an
inherent

implication of the rejection of some
of the basic tenets of power
politics.
"We propose," Nehru declared, "as
far as possible to keep wawy
from the
power politics of groups, aligned against
one another, which have led in
the past to world wars, and which may
again lead to disasters on an even

vaster scale.

Nehru's understanding was that the problems
of the de-

veloping countries were peculiar and they
required a variety of politics
different from power politics.

It was therefore essential for developing

nations to stay away from global politics.

He stated that "the problems

of Asia today are essentially problems of supplying
what may be called

the primary human necessities.

They are not problems which may be called

problems of power politics. "^^

Nehru decided to remain non-aligned in a

bipolar world to safeguard India's independence, and to maintain world
peace.

Whenever India saw that power politics was attempting to play
an undesirable role in certain parts of the world, she tried to steer

clear of it and to save the situation.

At the United Nations, in 1947-48,

when the question of partitioning the Holy Land into Jewish and Arab
states was being considered, she withstood the pressure of the two super

powers and proposed a reconciliation formula in favour of establishing a

^^Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches,
September 1946-April 1961, (New Delhi: 1961), p. 2.

^^Dorothy Norman, Nehru; The First Sixty Years
1965), p. 463.

,

Vol.

2,

(Bombay:

27

federal syste..

It is true that she failed
as as a consequence of

power politics Israel was brought
into being but her efforts
were indicative of an approach which was
different from one of power politics.

Years later, in 1960, when the Congo
became a theatre of dissensions, which, though apparently
internal, were really a consequence
of international power politics,
India did her best to save the
territorial

integrity and political unity of the newly
created states.

She refused

to recognize the various factions in
the Congo and thus repudiated the

game of power politics.

Likewise her refusal to recognize the
divided

states of Korea and Vietnam as also Germany
emanated from this attitude.
By doing this, she was staying away from becoming
a follower of either
the western or Soviet bloc.

India's attitude indicated

an essentially new trend in inter-

national affairs which was different or away from power
politics as we
shall see in subsequent chapters.

It may variously be described as a

deviation from, a substitute for, or an alternative to, the traditional

power-oriented approach.

Indian policy, for almost two decades, could

be described as an exercise in influence politics.

It

is not always

easy to make a discernible distinction between power and influence.

Lasswell and Kaplan have pointed out that "it is the threat of sanctions

which differentiated power from influence in general. ""'^
power

Thus, unlike

politics which relies on force or coercion of sanctions, influence

politics relies on persuasion and reconciliation.

As influence relies upon

persuasion, it is more responsive to liberal and moral values in inter12

H.D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society
1950), p. 76.

,

(New Haven:
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national politics.

This was especially true when

a

country did not ac-

tively belong to a bloc.

Owing to a variety of factors,
India's policies hold a leading

position in the founding and development
of the concept of non-alignment.
Even before it attained freedom in the
middle of the year 1947. India
had become "a symbol and catalyst of
self-determination."^^

nationalist movements in Asia, as also elsewhere.

for most

After the Second World

War it was one of the first to attain
independence.

Its history, geo-

graphy, national interest, and leadership combined
to produce a certain

policy in external affairs which came to be known
as non-alignment.
The concept of non-alignment may be said to attempt
a harmonious

blend of negative as well as positive elements.

The so-called negative

elements envisage a course of refusal to take sides in any
military lineup of world powers.

This is perhaps the hard core or the irreducible

minimum of non-alignment, and a state would not be recognized to be nonaligned by the non-aligned nations if this condition is not satisfied.

-"-^

Non-alignment was meant to keep away from bipolar ity, the cold war,
ideological crusades, the arms race, and military blocs which were the
chief characteristics of the era following the Second World War.
It is this negative element of non-alignment which has been unduly

emphasized by the West and which has driven many of their scholars to use
the terms "neutrality" and "neutralism."

It would lead to a better un-

13

See Paul F. Power, "Indian Foreign Policy: The Age of Nehru,"
The Review of Politics , Vol. 26, 1964, p. 257.

^^The Cairo Conference, held in October 1964, shows it clearly.
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derstanding if the legal aspects of
this negative element of non-align.
ment were not lost sight of.
Firstly, the neutral states,
neutral in
the traditional legal sense, have
accepted neutrality through, or as
a

consequence of, the provisions contained
in:

(a)

their respective muni-

cipal lavs-either in the constitution
or in the ordinary law of the
land, and (b) international treaties
and agreements.
Thus, the commitment to neutrality in
these traditionally neutral

states continues, irrespective of governmental
changes in them.

The

status of neutrality of Switzerland and Austria,
for instance, remains

everlasting and is not subject to change by
governments.^^
The nature of the commitment of non-alignment
is different; it
«

has no such legal foundations.

Its basis is political.

It can change,

and in fact has changed, with the coming of new
governments.

Secondly, it is argued that keeping non-aligned in a
conflict
is inconsistent with the principle of collective
security as established

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, containing Articles
39 to 51."^^
It is submitted that a couple of factors weaken the validity of

such a contention.

Morgenthau rightly points out that Article 27

(3)

of

the UN Charter provides that the decisions of the Security Council require
the majority of votes, including concurring votes of all the permanent

^^he changes

in the policies of Iran and Iraq are concrete examples

in point.

^%his was argued by Secretary Dulles and many others in the West,
On 9 June 1956, Dulles made his oft-quoted remark which characterized
the policy of non-aligned nations as "obsolete," "immoral," and "shortsighted," and said that the UN Charter abolished such a position. See
New York Times, 10 June 1956, p. 24.
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member.

By making such a provision
the Charter leaves member states

free to exercise their discretion
in case a permanent member
is involved,
such a situation clearly permits
a state to remain aloof or
non-aligned.

Again for making the system of collective
security effective, it is
necessary that agreement or agreements,
specifying several details of
the operational aspect, should be
concluded in terms of Article 43 of

the Charter.

it is notable that no such agreement
or agreements have

been concluded, and in their absence member
states are left free to decide their course of action.

keep apart is permissible.

In both these situations the option
to

Thus what really happened was that the UN

members "embraced the ideal of collective security
and left gaping holes
in its legal fabric.

""^^

When one passes on to the positive elements of the
concept of
non-alignment, the preservation and furtherance of national
interests
appears to be the most important, an effort which has traditionally

been considered to be an object of all international relations.

National

interests of particular country are determined by geopolitical, economic
17

Art. 43 of the UN Charter reads as follows: (1) All members of
the United Nations in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security
Council on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace
and security.
(2) Such agreement or agreements shall govern the number
and types of forces, their degree and readiness and general location and
"
the nature of the faiclities and assistance to be provided
,

18

See Morgenthau, Politics among Nations
(Calcutta: 1966). p. 192.
Later on he makes a very interesting remark saying that the UN Charter
"did not kill neutrality, but rather sentenced it to die, staying in^definitely the execution of the setence.
,
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and other factors obtaining at a particular point of
time.^^

That is

why the elements of national interest change with the
variations in

national and international circximstances

.

In defining national in-

terest the ideology of the leadership of a country perhaps exercises
decisive influence.

The ideas of leaders of the non-aligned nations,

particularly some of their high priests, 20 ^ere shaped by the traditions
of their ancient civilisations as well as by the western liberal educa-

tion in which they had been trained during the formative years of their
This resulted in their taking an enlightened and a broader view

life.

of their national interests.

Therefore in determining their national

interests, they attempted a synthesis of nationalism and internationalism.

This enlightened national interest, then, is the most important aspect
of non-alignment; in fact its service has been considered as the aim

of non-alignment.

Thus the position of non-alignment is that of a

means^l whose end is the fulfillment of national interest.
It is a situation in which Arnold Wolfers' concept of milieu

goals which are pursued when a state formulates its policies in the

existing "shape of environment," instead of attempting to defend or
increase possession they hold to the exclusion of others," has some

^^This explains varying voting behaviour of non-aligned nations on
some issues in the United Nations, a situation towards which some writers
have shown lack of appreciation.

^^For instcince,

NcihrTi,

Nasser, and U Nu.

^^It has been pointed out that "non-alignment is best considered
as a means to achieve the aims, and not as an end in itself." See A.
Appadorai, "The Foreign Policy of India," Foreign Policies in a Changing
World J.E. Black and K.W. Thompson (eds.), (New York: Harper & Row, 1963),
p. 485.
,
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relevance. 22

claude points out that "the concept represents
an invita-

tion to integrate the consideration of national
interest and of inter-

national order, to examine the manner in which
concern for the improve-

ment of the global environment may be fitted into a
state's concern for
its own basic security and welfare. "23

That the concept of non-alignment should vitally
concern itself

with world peace was very natural in view of the development
of nuclear
weapons and the strains between the two block in the early years
of
the postwar period and also in view of its objectives.

India was

convinced that a war would imperil all chances of their development.
Besides Nehru was against the use of force in settling inter state disputes.

What gave added strength to his faith in world peace was his

conviction that progress, which was so essential for banishing poverty
and disease from new nations, was not possible until peace was stabilised,
Thus there was a direct connection between world peace and internal
progress.

rallying

That is why peace and progress became the watchword or the
ciry

of non-alignment.

However, even the non-aligned nations

are no exception to the convulsion of historical interests.

They have

wavered xineasily between the enunciation of principles, which they are
unable, to enforce and the pursuit of national interests, which they

find difficult to justify.

The sponsors of the Band\ang Conferences of

For a discussion see Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962),
Essays on International Politics
:

,

pp. 73-76.

Claude's review article of Wolfers' book in the
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VIII, 1964, p. 296.
^•^See Inis L.
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Afro Asian Nations,

(held in 1955) have become involved
in actions

which do not indicate a high regard for their
own principles.

To quote

a few examples, China's agression against
India in 1962: Indonesia's

involvement in open aggression against her Malaysian
neighbour: U.A.R.'s
conflict with another Arab country, such as in
Yemen.
In view of the economic and technological
backwardness of the

new nations, Nehru, following a policy of non-alignment
hoped for and
secured economic and other types of foreign aid from the
countries of
the two power blocs.

He declared that he would not accept foreign aid

if political strings were attached to it.

The policy of non-alignment

also held that racialism and colonialism, in every shape and form

should be liquidated without further delay, coexistence should be uni-

versally adopted, effective steps should be taken for general and complete disarmament, territorial and political integrity of countries
should be respected, the settlement of international dispute should
be attempted through peaceful means.
The Korean War transformed Indian non-alignment from a verbal

assertion into a global posture which served as an effective instrument
of power.

The necessity for the United States to obtain United Nations

sanctions for its Far Eastern containment policy gave India, as leader
of the so-called Arab-Asian grouping of states a new importcince to the

West by playing a mediative role.

As Indian delegates in the United

Nations increased their countries involvement in the diplomacy of a
global crisis and Nehru maneuvered his government into positions of

mediation between the Soviet and Western coalition, India's non-alignment evolved into a sophisticated means of influencing the decisions
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of other governments.
At the Geneva Conference in 1954 Indian
influence was a re-

cognized though unofficial factor in the
Indo-Chinese settlement, and
India representatives were accorded the
pivotal positions in the Inter-

national control commission teams for Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos.

In

1953 an Indian was named head of an international
commission to super-

vise elections in the Sudan, thereby satisfying
the demands for un-

partiality made by Britain and Egypt.

Indian diplomacy was welcomed

at the time of the London Conference dealing with
Egypt's nationalisation

of the Suez Canal Coit^any and might have helped in bringing
the parties
to a settlement had not Egypt been attacked.

The Bandung conference

of non-aligned countries, held in 1955, was a move initiated by India
to chanalize the resentment in Asia against the S.E.A.T.O. treaty.

India

believed that the presence of the United States in Asia was a grave
threat to peace because it had the power to subvert the governments

of smaller states, set up puppet regimes, and maintain them in power.
The influence which India derived from establishing itself

firmly as a non-aligned state was exerted most effectively on the major

contenders in the bipolar struggle, the United States and the Soviet

Union
India was not tied to the traditional concepts of a foreign

policy designed to safeguard overseas possessions, investments, the
carving out of spheres of influence.
ideologies, at that particular stage.

She was not interested in exporting
In conformity with the objectives

of her policy, India sought friendship with every nation.

She did not

allow past conflicts to impede her new links with Britain within the

35

framework of the Coimonwealth,

The problem of French possessions
in

India, unlike those held by Portuguese,
was solved in a civilized manner

by peaceful negotiations.

India had similar relations with the
Federal

Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic and other

European countries, both east

S

west,

with non-aligned countries in

Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Africa
south of the Sahara, there

existed special understanding and cooperation based
on a common interest
in safeguarding freedom and a common struggle
against colonialism,

neocolonialism, and racialism.

From the end of World War II to the present India's power—
its
ability to influence the politics of other states—has rested
chiefly
on certain intangible bases which are no longer adequate to support
all of its national interests.
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India's prestige which was based

during the past several years, has declined rapidly after the Chinese

military advances of the autumn of 1962.
India's postxire of non-alignment, which achieved its greatest

effectiveness in the 1950s, was not designed with the physical security

of the country chiefly in mind.

Non-alignment as a defense policy

meant that India which refused to take sides might hope to escape involvement in a major war.

India's non-alignment can be compared with

the classical posture of a buffer state.

With the help of the policy,

she maintained an area free from direct great power conflicts.
24

See Charles H. Heimsath, "Nonalignment Reassessed: The Experience
of India, in Hilsman and Good (eds.). Foreign Policies in the Sixties
(Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1970)
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The declines in India's power, signs
of which were noticeable
in the mid-1950s in Southern Asia and the
Himialayan region, reached

alarming proportions by the 1960s.

That decline was most clearly

defined by India's confrontation with China.

In trying to re-establish

some of its lost prestige at home and abroad, the
Indian government

sent its troops into Goa in December 1961, and liberated
her from the
four centries old Portuguese rule.

The Indian government demonstrated

at Goa that it was becoming more concerned with its
prestige, i.e.,

its predictable power, among Asian and African states that with
its

standing in the eyes of the non-Communist west.
India's reliance on outside military aid to defend its own

territory during the Chinese attack in 1962, and Indo-Pak war of 1965,
and 1971 emphasized its weakness

cind

cast doubts on the validity of

non-alignment as an instrument capable of protecting the basic national
interest of self-preservation.

In terms of building military strength

in advance of an attack, India's foreign policy over the previous de-

cade was proved to be almost a total failure only partially offset

by the promises of future military aid from both the United States and
the Soviet union.

Pakistan promptly took advantage of India's diffi-

culties by pressing for a favourable Kashmir settlement.

While failing

in this Pakistan at the same time saw the possibilities of exerting

further pressure on India by negotiating a border agreement

cind

an air-

lines accord with China and by seeking to hinder large-scale military
aid from the United States to India.

During the 1950' s, Indian leaders

had already become complacent about their country's new power position.
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NO vigorous new policies were being
formulated to meet the rapid movement

of China into a position of dominance in
Southern Asia.

India appeared

to be depending on the United States and
the Soviet Union to provide

the force necessary to contain Chinese
ambitions.

Impact of Chinese war on Indian politics

.

The immediate Indian

reaction to the Chinese attack was one of
bewilderment, even though border clashes were going on for three years,
shock and also a feeling of

betrayal which was best expressed in Nehru's own
words.

He told the

Lok Sabha:
It is sad to think that we in India who have
pleaded
for peace all over the world, and who have sought

the friendship of China and treated them with courtesy
and consideration and pleaded their cause in the
councils of the world, should now ourselves be the
victim of a new imperialism and expansionism by a
country which says that it is against all imperialism. ^5

There was soon a recovery in Indo-U.S. relations and in 1962

they reached a new peak with the Sino-Indian border war and the American
readiness to ship small arms.

However, the Indians soon discovered that,

while the Americans were ready to assure India with air support against
any large scale invasion by China, they were ready neither to supply
it with modern supersonic jet fighters, which they made available to

Pakistan, nor move importantly to help India set up its own defense

industry to produce such sophisticated weaponry itself.
The United States was prepared to be India's military protector,

with the necessary complementary acceptance by India of being an American

Publications Division, New
J. Nehru, We Accept China's Challenge
(New Delhi:
Delhi, quoted in S.P, Varma, Struggle for the Himalayas
Delhi University Publisher, 1965) , p. 184.
,

,
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Client or protectorate, but was
not ready to help India
establish the
wherewithal to become an independent
centre of power.
The immediate effect of the War
of 1962, however, was to call
into question the basic tenets
of India's foreign policy.
Criticism
was strong in the country and in
the Parliament. Nehru himself
said
that India had been living in an
unreal world, and that "we are
growing
too soft and taking things for granted.
But he clung tenaciously
to the old lines of policy: "We are
not going to give up our basic

principles because of our present difficulties."^^

A Western observer,

A.M. Rosenthal, noted the spirit of the
country at the time in the fol-

lowing words
For years and perhaps decades to come the fact
that
on the morning of October 20, 1962, Chinese Communist
forces moved with power and planning into northern
reaches of the country that had lived the dream that
could never happen, will affect the thought and
destiny of India. So much has been happening since
October 20, so many attitudes are in process of
change that it seems sometimes that what went on
before in India is part of a different world and
different age. Time and events are racing through
the historical camera in India, changing the way
men think and act... The reel may slow and even may
become stuck fast for a while, but it seems impossible for the moment that it will even move
backward, that the lessons of the attack will be
forgotten, that India will ever be as she was before
28
October 20, 1962
The heaviest attack came in the Lok Seibha (the lower house of
Parliament) by the conservative Swatantra Party for the neglect of the

1964)

,

°J. Nehru's Speeches, Vol.
p. 230.

27ibid.

,

IV,

(New Delhi: Government of India,

p.

28New York Times, 17 November 1962.
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basic national interest of security.

n.G. Ranga, the President of the

party, appealed for large-scale military
aid from the United States.

"HOW are we to become strong/' he demanded,
"if we hang on to this non-

alignment?... Non-alignment has not served
us, and does not serve us
any longer.

The sooner we get rid of this the better. "^^

Mr. B.N. Singh, another member, argued
that for a militarily

weak country like India who could not even safeguard
its territorial
integrity, non-alignment was a "deception. "

Another argument advanced

by many members in favour of alignment was India's
financial inability
to pay for the arms.

It was thus suggested that India should get
free

aid through military alliance. 31

Strong sections of opinion in the country favoured carrying the

war to the finish with China.

People like J. P. Narayan and C. Raja

Gopalachari were against negotiations until the "last Chinese soldier
had left the Indian soil."

For the purpose they pleaded strengthening

India by whatever means possible, including all out aid from the West."^^

Disillusionment with non-alignment in the country was also caused

by the failure of the non-aligned Afro-Asian nations
had championed for so long

1962,

— to

— whose

cause India

give her any material or even moral sup-

^^Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. LX, Nos. 1-6, Nov. 8-14,
(New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat), Cols. 158-159.
^°Ibid., Col. 489,
31cSee

Frank Anthony's speech in the Lok Sabha

,

ibid., Col. 201.

-JO

Quoted in S.P, Varma, Struggle for the Himalayas
Delhi University Publisher, 1965) p. 184.
,

,

(New Delhi;
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port in her hour of need.
need ^3

p^-^
Referring to the Failure
of India's non.

alignment policy in this
respect, Frank stated
bitterly:

Non-alignment under the orientation
we have given
xt has proved under the
impact of war to be
xllusxon... which has been
dissipated by the Srst
gust Of the breath of war....
^at are the

^

fSts

is

hosLle,

.epal^^Se^-™^^

Asian countries which we
^""^
nfttered' ourselves were following
flattered
our fine
peculiar way subsc^hir/^''^
^'•f'*
""""^M
scribed to non-alignment.
34

Non-alignment was further said to
have lost its

raison d'etre
in the seeming failure of
the Soviet Union to support
India initially.
In fact, in the beginning
it appeared to be taking a
pro-Peking line.

Russian advice to India not to
accept Western military aid and
conduct
negotiations with the Chinese
unconditionally came under heavy assault
as proof of Russian "betrayal."
Mr. Anthony charged in the
parliament
that China being the Soviet Union's
only major ally, in a final crisis
the Russians will "pull the carpet
from under us. "35

Even though greatly dismayed by China's
action, Nehru personally

did not allow himself to be swayed by
these popular sentiments.

In

spite of the upsurge of emotion all over
the -country, of excitement and

33According to a New York Times report, out of
the sixty AfroAsian nations to whom India had presented
her case and sought support,
only 26 had given full moral support, and
only Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia
and Lebanon had branded China as an aggressor.
Nine others expressed
sympathy and seven had merely expressed their concern
and suggested
ways of resolving -dispute. Three remained
uncommitted and the rest did
not reply. New York Times 22 January 1963
.

34Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit,

35ibid., Col. 194.

,

Col. 194,
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a.,er. He was able to

^i«ain ccpos...

a.a oonna.nce.

He „as wUXin,
to go to great lengths to
establish friendship with
the West but not
at the cost Of
„e was not ready to give
up faith and
friendship of the Soviet Union.

non-ali„.

g^iPectancy of a re-orientatio n
of India's ool .V.

It was commonly believed in this country
that the shock of the
invasion and what
appeared to most Americans a
demonstration to India of the
validity of
their view of the world's major
problems will bring about a
change in
India's policies, especially
her non-alignment. The
American press
made such categorical statements:

Nehru cannot shun and oppose
indefinitely the Western
system of collective security
without forfeiting its
protection. A free ride for Nehru
on the back of
Neutralism would be grossly unfair to
SEATO countries
and others that have staked their
treasure in the collective security system. The Prime
Minister of India
could alter the course of history and
give the freedom of mankind an enduring impetus
by acknowledging
that his theory of neutralism has
been proved by time
and events to be impractical and
dangerous, by renouncing neutralism, by joining the
collective
security system of the free world and
urging other
neutrals to do likewise before it is too
late. 36
The first step considered essential in
this direction was the

removal of Menon who had become in American
eyes the symbol of all anti-

Western policies of India.
as a surprise to many.

The subsequent statements of Nehru, came

The best exposition of this view can be found

in a dispatch from New Delhi by Rosenthal.

Writing under the title,

"Nehru's Two Battles" he said:

India's policy in a day to day practice was a three36 philadelphia Inquirer
6 November 1962.
South Asia and United States Policy p. 268.
,

,

Quoted in N. Palmer,
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Legged stool,

ivo legs are gone...
the belief
'^^^
the
belief
that TIndia
i""^ could
defend herself without
aid
from the west. Now the
Prime Minister te^Jers
leg... the hope that one
day the
sL- . union
n^^''
Soviet
will be able to shake off
its
commitments to Peking and back
India.
This
hope has produced some
strange, and to
Westerners and many Indians,
disturbing political acrobatics on the
part of Mr. Nehru.
"^^^ ^° ^^^^
difference
d;;^ between the
drawn
Soviet Union and the United
States
It hurts to see a man who
announced
the end of his illusions
cling so hard to the
dream that Communism itself
is of no importance. ^7
However, most of Nehru's
"acrobatics" were explained by
Rosenthal
and others as the result of
his own personal convictions
which others
in India did not^share: "Prime
Minister's wistful attachment to
the
soviet union doe^ not reflect
the real temper of the country
nor remove
the fact that Peking's attack
forever changed the psychology and
posture
of India. "-^^

According to others, India's policy of
non-alignment was believed
to have been wrecked "militarily
if not politically...." "ultimately
if

India is to continue to function as
a huge, non-Communist "show case"
in Asia, it will need more foreign
aid to compensate for the diversion of
its capital into building a war machine."

The real rationale of non-

alignment has been that India could exist
without the vast arms expenditure that staggers so many "underdeveloped
countries ... that is now a thing

of the past."-^^
37

New York Times

,

1

November 1962.

^^Ibid.
39 Daily News

(N.

Car.), quoted in New York Times ,

2

December 1962.
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These views we.e based
on two assumptions, i.e.,
the Soviet
union haa .o.sa^en India and
that exposure of India.s
^Xita^ weakness
had caused the non-aligned
nations also .enunciate
he., and thus we.e
said to have vanished all
hex "pretensions to the
leadership of the
third world... The real
indication of the collapse of
India's non-ali^ment, however, was regarded
to be the failure of the
Soviet Union to
support her cause, it was
believed that the basis of
„uch of India's
foreign policy was the hope
that in a conflict with China,
the Soviet
union would support her. This
cherished hope was said to have
been
destroyed in the crisis of 1962.40
The American press gave extensive
coverage to the Soviet Union's
inability to give explicit support
to India in the initial
stages of the

crisis and what was viewed as the
resulting disappointment in New
Delhi.
These were meant to be implications
of Indians as to where their real

friends were.

Both the context and content of
India's non-alignment

had changed after 1962.
M.S. Rajan held the view that
non-alignment is essentially a

peacetime policy (even though Nehru told the
Congress Paliament Party

meeting that non-alignment was

as good during war as during peace)

During a war, according to him, a nation is
necessarily though not always
formally aligned with those who help it morally
and materially and like-

wise aligned against the nation

with which it is at war.

Thus while

India was still unaligned between "blocs," it was
aligned against China
40 New York Times
'

,

30 October 1962.
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and with the United States
in her conflict with
the former.^^
"

Dual alig nment" with Washing... ...

^^^^.^^

conflict With China, Indian
non-alignment had a pro-Soviet
bias and
to a large extent this was
because Pakistan was a
long-time adversary
Of India and an ally of the
United States. Now that China
had emerged
as a more formidable enemy,
there was a shift in Indian
non-alignment
in favour of Washington without
moving away from Moscow, who not
only
continued to give active support
against China, even though initially
the soviet attitude seemed pro-Chinese.
The Christian Scien.. Mon.-...

best described this new power alignment
graphically: "china more adament
toward MOSCOW and belligerent towards
India; Moscow more eager to
hedge towards India; India more amenable
towards the West."^^

Shastri era . There are realities in the
national and international
societies conditioning foreign policies to
such an extent that radical
changes in their content and methods becomes
virtually impossible.

The

Shastri era was therefore distinguished from
the Nehru era not so much
by radical innovations in foreign policy as
by the further development

of trends whose origin could be traced in many
cases to the last years
of Nehru's regime.

To some extent continual adherence to the so-called

policy of non-alignment in both eras obscured alterations
in the substance of India's foreign policy.

But under the impact of events and

41 M.S.

Rajan, "Chinese Aggression and the Future of India's Nonalignment Policy," International Studies p. 128.
,

42

"Strained Triangle," Christian Science Monitor , 13 Nobember 1962.

Werner Levi, "Foreign Policy: The Shastri Era," Eastern World
(London: September-October 1966)
pp. 3-6.
,

.

,

45

oppositions criticism, as well as some questioning
even within Congress
circles, doubts had arisen in official minds
regarding the quality or

usefulness of the non-alignment policy.

Throughout the Shastri era non-

alignment was stripped of its missionary connotations.
in a more modest geographic context.

It was applied

The government implied that the

improvement and fostering of good bilateral relations
with nations in
the region of south and southeast Asia was more
important than a great

expenditure of efforts on global and collective relationships.

And

within two months of his appointment as Minister of External
Affairs,
Swaran Singh visited Afghanistan, Nepal, Burma, Ceylon,
and other neighbours.

Many Indians expressed their conviction that it would be more

important for India to take care of immediate national interests than
of the world's moral welfare.
involvement.

Non-alignment tended to turn into non-

Foreign policy needs were not allowed to interfere with

internal economic developments, the scope of foreign policy was reduced
further.

India was satisfied being No.

2

during the Shastri period.

This presumably meant loss of international status, but made India's

foreign policy more realistic.

Policy changes in the sixties and seventies

.

Throughout the

sixties and early seventies, the pattern of international relations

changed profoundly.

Its most significant aspects were the substantial

lessening of tensions between the two super powers, and a loosening of
ties

within the two alliances.

The emergence of China as an independent

and undoubtedly major power made it even more difficult for the non-

aligned countries to adjust to the great changes introduced by the

detente and the ensuing local and regional disturbances.

China has now
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risen from the ranks of the less developed covintries, and has now in
a sense defected from the group she once belonged to.

The East-West detente brought hesitation and discord into the

camp of non-aligned countries.

They realized they were no longer need-

ed as the promoters of the detente; indeed they suffered from its

becoming a reality, and were frequently the background of new clashes.
After the Indo-Pak conflict in 1965, there was once again a
demand for a thorough reapparaisal of the Indian Foreign policy.

As

a resTilt of the war all economic and military aid was suspended.

Eco-

nomic aid from America was renewed but has been diminishing.

Military

aid denied for about eight to nine years, is being replaced by trade.

During the 1971 South Asian crisis, the United States took an obvious

pro-Pakistan position.

The Jan Sangh party was more than enthusiastic

about friendly relations with the United States.
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However, the other

parties including the congress argued that the United States failed to

understand the delicate relations between India and Pakistan.

According

to them if anything has plagued Indo-US relations it has been the

American bais in favour of Pakistan.

The Jan Sanghees viewed the

postponement by the U.S. government of signing fresh agreements for
another two years under PL-480 in 1965, as due to political as well
as economic reasons.

They believed that Pl-480

ad.d

was also being

utilized for political leverage. They thought economic aid was being
utilized to pressurize India into submission on the Kashmir issue.
The Jan Sangh party even blame the PL-480 imports for the subsequent

'^'^Kishore,

Jan Sangh and India's Foreign Policy, op.cit.
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neglect of .,ri=uXtu.e
in successive plans,

.s a .esult

P.-480

x^orts, Wheat crops haa
.eco.e un«..ne.ative
an. .a^e.s ha. tu^ea
to cash crops.

India could have attained
cainea self
.„ff
self-sufficiency
much earlier
according to them if this
was not so. "5

Non-ali^ent

in . ch.nnin ^context.

.on-alignment is a unigue

diplomatic Phenomenon, and has
a great power of
adaptability,
since
the Signing of the
Indo-Soviet Treaty of friendship
in 1971, critics
have reason to Relieve that
India is no longer non-aligned.
The nature
Of the alliance between the
two countries, is so
vague, that it produced
conflicting interpretations and
unnecessary confusion.^
whether nonalignment survives the treaty
depends upon what one means
by non-alignment.
in the early sixties, the
Soviet and American interests
began
to converge on the Indian
subcontinent.

Responding to the China stimuli,

the united States and Russia
began to worJc for stability on
the subcontinent; instability they felt
would work to china s advantage
The
•

.

united States lost much of its
earlier enthusiasm for the Pakistani
case
on Kashmir and the Soviet Union
began to discourage the strong Indian
belief that she could ignore Pakistan's
interest in the Kashmir problem. ^7
The united States pressures too,
if any, were towards a bilateral
solution.
The stability which was hoped for
did not follow,

instead China stepped

Ibid.
46
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into the Shoes of the united
states and played the role
of big brother
to Pakistan. «hen President
Yahya Khan launched his offensive
in East
Bengal, the Soviet Union had to
choose between India and Pakistan
to
balance off peace on the subcontinent.
This brought to an end a phase
of soviet diplomacy which was
irksome to India, and a great
irritant in
indo-soviet relations. This was the
phase when the Soviet Union was
trying to win leverage in Pakistan.
•

In signing the treaty the two
countries showed a dramatic sense

of opportunity.

The treaty says that "if either country
is subjected

to an attack, the two countries will
immediately enter into consultations
to remove the threat."

By Article X India and the Soviet
Union under-

took to abstain from "providing any assistance"
to any third party that
engages in armed c6nflict with the other party.

Soviet assistance to

Pakistan can therefore be treated as having come to
an end.

They also

agreed not to enter into any obligations with any
other country which
is not compatible with the treaty.

The present situation was brought about due to lack of
diplomatic

options on India's part.

In the fifties India's non-alignment brought

her closer to Russia as a counter-poise to Pakistan's alliance
with
America.

The situation was further reinforced in the sixties after

the Sino-Indian War when expected American military assistance for
defense build-up did not materialize.

The Soviet Union willingly agreed

to help build up India's defense structures.

More recently the emerging

US-China equation showed a remarkable identity of power objectives in
the Bangladesh crisis.

China was rather inactive throughout the crisis.

There was very marginal reaction.

India was therefore left with no
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options, but to secure Soviet
soviet political
doHH^=i support and
deterrence by
entering into a treaty relationsip
with her.

While China^s hostility
towards India is an accepted
fact,
A^nerica-s indifference had
continued to annoy and
exasperate Indians.
India's reaction to ;^erican
indifference has had en»tional
overtones;
this has been reflected in
the campaign against the
alleged CIA involve.^ent in India's internal
and external politics.
India was particularly
sensitive to M,erican attempts
to undermine Indo-Bangladesh
friendship.
It was argued that China and
the US

(focus was

^r.

.on

the OS) were

acting in concert, both internally
and externally, to wea].en
India with
a view to depriving her of the
new political stature that she
had achieved.
The Sino-OS equation was therefore
depriving India of alternative political options, and seemed to corrode
India's internal body politics,

by raising the fear of CIA interference
in India's domestic political
activities
However, such overt dependence on the
Soviet Union does not

square with India's own political aspirations
as a potentially great
power.

Therefore, following Bangladesh's liberation,
India's official

statement tended to play in a low key the theme
of Indo-Soviet friendship.

She also reiterated her desire to establish
normal relations

with China and the United states.
Indira Gandhi has on several occasions stated categorically
that India has not abandoned her policy of non-alignment.

The ex-

foreign Minister Mr. Swaran Singh had repeatedly asserted that
the

treaty explicitly recongnizes and appreciates India's policy of nonalignment; to him therefore non-alignment remains fully intact.
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The Indo-Soviet Treaty was a quick
response to changes in the
global environment.

alignment

33

The treaty, while exposing the
irrelevance of non-

policy, has sharply brought out its
relevance as a strategy,

in fact, that is what it has always

been-a strategy, or in other words,

a rationale, for a policy rather than
a policy in itself.

The strategy

of non-alignment emphasized the independence
of policy right from the
beginning.

Politically this was the only choice open to
countries which

had been under colonial domination.

However many non-aligned countries

failed to maintain their independence because they
were slow to develop
themselves.

For economic development they had to depend on aid
from

the developed world, and as such they increasingly came
under the in-

fluence of those powerful countries from whom they wanted to
keep aloof.

Non-alignment as strategy is not too relevant for a small country, for
its security always remains a function of the international system.

When the international system develops hegemonial conflicts and imbalances, the security of small countries is threatened.

Asia does not exist as a homogeneous whole.

ethnically Asia is diverse.
group.

another.

China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam form one

Malaysia, the' Phillipines, Singapore, and Indonesia fall into
Laos, Cambodia and Thailand form part of yet another group.

India could form the nucleus of another group.
.

Emotionally and

^.

.

Af ghcinistan

,

If India, Pakistan '

Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon could form a unit

and work together, there is a chance that the region may have political

stability and accelerated economic development.

Even in this U.S.

economic aid would be necessary.
At no time since 1955, Nehru's policy of non-alignment excluded
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India ..o. ..vin, specUl

Powe.

poUUcaX

relations with one

the othe.

What wa. speci.icaXi,
e.i..ea «as he. havin,
^peci.i.

^uta^

respect of the confXiot
in West Asia (lse7,
or in vietna.. o„ the
fo^e. xndia supported the
.ra. countries in the
United Nations on
the ground that Israel
had taken the initial step
in opening ar^ed
conflict. With respect to
Vietnam, India always
thought that the US
.ust unconditionally halt
the boding in North
Vietnam,
it was ™ade
quite Clear in Ooa (1961,,
in the China War ,1962,,
the Indo Pa. War
(1965), and in the Bangladesh
aesn crxsis
Crisi«? nci7iN
^
y
(1971), that
non-alignment had
little to do with neutrality.
While global strategies and
regional perceptions are important
moulders of the foreign policy
of every country, in the United
States
the President's personal
views and predilections also
can be intensely
Significant. Kennedy was perhaps
the only American President who
wanted
to divorce aid from politics.
He held the view that aid flows
should
be independent of foreign policy
considerations. The State Department
had viewed aid as an instrument
or foreign policy. Johnson used
aid to
pressure countries for support on
Vietnam and so did Nixon. After the
Kennedy era, aid took more the form
of loans than grants.
Change and continuity in America: foreign
Like other
p nUny
countries, America has a particular way
of perceiving the world and a

corresponding "operational code," which
constitutes its "national style. "^^
47

^^^^^^^^^^

analysis of the American style may be found in
Hans
(New York: Alfred
Ideals and Self-interest in America's

T
M
J.
Morgenthau
xn D efense of the National Interest
A. Knopf, 1951); Robert E. Osgood,

.
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-e.ica„ fo.ei^ poXi=,

,3 .asea on ..e

.ssu^.,on that the „a„„«
i„

whicH poXi=.-:^..3 see
t.e wo.X. an. aeane
..ei. ai. ,3 aec.aed
within
the framework of a nation's
political culture. ;^erican
policy, li,,
Indian policy, derives fro.
a set of attitudes
towards international
politics, washington-s policy
has been influenced by
the values, beliefs,
and historical experience
of American democracy.
For almost a century, the
US isolated itself from
the quarrels
Of the great European powers
and devoted itself to domestic
tasks. Selfquarantine was the best way to
prevent the nation from being
soiled and
tainted by Europe's undemocratic
domestic institutions and foreign
policy
behaviour.
Given such a profound inward
orientation, the United states
turned its attention to the outside
world only when it felt provoked.
Long-range involvement, commitments,
and foreign policy planning therefore tended to be difficult.
,

The American attitude was further
characterized by a high degree

of moralism and missonary zeal stemming
from the nation's long consideration of itself as a unique and morally
superior society.

The United

States was the world's first democracy
committed to the improvement of
the life of the common man.

However inspite of her zeal, pragmatism has

dominated American policy,

it has been part of the nation's experience

that when problems arose, they were to be
solved by whatever means were
at hand.
U.S. identification of Russia as an enemy was
partly the result of

Russian actions in Europe and elsewhere.

U.S. attitudes affected U.S.

Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1953); Kennan,
American Diplomacy 1 900-1950 and Spanier, American Foreign Policy
;

.
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behaviour patterns only after
n^i-^^r, had
^ .
y rrer the nation
become so engaged in the
war against communism.
Once that
"la;: nad
had occurred,
occnr-r-«H
u
however, American moralism was transformed into
=^4.- ^
mim-;^n+militant anti-Communism.
American policy, for
instance, put off any
political settlement with
Russia until after Communism had "mellowed.-.that
it changed its character,
v,

since Co^unism
was the enemy, then America
has to oppose it
everywhere-at least where

counterbalancing American power
could presumably he effectively
appliedregardless Of Whether the area
to be defended was of
p.i^ary or secondary
interest to U.S. security.
Almost equally indiscriminately,
the United
States supported any
anti-Conununist regime, regardless
of whether it
was democratic~a Franco,
a Chiang Kai-sheic, a Diem or
Thieu, to name

but a few among many. Above all,
the issue of foreign policy
tended to
be posed in terms of a universal
struggle between democracy and
totalitarianism, freedom and slavery.

Thus at the beginning of Cold War,

president Truman stated the issue

in Greece as follows: "Totalitarian

regimes imposed on free people, by
direct or indirect agression, undermine the foundations of international
peace and hence the security of
the united States.

..

"-although Greece, for all its political and
strategic

significance, could hardly be classified
as a democracy.

Presidents

after Truman followed his precedent,
as American commitments became

virtually global.
In the wake of Nationalist China's collapse,
the Truman Admini-

stration was attacked for being "soft on Communism."

The subsequent

conduct of the Korean war provides a good example
of the influence of

anti-Communism upon foreign policy.

Truman could not sign an armistice

that accepted the pre-war partition of Korea,
for this would allegedly
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represent that North Korea was lost to
communism a peace without victory
and would mean risking a Democratic defeat
in the coming 1952 Presidential Election.

Truman was trapped.

He could not extend the war without

risking greater escalation, casualties and costs,
nor could he end the
war.

The continuing and frustrating battlefield
stalemate was a major

factor in the Republican victory in 1952.

Only President Eisenhower,

who as a war hero could hardly be accused of being an
appeaser, could
sign a peace accepting the division of Korea.
Similarly, when in 1960 it became popular "to stand up to

Castro," presidential candidate Kennedy dr^atized his anti-Comm\inism

with vigorous attacks on Castro and suggestions that the Cuban "freedom
fighters be allowed to invade Cuba."

When he came into office, he found

that the Eisenhower Administration had been planning what he had advocated.

Despite his own later uneasy feelings about the CIA-planned and

sponsored invasion, he felt he could not call it off.

So with some

changes, he permitted the operation to proceed despite misgivings that

turned out to be correct.

It was a hvimiliating personal and national

experience for the Administration and, ironically, left Kennedy vulnerable to the accusation that he was unwilling to stand up to the Communists

because he would not use American forces to eliminate Castro.

Thus,

as the situation in Vietnam proceeded to worsen later in 1961, it is

not surprising that the President would introduce American military
"advisors," particularly when the Bay of pigs had been quickly followed

by inaction at the time of the erection of the Berlin Wall, and, in
Laos, by the agreement to form a coalition government.

An additional result of the fear of Communism was the patho-
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logical domestic proportions it reached.

"Reds" were seen not only in

government but in the universities, labor
unions, churches-everywhere.

Communism was portrayed as an all-powerful
demonic force seeking to
subvert and destroy the American way of
life.
In view of these happenings, it is not
surprising that critics

of America's most agonizing war, the Vietnam
War, see the American inter-

vention in terms of this continued anti-Communism,
even though the bi-

polarity of the Cold War days has passed.

^^^^ policy-makers char-

acteristically regarded the Vietnam war as essentially a
"military" war
in which superior firepower and helicopter mobility would
enable America
to destroy enemy forces.

The political aspects of the war, above all

the basic land reforms needed to capttire the support of the
peasantry,

were by and large ignored, and therefore no South Vietnamese GoYemment
.

could win popular support.

Indiscriminate use of air power and artillery

fire, which destroyed many southern hamlets, did little to help create

the peasant support needed to win a counter revolutionary war.

Instead

of examining the political reasons indigenous to South Vietnam, the

policy-makers told themselves that the reason it could not be won was

primarily military.

Thus the optimistic faith that, with America's

i

great power and missionary zeal, it could improve the world was replaced
by a mood of disillusionment in the wake of the Vietnam War.
The concept of a bipolar world and the iron curtain so sedulously fostered by Washington in the 1950 's and 1960 's has been replaced

by that of a multi-polar power structure and co-existence.

The United

48
For some recent criticisms of American "globalism," see Fullbright,
Arrogance of Power Edmund Stillman and William Plaff, Power and Impotence
;

,
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states has had to give up its
t„o-decade old efforts to
contain the
soviet union and China behind
a .ilitazy shield and co:^
to ter^ with
them.

The pattern of multi-polarity
that Washington itself has
encouraged to emerge has deprived
it of some of its earlier
ability to

manipulate world politics all by
itself,

,

it now requires the concur-

rence of MOSCOW before it can
act effectively, as was
demonstrated in
the crisis in west Asia in October,
1973.
In south Asia the United
States found itself unable to act
effectively in the war between India
and Pakistan, in 1971, except within
the larger pattern of the detente
with the Soviet Union.
The United States wanted to create
its own balance of power

and tried to make the small nations of
Asia believe that without U.S.
support, they would become pawns in the
power game of the Soviet Union

and China.

It believed that -the American presence
alone provided" the

cementing common link in this fragmented region/^
and warned that if

pulled out of Asia, disunity, weakness, and insecurity
would follow.
The criticisms frequently leveled against the
contemporary

role of the United States in the international
state system seem to
focus on the charge that the nation remains

system— that
of behaviour.

is,

unsocialized by that

it has not yet internalized the state system's norms

The United States still has not learned that it not

ominpotent; nor has it given up its moralizing and crusading habits.
(new York: Vintage Books, 1967).
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Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia, McGraw Hill
Book Co., New York, 1968, p. 154.
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Meaning the U.N. Charter.
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It

si^l, .oes

Have the .esou.ces

to support extensive ,o.ei^ .o^it^ents
ana .eet p.essin,
ao^.tic neea..
vUtna.
seen as a tragic product
of an inaiscri.inate
anti-Co^unis. that
has led the nation to
over-extend i«elf
itself . It IS
i =
,
also
seen as a soberin, experience that will
result in the reduction
of ^erican co^it^nts,
a concentration on urgent
ao:„estic problem., and.
generally, a ™ore
restrained international
behaviour.
In brief, the United
states will
finally be socialized,"
shedaing eootional preaispositions
and patterns
Of behaviour derived froa
its long abstention fromthe state system.

-

ae

united States, as we suggestea
earlier, is essentially
an inwara-orientea society
that concentrates on domestic
affairs and
welfare issues and considers
foreign policy burdensome and
distracting.
Therefore in order to arouse the
public to support external ventures,
the struggle for power and
security endemic in the state
system haa to
be aisguisea as a struggle for
the realization of the highest
values.

Because, from the beginning of its
existence, the Unitea states has
felt itself to be a post-European
society-a New Worla standing as a

shining example of democracy,
free.dom, ana social justice for the
Old
^'^°qance of Pow^-, steel. Pax American a: Eugene
J
f^^"^^**'
McCarthy,
^e^imit^^f_Power. (New York: Hol t, Rinehart a^d Winston,'
<Balti:»re: The .ohn^
H:p,:iL^res^":6:;.'"='"'
"""^
power to have over-extended
)^.=,f °',^°"f"'-'^*
Itself.
The British acted that way for many years,
therench wasted
many years in Vietnam and Aleria when they
could not afford it. Portugal,
Netherlands and Spain, also had their colonies
in Asia and monarchies
at home, the Dnited tates was aifferent in
the sense it was a aemocraoy,
and always gave the image of being a great
champion of freedom.
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«or.a-..,.e„..

^„
^^^^^^^^^^^

••Powe.

pontics"
The

«ai

.is^uisin, it as ..iaeoXo,i.al
politics
test of ^.iea's
international
.ole has

con,e

-3
afte.

Vietnam.

»,.n po„e. politics was
s.nony:.us with ideological
politics
was easy to
a leade. ana o.^ani.e
various coalitions whose
.asic
task was to push bac.
when pushed. One of the
features of the postVietna. ^od, incorporating
the demand of "no „«=re
Vietnam," i^ the
Nixon, or Gua» Ooctrine.
The United States, .ixon
declared, would
regain a Pacific Power
safeguarding Asia's peace.
It would do so by
fulfilling its existing
con^itMents, but these would
not be interpreted
in a :»anner justifying
the use of force to suppress
don^stic rebellion.
The best defense against
insurgency was to in^leaent
preventive political and econo^c reform;
nevertheless, if internal revolts
occurred,

-

the united States would
provide ^terial and technical
assistance and
training for governments it dee,«d
worthy of help. Asian nations
would
be helped econo,„ically to
i^dernize the^nselves (although no
large contributions were promised) and
encouraged toward greater regional
collective security arrangements.
In short, the principal responsiblity
for Asian development and
security would rest with the Asians
themselves.

But this more modest role, or
"lower profile" as it came to be called,
was not limited to Asia. It applied
also to Latin America-where policy
53

J.H. Hulzinga, "America's Lost
Innocence," The New York Times
^SSSiSe, 26 January 1969, perceptively analyzes the problems confrontting the United States once it can no
longer disguise "power politics."
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Shifted away fro. the Alliance
for Progress ux.Oer
African leadership
to a "partnership" role,
which emphasized help primarily
through giving
the southern part of the
henusphere tariff preferences
(if Congress

.greed)-had to Western Europe-where
n»re military self-reliance
was
stressed.

The 1970s would then undoubtedly
bring a significant reduction
Of American troop strength.

By the time Nixon came to power,
a new initiative in Asia
had
become imperative, il^ough Nixon had
earlier indulged in witchhunting
communists, he recognized the realities
of the U.S. weakness in Asia.
For the sake of saving face, for
disengaging from the disastrous war
with north Vietnam, and for creating a
counterweight to the Soviet Union,
he required the friendship of China.

The main thrust of the U.S. policy

in Asia in the 1970s had been to seek
accomodation with China, balance

the power of the Soviet Union and Japan,
and maintain a dominant role
for the United States. Washington believes
that in Asia in the decade

of 70s, there would be a quadrilateral balance
hinged on the United
States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan.

Another symptom of the new mood of playing a more
limited
foreign policy role was the greater attention to be
given to the

nation's domestic problems.

Symbolic of this conflict was the new

found unwillingness of the Senate to let only programs labelled
"defense" pass unchallenged or to spend billions of dollars on weapons

when many Senators felt the money could be better spent curing America's
ills.

A change in American behaviour is thus the remedy.

If America

abandons its cinti-Communism, and Rxissia could abandon its anti-capitalism
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there Will be no need for
Cold Wars, interventions,
large military
budgets.
Of What utility would
this prescription .e if,
i,
China Should attaok India,
penetrating Indian territory
deeply, of
What use is a reminder of
^^erica's limited power if,
in the continuing
Arab-Israeli military conflict,
the Soviets come increasingly
to the
help Of the Arabs-perhaps helping
them someday to defeat the
Israelis
and Of course, even if America and
Russia were not ideologically
motivated, they would just by
reason of being great powers,
militarily,
compete with each other, and have
big defense budgets.
If the united states now contracts
its overseas position,

whetherin the Far East or Middle East
or even in Europe, and leaves
one or more power vacuums, the
results for the continued stability
of
the international system are, at
the very least debatable.

Can it thus

continue to play a major role in
stabilizing the state system after

Vietnam?-that

is the question.

As a power socialized by the state

system, the United States seems to remain
haunted by its past,

in this

sense, America and Russia face identical
problems.

Nixon initiated a new dialogue with Peking
in 1972.

At one

time it was Washington's deep concern for
Pakistan that had kept India

low in U.S. priorities, and now it was
Washington's desire to edge

towards China that made India a secondary concern.
lai had agreed to work for a detente in Asia.

Nixon and Chou En-

Nixon even claimed that

the week he was in Peking "was the week that changed
the world. "54

The China-U.S. accord did not solve Asia's problems.
54

The Times of India

,

January 28, 1973.

Of course it
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a,o„v Of the Viet„a.ese
peop.e.The U.S. .ialo^e
with china aX.o helped

not ena the aggressive
U.S. presence in Asia,

it was after the aetente came into beinq
ng that thf»
c
the n
U.S.
navy expanded its
operations in
the Indian Ocean.

Conclusion
India's policy of non-alignment
did have its advantages,
even
though it was never intended
to compensate for a military
policy,
military terms it brought the
distinct advantage of leaving
open the
possiblity of assistance from both
the great powers.
Besides non-alignment provided the re-inforcement
by the great powers of Indian
economic
and political objectives. During
the past several years India has
been
reappraising its international role.
While the goals of non-alignment
and world stature continue to
dominate the rhetoric and many of the

m

assumptions behind Indian thinking, a
new awareness of India's role as
a potential trading partner and
middle power in Southern Asia is emerging.
.

United States rapproachement with the
USSR and China has led to

great policy changes within the United
States.

The fact that Indo-

American relations have been characterized
by sharp fluctuations rather
than consistent hostility or cooperation
suggests that the two country's

policies towards each other have been primarily
influenced by other
concerns, which their governments regarded as
more important.

Each has

had different perceptions of the key issues in world
affairs.

A newly

independent India placed a high priority on anti-colonialism,

whereas
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.p... o. co^un...

^^^^

^^^^

was however in the (aAr-i-;«^
earlier years looking
for areas of agreement
^ -uui
with
Moscow and Peking.

^

inaia also ha. its

o™

national interests to
pursue on sue.

issues as Kas.^.,
^^^^^^^^^^^

-rai

^

^^^^

rhetoric.

The Unitea States viewed
Znaian forei^ poii.,
as
pretentious and hypocritical.

conflicting approaches to
the Midaie East and
Southeast Asia
.ight have been surmounted
if the United states
had not extended its
alliance polic. to the
subcontinent.
Indians were furious with
Eisenhower
and Dulles for providing
:„ilitary aid to Pakistan.
The „«i„tenance of
the alliance over the
years despite Pakistan's
growing co-operation
with Peking, culminating in
the American action during
the 1971 crisis,
have led a growing number
of Indians to believe that
the primary aim
Of the united States to
prevent India's emergence as
a major power,
'

aey

grant that the United States
does not want to see India
collapse,
least the Soviet Union of
China take advantage of the ensuing
power
vacuum.
U.S. policy towards India
is that she must be protected,
but
not allowed to develop the
strength to protect itself. American
un-

willingness to provide direct help
for the heavy industrial facilities

designed to promote India's economic
dependence, is cited as evidence,
inaia's suspicion of U.S. policies
towaras Pakistan, China ana the Soviet
union on the one hand, ana the American
dislike of India's closeness to

soviet Union (and ironically her earlier
closeness to China) on the
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other hand have contributed
the .est towards dividing
the two countries.
Americans consider these
arguments as based on an
incredibly
inflated view of India's
importance.
Indo-A.erican clashes during
the
struggle over Bangladesh are
the :nost obvious, but
there are others
as well.
For example, in the mid-1960s,
Mrs. Gandhi accepted the
argument Of the world Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and
the United
States that devaluation of the
rupee, in coxnbination with
economic
liberalization and increased American
aid, would pull India out
of its
economic difficulties. At some
political risks, Mrs. Gandhi
devalued
the rupee, only to be told by
an America which bogged down
in Vietnam
and less interested in economic
development that it could not provide
the aid it had led India to expect.
Such disappointments, together with
the American suspension

of military aid after the 1971
Indo-Pakistani War, led many Indians to
conclude that their country should look
to a more reliable Soviet
Union for support.
relative disinterest

Moscow's need for a counterweight to China
and its
-in

important trade partner.

Pakistan make it a dependable ally, and an
The Nixon and Ford Administrations believe

that a working relationship with Peking is much
more important than
any American interest in the subcontinent.

Some officials think

that this requires the United States to keep in step
with Chinese

hostility towards India by paralled support of Pakistan.
Only in the area of economic development has there been
sustained

Indo-American co-operation.

The outlook of the two countries on political

issues happens to be different.

Nearly two-thirds

of the aid has come

directly from the United States, whch also provided about one-third of
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.„.i.

sheex.

Unite, states Relieves
in sta.iXit„
^xitax,
strength, and leadership.
Unlike United otates,
States InHH,
India k
has a measure of
tolerance of co^nunis. because
the world =o».unist
powers have been
allies in her anti-colonialis.,
and have consistently
supported her
Stand on many issues like
Kashmir.
The ideological pre-o=cupations
of the cold war and
Washington's
crusade to .ake the ^erican
way of life a universal
«,del are things
Of the past. But the
trans-ideological attitude the
United States has
adopted as an expedient has
not ^de the global kaleidoscope
less confusing, nor has it ,«de
natters easier for developing
countries like
India to work out their o«,
solutions. India does not
question the

wisdom of the detente, but she
has her doubts about its
usefulness to
India.

"We are not sure," said Indira
Gandhi, "if these flexible relationships necessarily point to a
more stable world order.
Co-existence
by itself does not preclude
policies, separately or in concert,
which
are detrimental to the freedom and
interests of third countries . "^^

The paradox of the relationship not
in terms of real politik,

however is India's dependence on the
United states even when she is in
total dishanoony with U.S. policy on
Pakistan, China and the Soviet

Foreign Affairs. October 1973, New York.
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are no absolute f rienaships

only evolvin, adjustments.

,

no indissoluble
entities.

..e conte^orar.

There are

dile^ is that there are
no relationships based
purely on ideologies, and
there is a convergence
Of national interests on
all international issues.
This
help the
two countries to evolve
a :.anin,ful relationship,
and balance ™tual
conflicts

CHAPTER

II

U.S. POLICY ON THE
SUBCONTINENT

After world war II,

circ^stanoes and ,eo,raph„

maia

had become through a
co:n.i„atio„ of

a strategic area for
the suooess of united

States post war containment
policy In Asia,

of course, India as a
region

was not always given due
importance by the ;^erica„
policy .a.ers. Por
the united states then, India
alone had the potential of
helng developed
into an effective countercheclc
to an expanding Connnunlst
"empire", since
She was the largest democracy
in Asia.
Besides, America had a national
interest in building a stable and
economically developed democracy.
She
also had the material capacity
to meet India's need for
economic and technical assistance - - vital for
her economic development. Again,
the security of the subcontinent was
almost unanimously considered
Indivisible in
the united States.
It was believed that only in
cooperation can India
and Pakistan present an impregnable
defense to China. Hence a reconciliation between these two countries
became a primary objective of American

policy after 1962.

Such a reconciliation was generally
equated in the

United States with the settlement of the
Kashmir dispute.

Truman Administration

In 1945 when the World War II was over,
the United States was the

dominant super power, having for the first half
of this period a monopoly
of nuclear weapons.
In the first half of the post war decade, India was
much too in-

volved in domestic tasks to pay much attention to world affairs.
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It was
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suspicious Of the united
states as itr was at
the same time
favourably inclmed towards
at*.
wards It.
It was suspicious,
because it correctly
correctpercieved the
^
„
Unxted
States even at this earlv
early stage as the
successor to the British
-Perial policy of divide and
rule in South Asia.

During the Roosevelt-Truman
period
P rioa, the Indian
inHS.
image in the U.S
was probably the most
favourable.
India was
wa. seen
«
as the
•

leader of the

.oxe,

.ace. up

presse. .ost ^e.i.ans.

..3.0^
.ea.ers o.

3.^,,,^
statu., o. .a„a.a.Xa.

..^

ana

Sa^aa. Patel cont.i.utea
sufastantiaXl, to the
composition

national
;uthou,h the ^e.i=a„s «antea
Xnaia.s ..ienaship ana
„e.e anxious
to have the nation on
their siae, thei. .eaXpoliti.
interests were aXso
now beco:„ing prominent,
with Korea stanain, out as
a seotor of oonfXicting political judgement.

-,e.

It was aifficuxt for India
to shed off its distrust
of the West.

This f eeXin, was voiced

Mehru in an address at CoXumbia
anitersity in
October X947 aurin, his visit
to the States.
"The Vest has too .often despised the Asian and the African
and stiXX, in .any pXaces,
aenies the.
not only equality of rights
but even co^on hu^nanity ana
UnaXiness. A
new era had dawned and countries
of Asia and Africa did not
intend to be

bypassed or to have their decisions
made by Western powers. "1 However,
when China became Commuinist and
seemed to pose a threat to the new
democracies of Asia, it seemed important
that U.s.-India relations shouXd
be cordial.

New

YorTltei: p?T:?

SHHth^sii^ndU^eJ^ni^^
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Un.o.tuna.eX„ ci.eu....„«.
^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^^^

-.an

to

cXose to s...„a,a.,
..e cap.ta.. ..e
MaKara.aH, on Oo.o.e.
^e, X947. .e,uestea
that He
al.owea to aooeae to
the Xnaian Union
Neh^ .e...ea to accept the
accession as ion, as the
Musii. ^ationai Conference, the iar,est
poiiticai organization of
Kashmir, woui. not asK
for
accession, .ora „o.nt.atten
insisted that this was not
re^i.ea
the
independence Act of the British
Parliament. The National
Conference
having agreed to accession,
Kahsmir's accession to India
was accepted and
became legal and final.
The U.S. supported Palcistan,
even though it was the
Government
Of India, Which on January
1, 1948 brought the ^tter
before the Security
council. The U.S. position
was resented in India. It
is difficult to say
as to What extent the U.S.
position was due to India's
proclaimed neutrality.

India's neutrality which was
spelled out by Prime Minister
Nehru
in his speech to the Constituent
Assembly on December 4, 1947, was
also
the cause of enstrangement "We
=
have proclaimed during the past
year that
we will not attach ourselves to
any particular group. That has
nothing to
do with neutrality or passibiity
or anything else ... We have sought
to

avoid foreign entanglements by not
joining one bloc or the other.

The

natural result has been that neither of
these big blocs looks on us with
favour.

They think that we are undependable, because
we cannot be made to

vote this way or that way."^

This policy was not likely to win friends in

India s Foreign Policy, Jawaharlal Nehru.
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the U.S.

But public opinion
in the U.S was
hiahl incensed
by Indian
>
neutral.
neutrality,
its refusal to take
ij-aes, and its refn^ai 4-^
sides
^ retusal to be 'counted
as
•

^

"

^

-ena

POUC.

m

,

ana

.a.an

the Rules Committp**
-xtte.,

-ult

-

_

.....

^^^^^^

^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^
^^^^
"i-u^
the

1

•

,

legislative graveyard"
of ™any Bills. The
„as that the gift heca.e
a loan,
.he Onitea states
agreement to

.i.h inaig^ation in
maia.

In

1.3

the proposea aia to
Xnaia, .ro„ ,iis

heavy congressional
outs

^luon

.re .ae

to .43.53 million,
as a

the aaherence of PaKista:,,
Thailana, a.a the PKillippines
to SKATO presumably haa resultea in
large increases in aia to
those countries in 1555 ^
in 195e, again, aia to
maia „as reducea fro. 585 million
to ,65.88 million
because of her faille to
ta.e a strong anti-Soviet
stana on Hungary, while
axa to Bur^a ana Indonesia
was increasea in 1957.
probably of their antiHussian sentiments in the
U.N. aebate of Hungary. ^
some M,erican scholars
have tenaea to dispute, the
contention that the Onited States
was applying
a policy Of containment
as much to India as to the
Soviet Union ana China,
they have maintainea that
military aia to Pakistan was
merely part of a
global policy aa aressea to
the Soviet Union, without any
reference to maia.

1951, ^

^'^g^P^P^^tment of state Bull Pt in

,

Vol. XXV, No. 627,' July 22,

theory and Practi ce in Southern
Asia Princeton
Asia,
rfr_^f!!'r
University Press, 1960, pp. 140-145.
'

^Ibid., pp. 214-216 and pp. 218-219.
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However, the then
Vice-President

m-

''"^^ "^^^-^ When
he urged military a.d to Pakistan
'as a counterforce
to the confirmed
neutralism of
Jawaharlal Nehru's India'.
The
Aiie rise n€
of another
xier cen+-r-^»
centre r.^
of power in Asia,
no. under .erican
control
checked
_raii.in, its po„er through
ann.n, Pakistan with
abundant sophisticated
weaponry.
'

-other point on which early
differences developed
concerned Comon October

1.

i,.,

^^^^^

Then there were policy
differences on J^orea.
Korea

^^^^^

^^^^

m^s. >,having supported
India
a
•

security Council Resolution
of .une .5, 1S50 refused
to become a full
hedged participant in the
u... Co™„and.
when the ^erican
co:.and crossed
the 38th paralled in
Korea, despite Indian
warning that this would
bring
the Coimnunist Chinese
into
nto the war
=„n
^
war, anti-Smerican
feelings in India became
strong.
Indians were critical of n,. n o
the D.S., since they
thought its China
policy wrong, its Kashmir
policy hostile, and its
economic assistance negligible.
Indians were of course more
concerned about Kahsmir and
assistance for economic development.
The United states Administration
too
realised the importance of India,
to the free world and was
not completely
indifferent to its needs.

When India was faced with a food
shortage. President Truman
promptly responded to Nehru's
requests for economic assistance
and shipments Of food, one million
tons of surplus wheat was sanctioned
to be sent
to India as a gift, and another
million tons were to be sold.
Relations between the two countries
however began to improve because of the special efforts of Chester
Bowles, then American Ambassador
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to India.

The Eisenhower hdmini ^i-^.^^^^
'

(1952-60)"

During the Presidential
elections in 1952. the
Republicans had
denounced the Truman, .cheson
containment progra. as too
..ild and ne,a-

liberate the people there.

The Eisenhower administration
had no desires,

however, to have another global
conflict on hand.

So it modified that
policy and tried to give it
positive content through Military
alliances.
The execution of the policy
was entrusted to John Poster
Dulles. This

meant that the system of defence
pacts was to be extended.

Soon after
taking office Dulles developed
his doctrine of massive
retaliation'.
He declared that "the protection
of the free world should be
primarily
based on America's great capacity
to retaliate . . . instantly,
by means
and at places of our own choosing."
This was a policy of 'brinkmanship'.

The liberal view about India continued
to prevail by and large until
the
second period opened with the
establishment of Eisenhower's Republican
regime.

Relations with India began to be seen in
Washington as a part of

American's cold war strategy, and a hardening
of the official attitude
was unambiguously demonstrated with the
signing of the military pact with

Pakistan in 1954.

Dulles did not imporve matters by making public
pro-

nouncements of contempt for non-alignment.

This was a testing time for

Indo-American links.
e

Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report
380-399.

,

New York, Harpers, 1954, on
'
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India, however, refused

t-r,

'°

^

alllanc
an.a.e ..3...

'he ;^erica„ Military

^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^

sxf.ea the p.e.3u„s o.
coZ. „a. i„ .....

-c.

t.at

aist...ea ..e .e,.o„a.
.....ee

tion via-a-vis Pakistan.

Xn the Sp.in, o,

po„e. ana Xna.a. o«n
posi-

»S4. the

U.S.

Oo.e^nent

announcea its aecision to
ente. into a .utua.
sec^it, a„a„,e™ent wit.
Pakistan ana extena to it
.iiita.. aia. .Ms was
natu.aii, in p.„uance
Of .oXste.in,
the ..s. wo.iawiae
ae.enoe syste. against
China ana K.ssia
Th.s aecision was ta.en
against the hacK^rouna o.
Known Xnaian opposition.
Robert Trumbell reportea
from New Delhi:
"''^

"^"^

°*
affairs has so exer''''^^ free-there is no
that ifl;;
If the r^V'''
Karachi arms deal goes through,
the U S
have forfeited its position
in Indi!, whatever'
ti.i
that may be, and whatever
that may be worth.

Z^t

There was nothing more detrimental
to lndo-0.s. relations at
the
time than this decision of
the United States to give
military aia to Pakistan.
Nehru's views were elaboratea
in the maian press and on
Indian
Platforms to the extent that the
United States came to be regardea
as the
main reason of maia's insecurity
against Pakistan. The U.S. aaministration took cognizance of Indian
fears to the extent of giving an
assurance
that the anns aid would not be
usea aginast maia ana that if Pakistan
did so the U.S. would rush to assist
maia.
convince India.
7

New York Times

.

January 10, 1954.

An argument which did not
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— -—~

rz
cxose

'

„op..Uo„

....^

_

3o..
^^^^^

coop..aUon between x„ai.
an. ..^sia a.te.

.He e.ono.,.

xcax ana aipXonaUc
.ieMs.

Xndia soon ..oa:„e a
showcase of Soviet economic assistance in Asxa.
Asia
t>,^^«
There were ever increasing
educational and cultural exchanges. Along
T:n Kussxa,
Russia India
Xn^^. spearheaded
y with
the struggle in
the anitea .aUons to
seat oo^un.st China,
.he Russian proposals
.o.

Powe..uX. i„aust.iaXi.ea ana
scienti.ioail, aavancea nation
havin, Benevolent ai^s. The soviet
leaders publicly enao.sea
maia's position on Kash".ir ana Goa.
spite of all her efforts,
maia coula not keep these
isssues out Of coia war
politics, who. she haa to barter
this Russian support ana vetoes in the Security
Council for silence on Hungary.

m

John Poster Dulles sharply
reacted to these sentiments
of the
soviet leaaers, and in a meeting
with De Cunha, the Foreign
Minister of
Portugal, assertea that "Goa,
Daman and Diu were Portugese."
This angered

and infuriated public opinion in
India and brought on Dulles' head
a storm
Of protest and denunciation. It
was referred to in some Asian
countries as
"one of the greatest diplomatic
blunders in history".

Theascendancy of leftist views in India's
policy was also visible
8

See M.S. Rajan, 'India and Pakistan
as Factors in Each Other's
Foreign Policy and Relations', International
Studies vm
„o 4 '
'
April 1962, pp. 349-394.
'

m,
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in her disposition
.towards ^nma.
Chin;,

^

^
Of fr.endship

,
t
in
April I954
•

Tn^-;,
-l-ridxa

signed a treatv

•

with Pe.i„,.

,3 a

„suit of the treatv

I

.

"

"''^
ext.a-te„itoriaX rights in
n.et* and
""^ acquxesced in the
extinction of
Txbetan

autono.,.

-trine

of

it was also in
this treaty for
the first

...^

India's enth.sias.
over

events in H.,ar..

-e.

P,,,h^

f

^^^^^^^

Moreover, the conoept
of a

,eo,raphioai area of
on these principles
of international
oon.ot was s.oessf.llv

_e

.hwartea
Hence India he,an to
concentrate on the
consolidation
Of a non-ali,„ea .loc.
.ehr. was able to influence
leaders li.e Cesser,
T.to, Sukarno and »cru.ah
towards this concept,
.his new effort
hv India
hardly more pleasing to
Washington.

-erioan poliov.

There existed a widespread
misconception about the policy
of nonof applying a double
standard to the two blocs.

However for India, nonalignment did not mean that
the country must assume a
position of equidistance between the diplomatic
positions of the two blocs,
nor did
it demand

a middle of the road
diplomatic course between cold
war contestants.

The U.S. position was that
mere economic assistance is
not enough.
The area must become militarily
strong and must forestall
subversion.
Charges of imperialism annoyed
Americans. They feel that they
have hardly
a colonial record such as
the^Western Powers; that their entire
tradition
has been anti-colonial and
liberal. They had supported the
Indian Independnece Movement. Their motives,
therefore, should not be questioned.
They have had no ambition to build
an Empire. Their only endeavour
is to

check the growth of communism in South
and Southeast Asia.

To make this
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possible, they seek
allies everywhere

it

.

^° ^he Americans
that those who are
not with
w.th f-h
them against the
Communists, are
against them and with
the Communists.
.
,H
therefore,

THe

.^n^n,

..

„o..

eve.

.„,..„.3. .......^^

_

......

^^^^^

^^^^

proposition, but a stable
stahi« and
^r,^ ^
democratic India was
the only next best
thin,
-wards the end o. Eisenhower
administration there were
si,ns o.
relations. One .actor
which contributed to
this was the retirement o. oulles in
1., .ro. the
scene.

«ter hi., the inn.ence o.
Senator
-l..i,ht. Chairman o. the
Senate .orei^n delations
Co^ittee. who was a

stron,

critic o. Oulles, increased
considerably, and contributed
towards
the betterment of Indo-D.s.
relations.

India's new-found warmth for
the
"1= D
U.S.
s
at hhi=
k was largely
this time
the outcome of Chinese
activities on her northern
borders, and the suppression Of Tibetan autonomy
in 1959.
the end of 1959, President
Eisenhower visited India and
the visit mar.ed the apex
in Indo-American
relations during the period of
his administration.
In his mutual security
n.essage to the Congress in
February 1960, after his return
from India, the
President informed the House
that of all developing countries,
India held
singular promise and should get
the major share of development
loans.

m

In the post-Dulles period the
United States Asian policy tended
to become more and more
India-oriented.

A greater emphasis was laid upon

the need to help build a stable
and democratic India as the most
effective

counterpoise to the growing power of
China instead of the erstwhile system
of military alliances.

T.is .o.i.icat.on o.
„„Ue. state.s poUc, was
caused
^-^^^^^^^^

..e

^^^^

^^^^^
«^
Of nuclear weapons
during the past decade
had
resulted in a balance Of
of terror,
i-<^Tyr.^
^ak.ng nuclear war an
untenable policy
.or .oth the .nited
states and the Soviet
Union.

nical advance in the

fi
fUed
i

,

Conse^.„,,,,

S.S shifted to economic
and diplomatic .eans
fro. ^litary
for allegiance of the
uncommitted Afro-Asian
nations.

(1960-63,

m

the struggle

The Kennedv-Jnhnc,^,, Era
l.h^-M or'john.on -.-Tnistr.t^nn,

Kennedys election to the
Presidential post in 1960
was warily
welcomed in India.

Hope of a hright new era
of cordiality emerged
with
the election of Kennedy
as President.
Even during his hrief
two-year tern
Of office, Indo-American
relationship had begun to ta.e
a more cheerful
Shape.
But the U.S. had unfortunately
begun to be deeply involved
in Vietnam, and Washington and New
Delhi were speaking audibly
with discordant
notes.
There was, however still no
open rupture, and Nehru and
Kennedy remained on warm friendly terms at
the personal level.
His first appointments were warily received.
Chester Bowles became Under Secretary
of state
and Prof. j.k. Galbraith, was
appointed Ambassador to India. Events
in
1961, however, tarnished the Kennedy
image somewhat when the U.S. inter-

vened in Cuba.

But, in other ways Indo-U.S.
relations continued to improve

Kennedy was close to India and wanted
to work for .world peace and cooperation with Nehru.
India cooperated with the U.S. in Congo,
Laos, and the U.N.
Indian policy of neutrality seemed to
be better appreciated, at least

The

T.e .OS.

Stan .as

sa.

.

.....

.,.,.3e e.ee. o.

.e.can

poXie. o. a..., p^,.

........

created in India about
American aid to Pakistan
.
. the
and
consequent tension
,
,
,
xn
Indo-U.S. relations,
since India's
-^a s attitude
was considered to
be a
major factor in the
success of any American noi ^
y
policy
the region, the wisdom of gaining Pakistan's
friendship at
the cost of .forsaking
y t: cne
Indian goodwill began to be questioned.

m

At the same time it was
also apparent
FPcirenr thaia™.
that American
military aid
to Pakistan was having
adverse
verse effp^+-=
r ^
effects on mdian
economic planning and development insofar as it
necessitated India to divert
her resources to military purposes in order to
maintain the military balance
in the subcontinent.
Chester Bowles also held
American aid to Pakistan
responsible for
intensifying differences between
India and Pakistan.
view of the
adverse results of military
aid to Pakistan, Selig
Harrison suggested a
reorientation of American policy
in South Asia in favour
of an indirect
form of defense support
implicit in economic aid to India
rather than
direct military aid.
•

•

m

It was also felt by many
that the United States would
be better

Off as a practical matter to
"cultivate friendly neutrals rather
than seek
to enlist more allies. "^^ The
first official endorsement of
neutralism
came in the President's annual
State of the Union message:
We support the independence of
these newer or weaker
states, whose history, geography,
economy or lack of

House Foreign Affairs Committee, MSA
Hearings
12

,

1959, p. 670.

78

^

''^™ economic aid to
underdeveloped countries in
general and India in
particular
X
^-l- a Presiaential .as. Porce was
set

^

,

UP to

The act was said to
have marked a transition f
from the "decade
of defense"
to the 'decade of
development".
To meet the changed
nature nf
of rr,^
Communist threat, it
was declared
«.th the introduction of
the .ct of isei that
it is the purpose
of th.
united States through
foreign assistance
progra. "to help make
a historic
demonstration that economic
growth and political
democracy can go hand
in
hand to the end that an
enlarged conmunity ui.
free stable,.
stable and self-reliant
y Of tree,
countries can reduce world tpncrionc
= ^
tensions and
insecurity 9 However,
there was
no change in the basic
objective of toreign
foreign aid—
aid to
tn serve U.S.
policy
interests in the Cold War.
•

.

The ineffectiveness of
t militarv
military ;,nir,=
allmaces became more and more
apparent as the decade of the
fifties drew towards an end.
.He Chairman
Of the senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Senator
J. Pulhright himself
was one of the strongest
critics of military aid to
small underdeveloped
countries.
In his opinion such aid
to these nations undermined
them politically and economically. He
preferred comparable amounts of
money to be
devoted to their economic
development instead, which would
contribute to
their political stability

cal

Yelf 1962 ."°
10

""""'"'^ °"

Foreign Assist.n.e Prcgra. fn. .h. ....

J

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
MSP Hearings, 1959, p. 189,

power impels them to
remain outside
,
^"'^^"'Ung
alliances" as „e did for
more than ,
the independence of
"T'^V'
these nationf^
communist's grand design!"
^° '^"^
Phillips Tal.ot, assistant
Secretary of state for
Hear Eastern

.

Co:»ittee during hearings
on foreign Assistance
Act for 1962,
our o„n national security
„e have a ver. strong
interest in developing
Close relations with these
non-aligned countries and
in helping them
strengthen themselves recognising
of course that very
often their views
on particular issues will
differ from ours.""'

The year 1959 mar.ed the
beginning of a new period of
coexistence
in soviet-American relations,
an aim towards which India
had always worked.
Both the united States and
Russia were by now great and
satiated powers
With a common staice in the
preservation of the status guo.
But China was
neither. As a consequence on
the one hand the U.S.-Chinese
struggle was
Sharpened, and on the other a
Sino-Soviet split came about openly.
This
left the united States in direct
confrontation with China in the Cold
War.
in this struggle between
the ijnited States and China,
India was
explicitly committed to the
American side because of an identity
of national interest in opposing
Chinese expansionism, with the
intensification
13

J.F. Kennedy, State of the Union
Message, Jan. 11, 1962 Text in
Documents on American Foreign Relations
(1962)! (New Yor^: Har^effTitl)

,

14

ForPian

hereXr a'T"'

Hearings! 1962?''^^

Act

,

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on
The
87th Congress Second Session, 1962,
570,
cited
p.
Committee, Foreign Assistance Act,
"
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of rivalry between
India and ch,-n=
Chxna, the argu:„ent
for greater economic
aid
to Xndia-tHe bastion
of democracy in .sia
and the o„i, potential
co.nterpoise to China-began
to ass^e greater
validity in the United
States
It was President Kennedy
who was .est singularly
aware of the potentialities Of India-China revalry
and the lively effect
of its outcome in the

in affecting that outcome.

In his words:

'^'^"^'^
ana China
Sd
China'for
for the
thf leadership of all Asia, for """ithe
opportunity to demonstrate whose
way of life isth^
'^"'^
subti: tiL lo^d
'
It may not
ITIIITtbe even admitted by either
side
.
bui
it IS a very real battle
nevertheless .
Let th»r=
be no mistake about the
nature of the crisis-bott the
danger and the opportunity-and
let there be no mist^e
about the urgency of our
participation in this st^^gS."
.

.

The U.S. reacted to the emerging
border dispute between India and
China with quiet satisfaction,
since she was both worried and
annoyed by
Sino-lndian friendship in the
Panch-Sheel era. she considered
the border
conflict as an eye-opener.

Following the Chinese invasion, the
Indian government began to
demand large scale military assistance.
India complained that American
military was not adequate. The Hindustan
Times commenting editorially
on March 30, 1963, said: "Mr.
Kennedy's only important failure in
recent
months was his inability or unwillingness
to revise U.S. policies towards
India and Pakistan sharply enough to
expect maximum benefit from the Chinese attack.

Had the U.S. government capitalized on
the Indian people's

response to Western assistance in their
hour of need, it could have a
15

^^^^^ Harrison, India and the United States
M
^i'?^^'^
'
The Macmillan
Co., 1961, p. 63.

.

New York,

staunch friend for the
doubtful
tul loss of an uncertain
ally,
instead U.S.
attitude wavered between
sympathy
for India ;,n^
and concern over
y ror
Pakistan's
reactions thus creating
doubts
in
..r,^
one country without
g
removing them in
the other"

m

in March 1963, Nehr.
sent two personal
emissaries to the a s

Xob.y for .ore military
assistance,

.t the same time aia
for another

steel .ill „as sought.

Xn.ia asKed for a Billion
dollars of military aia.
While the U.S. was committea
toamere 60 million. The U.S.
terms were
Clear.
Settle the Kashmir problem
and aid would come.
Chester Bowles
flew to Washington to plead
the Indian case.
«ter Kennedys assassination Bowies discussed the
matter with his successor
President .ohnson.
The President promised his
decision within a few weeKs.
General Maxwell
Tanor who visited India also held
out promise of increased aid.
The
military assistance promised
by President Johnson also did
not come through,
India was greatly disappointed.

After Nehru
On May, 1964, Nehru died.

This was the end of an era.

At the
time of his death, the U.S. position
in Asia had considerably weakened.
The united States viewed with concern
the political situation in Asia.

The S.E.A.T.O. and C.E.N.T.O. were
in shambles.

deeply involved in Viet Nam.

The U.S. had become very

This conflict in Southest Asia had almost

split the SEATO allinace and had caused
great divisions in the ranks of

both Democrats and Republicans.

With most of its Asian allies in revolt,

the U.S. position in Southeast Asia was extremely
delicate.

The U.S. has

also discovered the simple fact that economic
assistance "buys" very little
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political influence and
establishes
ixshes a r.i..relationship that is
both prickly
and counter-productive.
U.S. economic aid
has be.n
been .declining since
the
late 1960 's.
•

The

China polic, i„ .He
1,50-1960 .e.aae. was
a source
..rotation .o xnaia, ..o.
l,eo-lS,o was a sou..e
o.
....^.action
and from 1970 onwards
appeared to threaten India
This
-i-nis na...
nakedness to Chinese strength, oa.sed
the detente between
the U.S. and China,
left
X.d.a in the position of
re,uirin, Soviet support,
xhat support ,i.en in
abundance ran counter to
^erioan interests in South
.sia and in the Indian
Ocean, and hence became a
source of friction.

^

m

the subsequent chapters,
we shall follow the course
of IndcAmerican relations after 1965.

Pakistan as a O eterminant in
United States Policy TowardT-Ehr^coni-.n.n^
Relations between India and the
United States we have seen so
far
are entangled in a complex
web of interrelationships
between the two countries themselves and Pakistan,
the Soviet Union and China,
and are continuously conditioned by the distinctive
roles these countries have played
in South Asia and the world
cormnunity.
While reacting to the cross-pressures of great powers, the middle
powers themselves determine the environment to which superpowers must
respond. Acting in pursuit of their
own
goals they create conditions and
problems to which the great powers must
react.

Here we shall focus out attention
on Pakistan as the "environment
16

A point made by Anwar Syed, in the context
of China-Pakistan relaChina and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cord i.i..
(I
^"-f,
~
(Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1974).

T

determining actor/' on the subcontinent.

„e shall try and find
out how

from time to time PaJ^istan's
behaviour in the region, and
in the international system, has helped the
United states determine its
policy in

South Asia.
Initially South Asia received little
attention from the policy

makers in Washington.

The world was then (after 1947)
confronted by cold

war between the East and West.

Since' South Asia was comparatively
free

from immediate tensions, Washington
could afford to confine her first
phase
of policy towards the subcontinent
during 1947-53 to pious and friendly

gestures of good will and a modest amount
of economic aid and assistance

under "Point Four;" no major diplomatic
or political or military involve-

ment was necessary or contemplated.

A major challenge to any intimate association
between India and
the United States was America's relations with
Pakistan and the problem

of Kashmir.

The United States insisted on India agreeing to
a plebiscite

even before Pakistan vacated the agression.

The Indian government thought

that the United States had taken "a strangely narrow view"
and felt dis-

tressed that it referred to the Kashmir cirsis as a Hindu-Muslim
conflict
and seemed to accept the Pakistani view point that Kashmir should
go to
Pakistan.

The United States never condemned the Pakistan agression.
India suspected that the continued U.S. support to Pakistan was

tied up with the American hope of acquiring military bases in the Pakistan-

held portion of Kashmir adjoining the Soviet Union and China.

She believed

that this was the reason for the major role the United States took in

shaping the U.N. policy on Kashmir.

When the United Nations sent military

observers to Kashmir to supervise the ceasefire, Washington managed to
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include seventeen ^erican
nationals in the tea. of
thirty-six U... observers,
xndia.s suspicion of U.S.
motives was strengthened
when the two
military officers whose na„es
were suggested by the
U.N. Co^ission
for

Kashmir for appointment as
plebiscite administrators
were ;^ericans. General Bideu Smith and Admiral
rax Numit?
1=4-4.
Numitz, i-h^
the latter
wanted to induct 3,000
U.S. soldiers into Kashmir.^^

Ever since 1948 when the
United States

failed to endorse India's position
on Kashmir in the Security
Council, the
issue of Kashmir and the question
of U.S .-Pakistani alliance
hasbeen in-

tertwined in Indo-a.S. relations.

By the early 1950s the American
policy

of containing Soviet and Chinese
influence was fairly, well established,
and the United States accepted
Pakistan as an ally in the process
of

building anti-communist coalitions in
Asia and the Middle East.
One of the major thorns then in
Indo-American relations was the

system of military alliances built
by Dulles in Asia.

When U.S. policy

makers began to give serious thought to
regional defense arrangements for
the Middle East and for South Asia,
Pakistan's geographical location gave
it a special strategic significance.

Since West Pakistan borders on the

region surrounding the Persian Gulf, her
geographical location made her
an object of special interest and signif
icance-when the United States was

embarking on collective security arrangements, to
deal with the "menace"
of international Communism.

Nehru could not endure the U.S. policy of regional military
pacts;
India like most of the Asian and Arab countries was not convinced
of "any

imminent Communist threat," and secondly Nehru was not prepared to give
17

The New York Times

,

Aug. 14, 1949.

up his policy Of

non-ali^ent which haa

the hle.sin, of both
Moscow and

Peking in those days.
Dulles found a completely
different and favorable climate
in Paki
Stan. Pakistan in her ,uest
for security, in the context
of unending
Indo-Pakistan tensions had been
eagerly looking for "allies"
and •friends
President Eisenhower gave the
military pact a garb of respectability and said that the United
states was concerned over the
weakness
of the defensive capabilities of the
countries in West Asia, and was

therefore complying with the request
from Pakistan for military aid.
When Nehru protested against the pact,
Washington replied that India

might also take military aid from the
United States.
regional pacts had great attraction for
Pakistan.

The U.S. plans for

In 1954, a military

pact was signed between Pakistan and the
United States.
stan joined the Western sponsored Bagdad
Pact.

In 1955, Paki-

India protested to this

move
But surely nobody here imagines that the Pakistan
government entered into this pact because it feared
some imminent
or distant invasion or aggression from the Soviet
Union.
The Pakistani newspapers and the responsible people
in
Pakistan make it perfectly clear that they have joined
this pact because of India. -^^

Indo-American relations further deteriorated by the establishment
of SEATO over India's open and strong opposition.

India's opposition to

the alliances was further intensified by the fact that they had balked

Indian attempts to designate a "no war" area in Asia.

To counterbalance

Western influence in the region, and Western economic and military support to members of SEATO

^%ehru, Speeches

,

— in

particular Pakistan

— India

Vol. Ill, 1953-57, p. 377

sought to
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cultivate close cooperation with
the Soviet Union and Red
China. ^»
Nevertheless, there was nothing
more detrimental to Indo-U.s.
relations at the time than this
decision of the United States
to give
military aid to Pakistan for its
anti-Indian designs. The New YorK
Times
correspondent Robert Tru^ull noted the
effect the proposed American
action would have
If the Karachi arms deal goes
through, the U.S

will
it may

bHorthfJo'^"

President Eisenhower himself was aware
of the reaction it would produce
in India.

In his announcement of March,
1954, he stated:

I can say that if our aid
to any country, including
Pakistan, is misused or directed against
another in
aggression, I will undertake immediately
appropriate action both within and without the
United
Nations to thwart such aggression. 21
.

.

.

In a personal letter to Nehru he assured
that the action was not directed
in any way against India and that if
"your government should conclude that

circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated
by our mutual
security legislation, please be assured that you request
would receive my

most sympathetic consideration. "^^
Nehru dismissed the American aid offer since it was common
knowledge that India would not militarily align herself to any
power.
19

He

See M.S. Rajan, "India and Pakistan as Factors in Each Other's
Foreign Policy and Relations," International Studies Vol. Ill, No. 4,
April 1962, pp. 349-94.
,
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New York Times

,

January

9,

1954.

Department of State Bulletin

,

March 22, 1954, p. 447.

describe, ^.e.ican ai. to
Pakistan as an "anti-XnCian

Pa^istan in the Kash.i. dispute
and
officers from the ceasefire
line.

de^

,

anti-.sian ana anti-

the withdrawal of ^erican

According to him:

^^^^^^^
of the United
Stat^^^''i°''
States
army cannot be considered
neutral in Kashmir'2!

Nehru's views were elaborated
in the Indian press and
on Indian
Platforms to the extent that the
United States came to be regarded
as the
main reason of India's insecurity
against Pakistan. Later on Nehru
moderated his views to a considerable
degree. He could believe, he
said,
the motives of the United States
in giving aid to Pakistan,
but he could
not be sure of Pakistan'
s. design.
Speaking in the parliament, he stated:

Spokesmen of the Pakistan Government have
on various
occasions stated that their objective in
entering in
a defence aid agreemnt with the
U.S.A.
is to
strengthen Pakistan against India. We have
repeatedly
pointed this out and emphasized that the
U.S. defence
aid to Pakistan encourages the Pakistan
authorities
their agressiveness. ... We welcome the
assurance given to us by the United States
authorities
but agression is difficult to define, and
Pakistan
authorities have in the past committed agression
and denied it.
In the context of this past experience,
the continuing threats held out by Pakistan and
Pakistan's interpretation of the latest agreement
with the U.S.A., it is difficult for us to ignore
the
possibility of Pakistan utilizing the aid received
by it
against India. 24
.

.

.

m

.

.

.

The United States, on the other hand, assumed that
this aid could
not constitute a threat to India simply because of her
relative size and

strength against Pakistan and if despite this relative weakness Pakistan
Nahru, India's Foreign Policy p. 476. These charges were borne
out by the official and unofficial claims made in Pakistan to American
support against India after the signing of the alliance.
,
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was to launch an aggression
against India,
a, American infi
influence could bring
it to a quick end-an
argument which did not
convince India.

Speaking before the General
^sse^iy on October 6, 1954.
the
Indian a^assador, Krishna
Menon. regretted the fact
that the Manilla
Pact had adversely affected
the climate of peace
brought about by the
Geneva settlement:

"

understand the great hurry
to perform
pe'rfo^'th"
this operation when there
had been aggression trouble and war in
Indo-china for eight
" settlement was negotiated, thafS^re
should be an agreement of this
character. Nothing
positive was gained by this
agreement because iHoes
not appear that it can be an
instrument of great
potency, but it can do a great
deal of harm. 25

yeS

Nehru regarded SEATO as an attempt
to recreate spheres of influence in southeast Asia.
India also contested the fact
that the organization was a regional body within
the definition of the U.N. charter
because
some of the signatories were not
geographically situated in the region.
India disapproved of these alliances,
because they

directly affected her

internal development, and obstructed
her attempts to designate a "no war"
area in Asia.

What led the U.S. and Pakistan to enter
into the arms agreement
and allinaces?

What did they really expect of it?

The U.S. government

was convinced of the desirability, of
building collective security organi-

zations in Asia, to contain Communist power.

U.S. officials also believed

that the 250,000 man Pakistani army had
considerable potential for the

defense of the northwest frontier of the subcontinent
until outside forces

1954.

25u.N. General Assembly, 9th Session, Official Records,
October 6,

.

arrivea, provided it could
ao^i.. an ade^ate and
assured supply of

.odem ^utary e^lp.ent.^^

ti„e the United states
had no ai.

bases between Turkey and the
phillipines, and bases in
Pakistan ,or even
the right to land on airstrips
in war tine, would extend
^erica's power
to strike at the U.S.S.R..
thereby adding to Soviet air
defense problems.
While neither the arms agreement no..1
nor the alliance
provided for military
bases in Pakistan, the possibility
of acquiring such facilities
were
Obviously better in an allied nation
than in a neutral one. The
United
States had little choice but to
accept those nations willing to
join such
,

security organizations.

Besides the political support that
was expected

to accrue from allies as compared
to neutrals was regarded as
important,

particularly their votes in the United
Nations.

In part this reflected

the traditional American desire for
friends, but calculations of political

support were interwoven.
The reasons Pakistan pursued the course
it did are less complex.
The primary goal was to obtain military
equipment to modernize the armed
forces.

Pakistan's leaders apparently also believed that
being an ally

of the west would afford them some military
security against India beyond
that provided by arms, and would help them in
dealing with Afghanistan's

attempts to undermine Pakistan's position along the
northwest frontier.

'

Even for economic assistance, allies were heavily
favoured over neutrals
by the United States.

In return for these benefits Pakistan was willing

to abandon its policy of non-alignment or its policy
of friendship for all.
26

Little seems to have been done in the way of pre-positioning
supplies for U.S. troops, nor was any serious attention ever given to
the defense of East Pakistan.

'
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one underlying p.oble.
presented potential difficult,
for u s Pakistani relations. Kac.
country clearly understoodthat it .ad ta.e„
on certain obligations and
its allies .ad done t.e
sa„e. .ut .otH thought
that an unspo.en and
unsigned agreement going
further was implied. The
united states thought that
Pakistan was well aware it
was expected to
pursue an anti-Indian policy,
it surely was not to
adopt a pro-Indian
stance.
These different underlying
assumptions were later to
cause .uch
troxible.^^

western ar^s aid and the Indian
defense build up following
the
Sino-lndian war forshadowed for
Pakistan a seriously adverse
shift in the
balance of power. Ayub tried
to offset India's growing
strength by changing the orientation of their
foreign policy. Pakistan remained
formally
aligned with the west, just as India
remained formally non-aligned,
despite
changes in the substance of the
foreign policies of both countries.
During
these years Pakistan took the
initiative In altering th6 power relationships affecting South Asia, and its
moves culminated in the second IndoPakistani war in 1965.
The decision of President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Macmillan in

December 1962 on a second installment of
$120 million worth of arms for
India, the joint U.S .-U.K. -Indian air
defense exercise in 1963, and the

long-term agreement to supply arms when Defense
Minister Chavan visited
the United States in April 1964 confirmed
Pakistani leaders in their

earlier fears regarding a major shift in American
policy and the decline
27 U.S.

House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Hearings Mutual Secu rity Act Extension 83rd Cong. 1st sess.,
1953, pp.
.

720-21.

in Pakistan's influence on
the United States.

Now Pakistan began to ex-

plore the possibility Of forging
links with China, to
court Afro-.sian
states, and to put additional
pressure on India to co.e to a
settlement.
Pakistan did not try to diversify
its military procurement
program.
Its
armed forces were stable at roughly
225,000 men between 1960 and 1965,
and its defense outlay rose by only
30 percent; Indian forces
increased
from 535,000 to 869,000 men and defense
spending roughly tripled in this
period. Peking looked like the best
bet for Pakistan, for the Soviets

appeared too closely tied to India.

There were also the special U.S.

facilities in West Pakistan, directed against
the U.S.S.R. which circumscribed Ayub's maneuverability

with Moscow.

concerned over Soviet designs in Afghanistan.

Ayub may still have been
Thus it was not until

April 1965, after the fall of Khrushchev,
that Ayub made an official visit
to the U.S.S.R. and the relations began to
improve. ^8

Ayub's efforts to

improve relaitons with China and to put pressure
on India were to be under-

taken without cutting Pakistan's ties to the United
States. 29
India emerged from the war with China a scarred nation,
with its

self-confidence undermined.

Muslims had increased.
were growing.
The

Communal violence between the Hindus and

Political and communal tensions inside Kashmir

The Indians were resentful over Pakistan's ties with China.

government announced in December 1964 that the state would be more

closely integrated into India.

In January 1965 the ruling party in Kahsmir,

28

Ayub's conversations with Soviet leaders are discussed in Friends
Not Masters cited, pp. 168-74.
,

29

See Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis of
Pakistani Fears and Interests", Asian Survey Vol. IV, No. 3, March 1964,
pp. 746-56.
,
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the National Conference,
.erged completely with the
Congress party.
Indians were also roused by
Ay... 3 visits to Peking
in March and to Moscow in April. They also saw
Pakistani machinations behind
Sheikh Abdullah's meeting with Chou En-lai
in '^yj.ers
Algiers in Jann;,r..
. ^
January; and
rearrested
Abdullah as soon as he returned
to India in April.

President Ayub's visit to China
early in 1965 and some of
his
remarks there were viewed with
concern in Washington, although
Ayub was
careful in the course he followed
on the Viet Nam issue.
In April 1965
the united States cancelled an
invitation to President Ayub to
visit

Washington-officially it only postponed the
visit,

but the effect was the

same.

Since the United States did not feel
it could receive Shastri after
cancelling Ayub's invitation, Shastri 's
visit was postponed too, which

annoyed the Indians even more than the
Pakistanis.

Washington was getting

out of touch with, leaders of both
countries at a time when their mutual

hostility had reached a kindling point.
On April 8, 1965, a disputed border claim
over the Rann of Kutch

that the two countries had been unable to
settle during the 1959 negotiations, turned to large scale shooting.

The clash put the United States

in a difficult position and cast growing doubts
on the wisdom of providing

military aid to two hostile neighbors.
Many Indians feared that concerted Chinese and Pakistani
moves
formerly a princely state, was part of Gujarat state by
Since 1947 India had claimed the entire marsh. Pakistan had not
accepted India's interpretation of the boundary, saying that the boundary
ran along the middle of the Rann or approximately along the 24th parallel.
Some 3,500 miles of territory was in dispute. In 1965 both coiantries were
moving their forces forward to make good on their border claims, and each
blamed the other for the initial clash.
"^°Kutch,

1965.

were liXeX,. since the H.n„
of K.tcH fi,hti„, followed
so closely upon
.yub-s Visit to Pe.i„,. ana
visits
chou En-lai ana Poreign
Minister
Chen Vi to Pakistan.

The Soviet position not
only seeded to e^ate the

two countries, but raised
doubts about India's ability
to retain Soviet
support on Kahsmir.
AS soon as the fighting began,
charges were made that the
Pakistani forces were using American
equipment, of which India soom
claimed
to have photographic evidence.
Opposition leaders cited the U.S.
assurances that Pakistan would not use
the arms supplied by America
against
India, and now the United States
apparently was unwilling even to
repri-

mand Pakistan immediately and publicly,
much less prevent or take positive
steps to halt the Pakistani action.
The Indian government was caught in
the middle; it obviously wanted the
United States to reprimand or restrain

Pakistan, but saw more danger in denouncing
the United States as an enemy.
All this came about soon after Shastri's
visit to Washington was

postponed, and his domestic opponents argued
that this showed how little

stature and influence he had in the United
States.

The whole affair

brought to the surface once again the underlying
Indian annoyance at being
equated with Pakistan.

The United States wanted to avoid choosing between

India and Pakistan in view of its extensive interests
in each country.
The administration was also running into more
trouble with Congress. Many

members were irritated that the two recipients of U.S.
military aid were
not fighting each other.

31 Pakistan

also claimed that India was using U.S. equipment in the
fighting, but the small amount of U.S. arms apparently used had been
purchased by India in earlier years and not acquired through the aid
program.
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The outcome of the Rann of Kutch
episode left Pakistan dangerously
overconfident and India dangerously
frustrated.
The outbreak of war signaled an important failure of
U.S. policy in the subcontinent,
telling
the Senate Appropriations Committee
on September 8 that the United
States
had suspended military aid to both.
Secretary Rus3c said no new conunitments

m

of economic assistance were being
made, and only those shipments
already
underway under past agreements were allowed
to go forward:

Now this will not be well received either
in Pakistan
or
India but we cannot be in a position of
financing a war of these countries against each
other.
Nor can we be in a position of using aid
under circumstances where the purpose of the aid is
frustrated
by the fighting itself

m

.

.

.

Our problem has been and obviously we have not
succeeded, to pursue policies with Pakistan and
India
related to matters outside of the subcontinent and
at the same time try not to contribute to the
clash
between the two within the subcontinent. This is
still the shape of the present problem. 32

American inability to prevent the use of American military
equip-

ment by either party only served to highlight the irony of
United States'
aid policy in South Asia.

The only effective measure it could possibly

take was to suspend all aid to both nations, treating the ally and the

neutral thereby on an equal footing.
The patterns of alignment in South Asia have always been compli-

cated by the Indo-Pakistan regional disputes.

India and Pakistan have

always moved in the extreme opposite direcitons

— if

one turns to Wash-

ington, the other tries to move to Moscow and Peking.

-JO

Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966 89th Cong. 1st session,
pp. 18-19.
-"^U.S.

,
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Both Pakistan and Washington
reaped some advantages and
some disappointments fro. their alliance.
Between 1954 and 1965 Pakistan
received,
on a grant basis, .ore than
one billion dollars worth
of weapons, military
training and advice. The United
States had given a total of $3,713.8"
million in economic assistance to
Pakistan, in the form of grants,
loans
and agricultural commodities. ^
3

At least till 1961, the United
States had

the satisfaction of having Pakistan's
firm support in the Cold War.

Paki-

Stan opposed China's admission to the
United Nations, and ignored Moscow's

offers of expanded trade and economic
assistance, and even denounced Soviet
"colonialism" in Eastern Europe.

The United States could maintain a strong

political presence in Pakistan. -^"^
Pakistan also received a measure of American
support in her disputes with India. 35

This was just an act of reciprocity in exchange
for

Pakistani support in the Cold War.

However a radical shift in the align-

ment of forces occurred, and changed the nature of
the Cold War when the

Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian conflicts developed.

American interest in a

plebiscite declined, and Washington favoured a division of Kahsmir
that

would leave Srinagar and the areas providing access to Ladakh
with India.
When in the Sino-Indian border clash of 1962, the U.S. gave India
military
aid, the alliance with Pakistan became a notably complicating
factor for

American policy in South Asia.

Pakistan's objections to aid to India did

not subside in spite of repeated American assurances that such aid was

33see op. cit.
34

See op. cit.

^^ibid.

,

p.

34.

,

p.

35.
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directed only against China and
that it in no way ^alifled
or di:„ini.hed
American commitment to Pakistan. -^^

Officially the United States government
tried for an agreement
between India and Pakistan in the
belief that only cooperation
between
them can effectively resist Chinese
inroads
in Asia.

In the absence of

an agreement like this, any closer
American cooperation with India would

entail a breakup of the alliance with
Pakistan, which the United States

would like to avoid.

Nevertheless Indian official opinion held
the view

that the united States was more sympathetic
to Pakistan.

Mr. Gandhi told

American newsmen during her visit to the United
States in 1964 that the
United States was losing much good will in India
because of Washington's

favoritism towards Pakistan

"in- the

Kashmir dispute". ^'^

India in Soviet Policies

Broadly speaking, Soviet policy towards India went through
three

varying stages.

In the first phase, it was conditioned by Stalin's
overall

hostility towards the capitalist world.

Stalin treated India as a colony

of the Anglo-American monopoly capital.
The latter half of the fifties could be termed as a period of big

friendship in Indo-Soviet relations.^®

The post-Stalin Soviet policy to-

wards India endorsed an attitude of cultivating ties with India, and IndoSoviet relations grew in all the major areas of foreign policy operations
economic, political and cultural.

Krushchev also supported India on the

^^ New York Times November 21, 1962.
,

^^New York Times, April 22, 1964.

Kashmir issue.

In fact, this served
three .ajor interests of
Soviet

foreign policy in the region,

it increased India's
dependence upon

soviet Russia and thus provided
a major base for the
expansion of Soviet
ties with India; it served as
a lesson to the erring
Pakistan; and lastly,
it served the Soviet defense
interests too to some extent.

Nehru visited

Soviet Russia, and Krushchev and
Bulganin later toured India.
Because of India's geographical
proximity to the Soviet Union,
she received greater attention in
Soviet policies than say of the
United

States.

By its effective role as a peace
pursuing power in the Korean

War, at the Geneva Conference of
1954, in the Suez Crises and in organiz-

ing the Bandung powers, Indian diplomacy
had gained a certain stature in

Soviet eyes, and India had gained a
considerable power position.

The

Soviet policy makers seemed to have framed
a policy of associating India

with the Big Powers for the solution of Afro-Asian
and disarmament questions.

The Indians could now show that they were not without
the support
of a superpower.

They denounced American Cold War policies much to Mos-

cow's satisfaction, and supported Soviet positions on
international issues.
At the same time, they obtained massive economic assistance
from the United
States, since they did not want to become too dependent on Moscow.

Mos-

cow was thus assured of India's backing at a moderate cost.
The serious setback Indian foreign policy had suffered with the

conclusion of the U.S .-Pakistani arms agreement increased receptivity to
Soviet overtures. Nehru hoped that improved relations with Moscow could
also serve as a warning to Pakistain and its ally that India had powerful
friends.

In particular he thought it would be possible this way to get
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MOSCOW to Shift f.o. its
general!, neut.ai position
on Kash^. to a p.oindian stanoa, which would
be valuable, given the
..s.s.u..s percent
membership in the Security
Council.

During 1955 and 1956 those
A:„ericans who had objected
to the
alliance with Pakistan when it
was established continued
to argue that
the united states was alienating
India.

They maintained that a higher

priority should be given to ties
with India, the .ey country
in South
Asia. Since Soviet policy was
not proving to be militarily
agressive tothe underdeveloped world, the
United States should de-emphasize
military pacts and military assistance
and give economic aid a higher
priority. Even the administration
had concluded
that a shift in emphasis

was desirable.
Thus the united States and India sought
to improve their relations,
U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
played a major role in beinging the two

countries together.

He presented American policy in a manner
Indian

-

leaders could appreciate, and explained
Indian actions skillfully to Washington.

His efforts reduced the distrust between the
two governments,

leading them to understand their common interests
rather than their differences.
The two countries still differed on some issues.

India .thought

that the United States was not going far enough towards
seeking better

relations with the Soviet Union, and Nehru was strongly critical of
U.S.

nuclear testing when India sought special U.S. economic assistance in
1957,
the administration regarded it as economically desirable and politically

feasible to provide the aid.

A loan of $225 million was extended, the

first of many to follow. Nahru had always been dubious about too much

reXianc. on .o.ei,n aia
lest .He lea.e.s o.
.ecip.ent co.nt..es .e=o„e
.esponsive to t.e aono.s tHan
to t.ei. o™ peopU.
Vet
Xnaia was

now forced to take the
risk if
-ii-e ^
xf xts
development program was to
be carried
out.

At the end of the first
ten years of independence
India and Pakistan had achieved a measure
of stability in their
relations with each
other and with the major
powers.
Indo-Pakistani relations were
set in a
.Old of inactive hostility.
a.S.-Pakistan relations appeared
to be going
reasonably smoothly. Pakistan's
military forces were acquiring
the arms
they needed, and it felt a
certain security despite the
expanding Soviet
role in India and Afghanistan.
The U.S. military relationship
with Pakistan was not proving as harmful
to relations with India as
its opponents
feared, and the necessity and
purpose of the continued arming of
Pakistan
in view of the less threatening
Soviet stance was not really
questioned.
Indo-Soviet relations had cooled somewhat
as a result of Soviet actions
in Hungary, Soviet annoyance over
Indian attempts to further liberalization within the communist bloc by
urging upon Moscow a generous policy
towards Tito, and better Indian relations
with the United States.
Thus the polarization that at one point
appeared to be a distinct

possibility, with Pakistan, the United States,
and (to a lesser degree)

Britain lined up against India, the U.S.S.R.
and Communist China never
came about.

While India wanted expanded relations with Moscow,
it had

no intentions of becoming a partner of the
Soviets.

also supported Pakistan only to a point.

Washington never really put

heavy pressure on India to compromise on Kashmir.
early 1960

's,

The United States

In the late 1950 's and

Washington thought that its interest in India's economic
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development was too important to
ta.e serious ris.s by
withholding aid
pending a Kashmir settlement.
The soviet policy of considering
India as an important ally
against China received some cracks
after India's poor showing in
the

Sino-lndian border conflict of 1962.

The 1962 event shattered India's

special position in Soviet policies
vis-a-vis Pakistan and the Kremlin
therefore was seen reviewing its ties
with Pakistan, which was growing
much too close to Mao's China but
showing signs of coming out of the

Anglo-American alliances.

Kosygin invited President Ayub Khan
to visit

Moscow and the latter went there in April
of 1965.

Of course the U.S.S.R.

was concerned with safeguarding her own
vital interests, not those of
Pakistan.

She wanted "stability" in the subcontinent,
and an end to Indo-

Pakistan quarrels, so that Pakistan instead of
pursuing interests that
conflicted with those of India, would join India in
serving the common
Indo-Soviet, and also American, interest in containing
China.
In the extensive talks that Ayub Khan had with the
Soviet leaders

he must have impressed upon them the necessity of adopting
a non-partisan

policy towards the subcontinent.

Within a fortnight of his departure

from Moscow the Indo-Pakistan conflict in the Rann of Kutch
took place

and the Russians adopted a neutral, non-partisan posture towards
India

and Pakistan on this occasion.

Such a non-partisan attitude was further

confirmed during the Indo-Pakistan fighting in September 1965, which led
to the Tashkent Conference and the consequent emergence of Soviet Russia
as a peace keeping power between India and Pakistan.

The Kremlin changed its policy towards Pakistan with the rationale
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Sovie. tie..

Kos.,i„.3 „o..pa«i.a„
postu.. Haa a po.Uive
o.,e«ive o.
.ai„.aini„, Soviet presence
i„ .ot. countries
a„a tHus .eepin, t.e„
„it.
hi™ .athe. than aXienatin,
one, as aia KH^shchev,
o. aXienatin, ^th.
as StaXin aia.
Un..r Mrs. Canahi, however,
maia has a,ain re-e™er,ea
as a stron,, sta.Xe ana
pro-Soviet power. Soviet
poXic. towaras the subcontinent was reviewea a,ain,
which was cXearXy inaicatea
in Soviet
Russia's Signing of a aefense
pact with India in August
197X, ana its
positive heXp in the Xiteration
of BangXadesh, after Kosygin
faiXea in
his Objective of cuXtivating
Pakistan with a view to weaning
it away fro™
China

Besides in Juiy X97X it had become
known that a Chinese-American
detente was coming about, and thus
the earXier American coXXaboration
with India and the U.S.S.R. in
opposing China had cXearXy endea.
As
India prepared for another war with
Pakistan, in which the latter wouXd
have China's support, she wanted
a ciear-cut assurance of Soviet
aid.
On August XO, X97X, the two
governments signed a treaty of "frienaship"

incXuaing provision for mutual aefense
assistance.

From Moscow's point

of view this was a step towaras a more
inciusive anti-Chinese coalition.
Sino-Pakistan Relations

In contrast to India's active involvement
with the major powers,
40

In the mid-1960's, after the emergence of an
Indo-Soviet-American
entente against China, Russia could only gain some
influence in Pakistan,
and would not even impair her relations with
India.
Given Soviet and
American backing even Indian security would not be
threatened.
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X950.S.

But .e„.s..= =Ka„,es
i„ Pakistan, as

dispute, were to aXter
this.

Various .aoto.s

wen

as the Si„o-Zn..a„

We

contributed to the

convergence of interests an.
e.er,e„ce o. ciose
relationships between
China ana Pakistan.^cn, these .a. .e mentioned
territorial pro.i.it„
China's neea for secure
frontiers ana Pakistan's
neea for national security, and their identity
of interests vis-a-vis
India.

Sino-PaMstan friendship started
at the Bandung Conference

in

The Chinese .ay have sensed
that because the primary
motivation of
Pakistan's alliance policy
with the U.S. was to acquire
son,e protection
against India, ana not China,
Pakistan was a harmless .ember
of the enemy
camp, and this way they
could have directed their
diplomacy at reducing
the consequences of Pakistan's
membership in SEATO.
1955.

Because of Pakistan's obsession
with the Kashmir question, the
KashMir issue had developea as a
sort of testing grouna for any
country's
policy. The Chinese had perceived
possibilities of exploiting mao-Pakistan hostility to their own aavantage.

at least in their public pro-

nouncements, the Chinese haa adopted
a non-partisan posture between
India
ana Pakistan on the Kashmir issue
right from the beginning of their aiplomatic transactions with the two countries
till 1964, when they came out
in full support of Pakistan on Kashmir.

i^aia was now engaged in ter-

ritorial disputes with both Pakistan and
China, each of which was allied
41

V.P. Dutt, China s Foreign Policy
(Bombay: Asia Publishing House,
See also Haf eez-ur-Rahman Khan, "Pakistan's
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People s Republic of China," Pakistan
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Anwar Syed, op. cit ., pp. 57-60.

to one of the super
powers.

Yet rather than
cnan seek a con,
compromise settlement
•

fi-

in .oth cases,

sions:

maia's decision apparently
.eflecte. th.ee conclu-

nrs., that it would .e possible
to induce the United
States and

the soviet union to adopt
essentially neutral positions
in the Indo-PaKistani and Sino-Indian disputes
respectively,- second, that
the antagonists
of both Pakistan and China
were broader and deeper than
the border disputes, and that their settlement
would not lessen the underlying
hostility; and third, that India
could afford the military
burden of having
both neighbours as enemies. At
this point we shall of course
not elaborate on these contentions.
In fact, the Sino-Indian War
in 1962 and the subsequent
American

military aid to India accelerated
the process of Sino-Pakistan
detente.
When Bhutto succeeded Muhammed Ali
Bogra as Foreign Minister, Pakistan
pursued a policy of friendship with
China with zeal. The most significant achievement of Bhutto's stewardship
was the near complete identity

of interests between Pakistan and
China on the issues involving India.
In the Indo-Pakistan conflict of
September 1965, China openly supported

Pakistan, and condemned India for committing
aggression against Pakistan
and expressed its "firm support for Pakistan
in its just struggle against

aggression" and warned the Indian government of "the
responsibility for
"^^
all the consequences of its criminal and extended
aggression.

China's policy on Kashmir, like her policy towards India
and

Pakistan in general, is shaped primarily with a view to
serving her own

m

Quoted
Mohammed kyvh, "India as a Factor in Sino Pakistani Relations," International Studies January 1968, p. 292.
,
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national interests.

Because
ecause nf
of the geopolitical
importance of Ladakh
the Chinese thin, that
its inclusion in a
frienai,. dependent
PaKistal
«oul. serve their own
national interests
hetter tha„ its inclusion
in a
hostile India.

Co™,entators referred to
Pakistan's new China policy
as '.flirtation... .hey said
Pakistan was getting closer
to China only to spite
Xndia,
on the assumption that
the ene.y of one's enemy
was one's friend. Pakistan's relations with China
have developed largely
in response to her
security needs. They have
been influenced to a large
extent by her relations With India, from whom
the main threat to her
security has heen perceived.

Relations Between India and
Pakistan
India and Pakistan have had
numerous disputes, some of which,
especially the Kashmir problem,
as discussed earlier, have
led to'a high
level Of tension and military
conflict between them. Pakistani
observers
see India as an imperialist
power, entertaining grand expansionist
de44
sxgns.
Indian projections of post-independence
Pakistan and her leaders have been as deragatory. Nehru
alleged that Pakistani leaders were

driven by the old communal hatred of
India.

Indo-Pakistan hostility is

rooted deep in historical experience and
relations have remained tense
ever since independence, and Pakistan
has constantly sought reassurance
against India from other quarters.

Relations between India and Pakistan entered a bitter
phase after
44,

Anwar Syed, op. cit.

,

pp. 17-25.
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the failure of u-LjrecT:
direct tsiVc
r^r.
v
taiJcs on
Kashmir
in 1963.
"J^.

Xnaia-s ae.eat

CH^.

Paki^r^r.'^
-fajcistan s reaction
to

.

^^^^^^^^^^^

Co,»ents in the press were
gloating over India's defeat:
India
was cut down to size.'.
Once the conflict «as over
and the Chinese pulled
bac^, Pakistan's delight
gave way to frustration and
anger over its inability to take advantage of
India's troubles to gain its
demands especially on Kashmir. Their
provision of :„ilitary aid ^ade
Britain and the
united States special targets of
Pakistani anger. This created
a crisis
for Pakistan's foreign policy
of alliance with the West.
Ayub's objection to American arms for India
were due to Washington's failure
to consult with him as promised before
providing arms to India.
The United
States had simply informed Pakistan
of its intention to grant military
aid to India.
Besides American and Pakistani assessments
of the Chinese threat
to South Asia were different.

Ayub felt that the United STates misread

the extent of the Chinese military threat
to the subcontinent.

According

to him the Chinese aim was limited to
just a border problem.

As the military balance on the subcontinent was
shifting in India's
favor, Pakistan concluded that a measure of
security had been lost in that
45

Wayne A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China
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Mohammed
Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University
,

Press, 1967)

,
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was a staxe in it.
.e.ense .uU.-.p.

....

^^^^^^^^^^
that the United States
could not control the
wte use of
or arms
ar^s given to
Pakistan, so Pakistan was
now using
usina the same
o=
argument. Ayub wrote

Uer

P^ist^!47'°

"'^^^

-iftly and attack East

The decision of President
Kennedy and Prime Minister
Macmillan in
December 1962 on a second
installment of ,120 million
worth of arms for
India, the joint U.S.-U.K.
Indian air defense exercise
in 1963, and the
long-term agreement to supply
arms when Defense Minister
Chavan visited
the united States in April
1964, confirmed Pakistani leaders
in their earlier fears regarding a major
shift in American policy and
the decline in
Pakistan's influence on the United
States. Consequently, Pakistan's
policy moved along several lines.
it began to explore the
possibility of
forging links with China, to
court Afro-Asian states, and to
put additional pressure on India to come
to a settlement.

Pakistan did not try to cultivate the
U.S.S.R.

Peking looked

like the best bet, for the Soviets
appeared too closely tied to India.

There were also the special U.S.
facilities in West Pakistan, directed

against the U.S.S.R., which circumscribed
Ayub's maneuverability with Moscow.

Ayub may still have been concerned over Soviet
designs in Afghani-

stan.

Thus it was not until April 1965, after
the fall of Khrushchev,

that Ayub made an official visit to the
U.S.S.R. and relations began to
47
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204.
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improve

48

China saw its opportunity to take
advantage of the Indo-Pakistani
quarrel, for making a friend of the
enemy of your enemy is -almost
an automatic response in such a situation.
Friendly relationships with India's
neighbours was one way of isolating India
as much as possible.
There was
gradually a proliferation of Sino-Pakistani
contacts and activities.'*^
India became growingly convinced that it
needed military forces capable

of holding off Pakistan and China simultaneously.
The trend of events in the subcontinent was
making it increasingly

difficult for the (West to maintain satisfactory
ties with India and Pakistan, while countering Chinese and Soviet
influence in South Asia.

Chinese military danger seemed to be declining.

The

Furthermore Western offi-

cials had hoped that Indian armed forces would retain
their Western orientation, but increasing amounts of Soviet arms were flowing
into India.

These concerns paralleled earlier doubts in some quarters
about
the validity of the reasons for the alliance with Pakistan.

The United

States concluded that there was little choice but to continue moderate
arms aid to both covintries, trying to balance its interests in South Asia
as best as it could despite the renewed hostility.

The American government became increasingly unhappy as Pakistan
48

Mohammed

Ay\ib,

Friends not Masters

,

op. cit ., pp.

168-74.
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expanded its ties with China.

According to its assessment, Pakistan

should have made its military and
even economic assistance to India
conditional on India's willingness to agree
to what Pakistan regarded as a
fair settlement on Kashmir.

Foreign Minister Bhutto and the Pakitani
press created considerable annoyance for some U.S. officials.

President Ayub's visit to China

early in 1965 and some of his remarks there
were also viewed with concern
in Washington.

In April 1965 the United States cancelled
an invitation

to President Ayub to visit Washington—officially
it only postponed the

visit, but the effect was much the same.

Since the United States did not

feel it could receive Shastri after cancelling Ayub's
invitation, Shas-

tri's visit was postponed too, which annoyed the Indians
even more than
the Pakistanis.

Indo-American understanding and cooperation were also encountering more difficulties.

Washington was getting out of touch with leaders

of both countries at a time when their mutual hostility had reached a

kindling point.

Indo-Pakistan War of 1965

The continuing Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir erupted into
a large scale armed conflict in September 1965.

The war was triggered

off by a rebellion by the people of Kashmir in December 1963 which was

occasioned by the theft of a sacred hair of the Prophet from a shrine six
miles from Srinagar.

The holy relic had been in Kashmir for over three

centruies and news of its mysterious loss caused widespread and deep
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unrest in the valley.

Earlier on December

4,

1964, the Indian government
disclosed that

it abolished the Special status
of Kashmir under Article 370
of the Indian

constitution.

On December 21, 1964, the Indian
President issued a procla-

mation under which he assumed the powers
and functions of both government
and legislation in Kashmir. The Indian
government's new move was accompanied by a declaration that the state's
inclusion in the Union was complete, final and irrevocable

Pakistan's reactions were naturally bitter.

Her government pro-

tested and warned that "the consequences of
such attempts to annex Kash-

mir in repudiation of international obligations,
and in the face of open
and determined opposition of the people of Kashmir
will be disastrous

President Ayub accused India of taking illegal steps
towards the integration of disputed Kashmir territory into India.

India's new move confirmed

the suspicion that Pakistan had been tricked.

Reactions inside the Indian-held Kashmir, which had been in a
state of unrest ever since the uprising over the theft of the holy relic,

were violent and widespread.

The Plebiscite Front, the most powerful

political group in the State, described the new move, as "undemocratic
and anti-people."

It warned that India's action was fraught with grave

dangers, and pointed out that "due to these steps the situation in occu-

pied Kashmir has already worsened to an alarming extent
50

,

.

The Times

,

December 20, 1964

"ibid.
"ibid.
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"^"^
.

Abdullah
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appealed to the people of Kahs.i.
to Mefeat the purposes
of those who
are trying to tighten the
chain of slavery on the Muslims
of KashmirYou cannot achieve freedom by
imploring anybody and in view of
India's

present attitude you have to think
how to face her effectively."

Abdul-

lah was arrested, and this led to
further agitation and popular
uprising
in the State.

Before this incident, there was another
military encounter between the Indian and Pakistani forces
in the Rann of Kutch in April-May,
1965.

The conflict was a battle over a piece
of desolate land, which

Pakistan regards as a lake and India as a swamp,
and which is of very
little intrinsic value to either.

It has been a disputed territory be-

tween India and Pakistan since independence in
1947.

The question was

not that of demarcating a well-defined border in
the area but of agreeing
on its precise location.

The disputed territory comprises an area of

3,500 square miles situated roughly north of the 24th parallel.

^^Ibid.
55 ^
The

dispute pertains to the northern half of the area. On the
basis of historical facts and exercise of jxirisdiction, Pakistan could
claim to the whole of Rann of Kutch over which the former Sind province
(now West Pakistan) of British India exercised administrative control.
Pakistan however contented herself with a claim to the northern half of
the Rann.
Pakistan also based her claim on the international law applicable to areas which are of the nature of a landlocked sea or a boundary
lake.
However at the time of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947,
India laid claim to the whole of the Rann. As the boundary between the
province of Sind and the princely state of Kutch was not clearly defined
during the British period, there was scope for claims and counterclaims
by two successor dominions. The result was that the Rann of Kutch remained a disputed area between the two new states.

Ill

United States Reactions
in 1965 India was able to
wear down a little bit the
U.S. indifference to India. Just before
and after the war between
India and Pakistan in 1965, there was a brief
period when the United States
was dis-

illusioned with isla^nabad.

The United States postponed
from July to

September 1965 the World Bank consortium
meeting to decide on the extent
of aid to Pakistan and brought
pressure on Ayub Khan not to get
close to
Peking.

But U.S. officials went to great
lengths to assure him that aid

to India was not against Pakistan,
Islamabad was unhappy about the U.S.

stand.

Bhutto said: "...it is enough to say
great disappointment was

felt in Peking about the American attitude. "^^
In response to the outbreak of hostilities
the United States on

September

8,

1965, placed an embargo on the supply of all
military equip-

ment to India and Pakistan.

The embargo included commercial sales of

items on the annumitions list, all undelivered
grant equipment and services, and government to government military sales.

A U.S. Department of Defense publication noted that the
embargo

hurt Pakistan much more than India because Pakistan did not
produce a

significant portion of its armament requirements and did not have a
ready
source of arms outside the free world.

It was estimated that at the time

of the embargo, the U.S. was the supplier of about 80 percent of PakiStan

'

s

modern weapons
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The united States exerted heavy
pressure to achieve an under-

standing between the two countries;
all American aid to India and
Pakistan was suspended until an understanding
was reached and troops withdrawn.

This rein forced the Soviet bids for
peace in the subcontinent.

Rarely if ever have the two major protagonists
in the Cold War worked so

nearly parallel to cool down a major world
hot spot.^^
The six elected members of the Security
Council cosponsored a

resolution on September

4,

1965 requesting a cessation of hostilities,

and reestablishment of the 1949 cease fire line.^°

The atmosphere of the

crisis during these tense sessions in New York was
emphasized by the fact
that Russia and the United States voted together, for
the first time
since the U.N. was formed, on a question of war and peace
in a major area
of the world.

Both wanted the fighting to

end

as quickly as possible

and both were most anxious that China should not intervene in
it.

China

had given moral support to Pakistan from the outset, an official state-

ment from Peking on September

7

stating that "the Indian Government's

armed attack on Pakistan is an act of naked aggression.

"^"^

Professor Syed makes an interesting statement in this connection:
There can be no doubt, however, that Chinese threats
had a significant impact on the political-diplomatic
front.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union
would have preferred to come down strongly on India's

with refugees and escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
92nd Congress, February 2, 1972, p. 87.
59
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,

December 13, 1965, pp. 952-57.

,

side.
Hed they been unencumbered by
the Chinese
factor, they would have felt free
not only to aid
India but also to put a great deal
more pressure on
Pakistan than they were actually able
62
to
do.

This statement is not far from the
truth.

Moscow and Washing-

ton's attitude stemmed out of their desire
to keep Pakistan from being

dragged too far into Chinese influence, as
best they could.

Moscow had followed a careful strategic line
to make sure that
the Indian government did not react adversely
to the Soviet overtures to

wards Pakistan.

While calling publicly for peace and avoiding
the use o

veto, Moscow made no effort to interrupt the flow
of Soviet economic

assistance or to restrict arms aid to India.

Work proceeded on the MIG

factory, the military pipeline continued in operation.

Faced by the

Anglo-American embargo and the threat of Red China, New Delhi was more
dependent than ever on Moscow.

The Indo-Soviet rapprochment gave New

Delhi a potential arms source in defiance of the Western embargo, which
was of far greater consequence than any supplies Pakistan could expect

from Peking.

American military supplies to Pakistan, which were suspended at
the outbreak of war, were never resumed on a grant basis.

This amounted

to an effective disruption of Pakistan's military alliance with the

United States.

Pakistan's growing ties with China did strain her rela-

tionship with the United States during this period.
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Of Pakistan's confrontation
with India also called -for
a re-appraisal of.
American foreign policy.

The Emergence of Bangladesh
It would also be important to
study the impact of the
Bangladesh

crisis on Indo-U.S. relations.

The sharp differences in the
attitudes

of India and the United States and
the inflexible positions they
adopted
over the crisis in East Bengal in 1971
exposed to the world for the first
time the deep fissures that had existed
for a long time while in the ties

between the two countries.

Before taking a hard line, India made
re-

peated attempts to make the United States
understand her point of view
and her difficulties.

There was no corresponding effort by the
United

States to communicate with India.

The steps taken by India to meet the

threat posed by the mass influx of refugees from
east Bengal were in no

way directed against the national interests of the
United States, a country geographically far removed from east Bengal, India's
main concern

was to safeguard her national interests which she felt was
threatened by
the unprecedented upheaval in an area close to her borders, and
by the

presence of refugees in the sensitive border states in east India.
Bangladesh is the first country in the post-war world to emerge
after a secessionist struggle against its own government.

Every other

newly independent state of Asia and Africa won its independence from an
imperial power.

For two decades the Bengalis had been pressing for au-

tonomy against a West Pakistan dominated government.

They resented the

attempts to impse Urdu as the Official language, the use of the region's
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foreign exchange earnings for the
economic development of the West,
and
their lack of access to the
military-bureaucratic elite which dominated
the country.

By 1970, the Bengalis were as united
as a people has ever

been behind its own nationalist movement,
Awami League and its leader
Sheikh Mujib Rahman.

Bangladesh was separated from West Pakistan by
a thousand miles
of territory over a country which since the
hijacking incident in February 1970, denied the Pakistanis air rights and all
land transit facilities.

For the Pakistani government it was a costly affair
to crush the

Bengali movement and it proved to be impossible to prevent
the smuggling
of arms and personnel across thousands of miles of largely
unpatrolled

borders.

Finally Bangladesh became independent through the direct military
intervention of India.

India had much to gain by seeing its hostile

neighbor dismembered and much to lose

doing nothing.
cessfully.

(a

permanent refugee burden) by

Moreover it had the military capacity to intervene suc-

It was thus in India's, interest to stress the virtues of

"self determination" over Pakistan's emphasis on the right to "national

integration.
The United States, China, and the Soviet Union were fearful that

their interests might be jeopardized by the civil war and an Indo-Pakistan war.

The Chinese wanted a strong Pakistan to balance India.

The

Soviets hoped to maintain friendly ties with both Pakistan and India.
The United States was content with the existing power balance in the

region and did not want to see it disturbed.

And all three powers
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feared that their relationship to
one another .ight be seriously
affected
by a south Asian conflict. The
Soviet leadership, however, had
.uch to
gain in supporting India in the
crisis than by taking an evenhanded
position.
The united States, since the 1965
Indo-Pakistan war, had tried to
prevent a new war on the subcontinent,
and to maintain friendly relations
with both countries. She tried to maintain
equilibrium of influence with
the Soviet Union and China through a policy
of "relief, restraint and

accomodation."

This attitude was in keeping with President
Nixon's 1971

foreign policy message in which he said:
We will do nothing to harm legitimate Soviet
and
Chinese interests in the area [the subcontinent]
We are equally clear, however, that no outside
power has a claim to a predominant influence
The State Department officials put it this way:

Our goal is stability in the siibcontinent
We
have counseled both India and Pakistan to keep coolnot to let tensions escalate in border areas that
lead to war.
Stability means no war between India
and Pakistan
.

The thrust of U.S. policy indicates that Washinton viewed its

interests as best served by helping to alleviate suffering among the dis-

placed in ravaged East Pakistan and among the 7.5 million Bengali refugees in India and by supporting the efforts of Yahya Khan to preserve the

unity of Pakistan.
A major side effect of U.S. policy towards Pakistan was to drive
U.S. -Indian relations to their lowest ebb.

Any show of support for

neighboring Pakistan was regarded as hostility towards India in New Delhi.
65
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Slowly the bonds of friendship between
the U.S. and India were dissolving.
The strains and irritations spawned
as a result of
rebellion and repression in East Pakistan
have been
obvious in recent months, but there is
also now discernible beneath the surface a more basic
shift in
attitudes here. Some degree of official
annoyance
has always plagued relations between
Washington and
New Delhi. And for half a year now, these
customary
tensions have been exacerbated by President
Nizon's
refusal to denounce Pakistan and by his
eagerness to
repair communications with China—the two
neighbors
that India fears and resents the most.
The Indians, in tnrn, have further frayed sentiments here by seeking strength in a new intimacy
with the Russians and by making a vigorous display
of their resentment of American conduct. ^7

Americans also contended that the Indians have been pro-Soviet
for a long
time and despite their professions of non-alignment, they
have been

deeply antagonistic to American positions on such issues as Vietnam,
the
Middle East and arms control:
India is no longer referred to as an Asian "showplace"
of development by democratic means.
She is no longer
talked about as the great "alternative" to totalitarian
prescriptions for economic progress. She is no longer
seen as particularly useful in luring other poor nations
from the temptations of Communism. .. .^^

Whereas China has been accorded almost big power
standing in the new American view of Asia as a nation
with which the United States, the Soviet Union and
Japan must now share influence in the Pacific India
.^^
remains merely an ovject of policy

—

—

South Asia's progress is important to the United
States because "we cannot deny our humanitarian
interest in the well being of so many people with
67
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such exxgent needs," and
because "unresolved ene'^"^"^^
--^^
area
^InTjlTlT."''^'^.
vulnerable
to an undesirable level
of foreign influence. "^0

Even though U.S. officials did
not condone President
Yahya's repression Of the autonomy movement
in East Pakistan, U.S.
arms shipments
to Pakistan continued. The
total value of commodities
at issue was only
something like 2.4 million dollars
worth, made under old
licensing agreements. Washington either did not
realize the anger these shipments
would
arouse in India, or probably did not
care.
The State Department says the
total shipment was worth 56.2 million,
some senators said it was as
high
as 35 million dollars.'^

However never before had the United
States sac-

rificed so much of the good will of a
friendly major country for so small
a consideration.

72

The Indians knew that U.S. military aid
shipments to both India
and Pakistan-even those already afloat-were
stopped in their tracks in
Thus they knew the same could have been done
this time, and the

1965.

deliberate decision in the face of Pakistani performance
in East Pakistan
sent them up the wall.^^

The arms shipment to Pakistan was, as Senator

Frank Church said on June 22, 1971, "one more instance
of our government
saying one thing and then Congress and American public
learning later
70
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that the facts are contrary."

The secret decision to give
anus to Paki-

stan was believed to have been
taken by President Nixon himself
in June
The Nixon administration publicly
announced in June 1971, that it
intended to continue economic aid to
Islamabad, although the Aid Pak Con1971.

sortium wanted aid to be withheld till
a political solution to the conflict between the two wings of Pakistan was
found.
The explanation was that it was a bureaucratic
muddle.

The State

Department officials were told by the Office of
Munitions Control that
all military shipments for Pakistan had been
delivered, that meant deliv-

ered to Pakistan officials in the United States.

State Department offi-

cials assumed it meant delivered in Pakistan, and
proceeded to assure the

American public that other shipments to Pakistan were halted.

There was

still time to halt the shipments but President Nixon decided
not to do it;

When this confusion surfaced, negotiations with the Pakistanis

already were well advanced for the use of Islamabad as the launching for
Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking.
What was so special about Islamabad as a point of
departure? If the Pakistanis would have reacted
badly to a blocking of the pipeline dribble, why
couldn't Mr. Kissinger have been rerouted from
Hong Kong or elsewhere? The point was, I bet that
Islamabad was by now in on the secret; if it had
been rendered peevish it might have leaked the
secret.
The one thing the White House was determined was that there would be no leak.^'*
The Indians were also greatly irritated by the U.S. -inspired U.N.

effort to station observers of the refugee flow symmetrically in India
and East Pakistan.

'^^Ibid.
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This is the same old pernicious game of
equating
India and Pakistan.

When hundreds of foreigners belonging to so
many
different nations have been going to the refugee
camps unhindered for the last four months and
have
freely reported conditions existing there and
what
the refugees want and hope for, it is sheer impertinence on the part of the U.S.A. and the U.N.—
goaded by the U.S. A. —to want to station U.N.
observers on Indian soil. ^5
It is already clear that during the Indo-Pakistan
conflict over

Bangladesh, U.S. policy was "tilted" in favor of Pakistan and
against
India.

But why did the President and Mr. Kissinger take the line of

policy that they did?

The calculations that went into this policy beha-

viour come out of the geopolitical power struggle game playing that is
supposed to be Mr. Kissinger's main forte, and is by all accoxints a game
that President Nixon liked to play.

Nixon and Kissinger had been play-

ing their geopolitical games in 1971-72 with a game plan aimed at re-

ordering all world relations through a series of bold and fast plays, the

boldest and fastest of them centering on China.
cal

— if

not a sensible or intelligent

The only key to a logi-

— explanation

of the President's

policy regarding India-Pakistan and Bangladesh lies in his carefullynursed surprise strategy to rearrange American relations with China.

Professor Harold

R.

Isaacs suggests:

There are older cold war underpinnings and precedents
for a pro-Pakistan U.S. policy. Pakistan was a Dulles
type "ally" via the more or less extinct Cento treaty.
It provided the U.S. with staging bases, especially
for the U2s.
It served in its own wobbly fashion as
the southern hinge of the bloc of non-Soviet-oriented

^^Quotes, taken from Lewis report to the Subcommittee, op. cit

.
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Muslim states including Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey
The United States has been
supplying arms
and other aid to Pakistan for
many years on thi^
account, aid which continued through
Pakistan's intermittent flirtations and brief
encounters with both
Russia and China.
The Pakistan connection as it
turned out, became an
asset and a key piece in Mr. Nixon's
new China game
plan.
When instead of launching U2s Pakistan
justified
Mr. Noxon's mind all the treasure
that had
been lavished on that country through
the years

m
_

Indeed, the bloodied land of Bangladesh
can be put
down in history as the first new common
ground across
which the Americans and Chinese reached to
shake hands
for the first time in nearly twenty-five
years.
India
might be finding its situation intolerable,
but India
would have to wait. Nothing could be allowed
to happen
that might irritate Peking, even lead it.
.to put off
or postpone the Nixon trip until too late for
the campaign season in America. So tilt we did towards
Pakistan
in order to keep tilting towards Peking.
'

.

It was too bad, then, if this gave Russia its
opport\anity to move in decisively to consolidate its
own

South Asian position. It was too bad if India
having been explicitly told by Mr. Kissinger last July
that it could not count any more, as it could in 1962,
on American help against China—seized upon the proffered
Soviet support against the newly- forming Pakistan-PekingWashington axis.''

Keeping the American eye on the Peking ball meant in
effect tiirning the American eye away from the plain
facts of West Pakistani oppression and repression in
East Bengal; the flouting of national election results
by President Yahya Khan; the contrasting democratic
character of Indian politics and the intolerability of
the situation created for India by ten million refugees.
76

'^^

Harold R. Isaacs, "Tilt: American Views of South Asia," essay
prepared for the subcommittee to investigate problems connected with
refugees and escapees, of the Committee on Judiciary U.S. Senate, 92nd
Congress, February 2, 1973, pp. 179-83.
,

"^"^

Ibid .
78

.

Ibid.
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During the weeks of the India-Pakistan
crunch, all reports made
it clear that the President's feelings
about "tilting" towards Pakistan

were very strong.

He kept calling Mr. Kissinger
"every half hour" to

see to it that the bureaucrats did his
will or suffered his wrath.

Pre-

Anderson White House reports described an
angrily aroused President dictating countermoves against India.

This "don't-stand-there-do-something"

approach was climaxed by the dispatch of the
Enterprise task force into
the Bay of Bengal just as the fighting ended.
It is certainly plausible to suggest that Mr.
Nixon
had already staked so much, politically and emotionally,
on his Peking game plan that any threat to it was
enough to drive him up the Oval Room. He got mad at
bureaucrats who were not tilting fast enough to suit him."^^
In August 1971 India suspected that Pakistan was
coordinating

her major diplomatic moves with the United States.

Whe found that the

United States was not interested in helping India to send back the
refugees.

In India there were many prophets of doom who said that the country

would suffer defeat if Pakistan made a lightning attack and lamented that
Islamabad had the military backing of powerful countries.
As regards India's role, the Nixon administration branded India
"as the aggressor in the war."
7,

In an unusual press briefing on December

1971, the White House spokesman narrated how "the United States Govern-

ment was actively promoting a political settlement," it was further dis-

closed that "the United States had wrung several concessions from the

Pakistani government and had conveyed this information to New Delhi

123

before the outbreak of
hostilities; ,et accor.in. to
the. Xn.ia attache.
Pakistan without justification."
The White House defended
the U.S. decision "to pin responsibility
on India for the warfare. "^^
an earlier
statement on December 4, a high
U.S. goverr^ent official
who spoke with
the authority of the government
cormnented that "we believe
that since the

m

beginning of the crisis Indian
policy in a systematic way
has led to perpetuation Of the crisis and deepening
"^^
of the crisis.

Henry Kissinger

saidt

"Moscow is seeking to humiliate
Peking by demonstrating that
China,
a supporter of Pakistan, cannot
prevent Pakistan's defeat.

Indira Gandhi the Indian Prime Minister
thought that only the

united States was in a position to
restrain Pakistan and help India to
solve the refugee problem. She even went
to the United States to inform

Nixon of the grave situation in South Asia,
to find out to what extent
he was committed to help Pakistan.

During their discussions lasting

three hours and fifteen minutes spread over
two days, Nixon and Indira

Gandhi made a sustained effort to understand each
other's points of view.
She did not doubt his desire to find a solution,
but she saw that he was

unable to shed his set notions about India and Pakistan.

Nixon indicated to her that the United States would cut off
military axd to Pakistan 84 and asked India to be patient for a
couple of
The New York Times
82
83

84

.

December 8, 1971.

The Sunday Times (London), December
The New York Times

,

5,

1971.

December 15, 1971.

A spokesman of the U.S. State Department said that the reason for
cutting aid was that "we agreed with the government of Pakistan that
there would be no useful purpose served by continued shipments." It
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months.

Kissinger had earlier in October
1971, told Indian leaders
that
the united States wanted at least
a year's cooling-off
period during
Which India should stop supporting
the guerrillas. Washington's
anxiety
was that there should be no major
conflict in South Asia which might
affect Nixon's visit to China, or his
chances in the presidential election
in 1972.

When Indira Gandhi returned to India
on November 13, she in-

formed some of her cabinet colleagues that
she believed the United States

did not want to get involved in an
India-Pakistan war.

She gave the im-

pression that before making any moves, India would
await the outcome of
the new diplomatic efforts by some of the
countries she had visited.

"

'

But less than a fortnight after her return, economic
aid to India was
cut off on the excuse that U.S. public opinion
"which had become impa-

tient over India's refusal to defuse the situation" had
to be assuaged.

When the war began on December

3,

1971, President Nixon granted

an urgent request from Pakistan for substantial quantities
of military
aid.

It sent the "Enterprise" to the Indian ocean.

William Rogers

called the Pakistani ambassador for a lengthy conference on December
4,

but did not contact the Indian ambassador to hear his version.

Acting

under Nixon's instructions, Washington suspended a little over a third
of the U.S. economic aid to India on the ground that such help might be
used by New Delhi to carry on the war with Pakistan.

A report in the New

York Times from Islamabad on March 30, 1972 said that Pakistan military
sources disclosed that the air forces of Jordan and Libya had provided

appeared from this statement that the stoppage had no connection with
the east Bengal crisis, nor with the assurance given by Nixon to Indira
Gandhi
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-erican-.uilt co^at planes to
Pakistan .u.in. the wa.
and t.at see of
the. continued to regain in
Pakistan in March, three
.onths after the
ceasefire.^^ The White House
conde^ed India's use of the
ar.ed

'

forces
as unjustified and as a
.ove that could lead to
international chaos.

Kissinger told a visiting British
statesman that he regarded
India's invasion^of east Bengal in the sa.e
light as Hitler's occupation
of the
Rhine.^^ Nonetheless, the White
House denied that it .as
anti-Indian:
The U.S. efforts in the United
Nations to brand India as the
aggressor were frustrated by the
Soviet Union. Nixon siad that
he re-

greted the failure of the Soviet Union
to join the vast majority of
the
menUoership of the United Naitons who
called for an immediate ceasefire
and withdrawal of forces.

Both the United States and China
working in

harmony and with the enthusiasm of a new
friendship, made bluff manoeuvres against India's land and sea
frontiers.

themselves as co-belligrents.

.

The U.S. and China "found

.when they backed Pakistan.

."^^
.

Washington put pressure on India and the Soviet
Union asking them
to end the war.

Nixon was reported to have felt that his visit
to Moscow

planned for June 1972 could be endangered if the
Soviet Union continued
to support India.

During the Bangladesh crisis the United States suffered

two diplomatic defeats.

The first was its failure to persuade Pakistan

to reach an agreement with Bangladesh and the second its inability to

avert the war between India and Pakistan.
85

86
87

,

The New York Times

,

Peter Jay, The Times

There was disappointment and

April 1, 1972.
,

London, January 1, 1972.

G.L. Sulzberger, The New York Times , February 2, 1972.
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bitterness in the United States
over "this disaster to
American prestige
and posture throughout the
democratic world. "^^ jaxnes
Reston had remarked that the President supported
Pakistan because he saw "in
the sub-

continent the power struggle between
China and the Soviet Union."
He
said that the war had encouraged
a close relationship
between Washington
and Peking just before Nixon was
to visit China, a desirable
result from
the point of view of the United
States.
Nixon had feared earlier that
a prolonged war in South Asia
might cast a shadow on his Peking
visit.

It turned out that the brief war
was beneficial to the United States
in

cementing its relationship with Peking and
discovering common ground.
India now felt that she was no longer a
service applicant

approaching the rich nations for aid with an
empty bowl in hand.

She

informed Washington that her relations with
it could be normalised only
if the United States recognized her dominant
position in South Asia.

She

said that the turmoil in the area was a legacy
of the big power politics

from the days of John Foster Dulles.

Soviet Russia and Ch ina on Bangladesh

.

Within about a week from the

adoption of the ruthless suppressive measures against the freedom
fighters
in East Bengal by the Pakistani rulers, President Podgorny wrote
a rather

strongly worded letter to the President of Pakistan "with an insistent
appeal for the adoption of the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed
and repression against the population of East Pakistan" and requested him
88

89

The New York Times

,

December 17, 1971.

The New York Times, December 18, 1971.
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to adopt

nethods of peaceful political
s.ttUmenf of the issue. '°

This
was indicative of the Soviet
s^pathy for the East Bengali
freedom
fighters,
indeed Pravda ohose to describe
the resistance struggle in
East Bengal as a "partisan war"
almost the same week.^l
Moscow's abandon:.ent of post-Tashkent Soviet
non-partisanship in the Indian subcontinent was evident in the coverage of
Bangladesh news in the Soviet press
right from the beginning.

Amidst such developments India's Foreign
Minister, Mr. Swaran
Singh, visited Moscow in early June.

While the government of India uti-

lized the refugee issue to justify its military
action against Pakistan,
the Soviet government used it for showing
its support to India on the

Bangladesh issue.

In a joint statement issued by Gromyko
and Swaran

Singh in Moscow on the occasion of the lattter's
visit to Soviet Russia,
the Pakistan government was asked to take "immediate
measures" to end
"the continuing flood of refugees into India" and backed
political solu-

tion of the problem. 92

In what amounted to a semi-official cognizance of

the Bangladesh government, Isvestia listed "Acting President
of the Demo-

cratic Republic of Bangladesh, Sayed Naztul Islam" among the leaders
who

had sent their condolence messages to the Soviet government on the death
of the Soviet cosmonauts. 93

When the prospects of a political solution of the Bangladesh
90

The Times of India

,

April

5,

Pravda, April 7, 1971.
92

93

The Statesman
,

,

June 10, 1971.

The Hindu, July 16, 1971.

1971.

128

crisis became increasingly bleak,
at this ti.e Gro^yKo paid
a sadden
visit to New Delhi and surprised
Mrs. Gandhi's friends and
foes by signing the Indo-Soviet Defence
Treaty.

soviet policy on the Bangladesh
issue must have had some
considerations for scoring an ideological
edge over Mao's China too.
The

Soviets seemed to have rightly guessed
that with their deep-rooted involvement in Pakistan the Chinese were
unlikely to support the freedom
struggle in East Pakistan.

Considerations of pure and simple power politics
must have also

weighed heavily in the Kremlin's mind.

As the Soviets were dealing with

both their global rivals-China and the U.S.
-on the Bangladesh issue,
they were in an enviable position of smashing
their rivals' influence not

only in the subcontinent but also in the world at
large.

As the objec-

tive of Kosygin's policy was to check American and
Chinese physical inter-

vention in the possible Indo-Pakistan war, he provided a
shield to protect
India by signing the Indo-Soviet Defence Treaty.

Indeed, the American

intelligence reports after the conclusion of the Indo-Pakistan war
disclosed that the Soviet Ambassador in India, Mr. Nikolai Pegov, gave secret
assurances to Mrs. Gandhi that the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet would not

allow the U.S. Seventh fleet, which was on the way to Dacca, to intervene
in the war.

The Soviet ambassador had also promised that in case China

attacked across the Himalayas, the Soviet Union would open diversionary

action
94

m

Sinkiang.

94

This disclosure was made by the Washington Post columnist, Mr.
Jack Anderson, who was supplied with this information by some officials
in the U.S. administration who were critical of Nixon's actions. The
Times of India, December 22, 1971.
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nor. than anything else it
is geopolitics that has
brought importance to Pakistan in Soviet
policies. The very possiMlity
of Pakistan's
aisintegration in the wake of the
Bangladesh Movement and the
inability
of the Pakistani government to
disengage itself fro-n China,
whatever the
fate of the Bangladesh movement,
had weakened the very base
of the geo-

political compulsions in Soviet Pakistan
policy.

Pakistan's reliance

upon the Chinese shield was largely
to protect East Pakistan from
India
and the Soviets might have imagined
that once the East Bengalis
separated
themselves from West Pakistan, Pakistan's
reliance on China too might
diminish,

under these circumstances, for the same
geopolitical reasons,

Russia favored a friendly Bangladesh
economically and culturally tied to
India.

Since the Bangladesh movement at this stage
was led by pro-Moscow
and pro-Indian Mujibur Rahman's Awami League
Party, the creation of Bang-

ladesh would not have been in China's interest,

in fact. East Pakistan

was a strategic link for China's political influence
in Pakistan itself,

because of Pakistan's reliance upon the Chinese shield for
protecting its
eastern wing fom India.

When the Indian government recognized Bangledesh, Peking radio
termed it as an Indian act of "expansionism" and compared the Bangladesh

government with the Japanese puppet government in Manchuria, which was
"recognized by the German and Italian fascists only."

Its attack on the

Soviet Union was more blunt; it accused Moscow of "trampling on the norms
of international relations at will." 95
95

The Hindustan Times, December

8.

1971.
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Conclusion

in this chapter, we l^ave seen
the kind of games that nations
play.

Great powers are afraid to tamper
with a small state that enjoys
the protection Of a great power, for fear
of generating a larger conflict.
When
a balance of power prevails, the
smaller powers make themselves
its beneficiaries, by aligning on the heavier side.
When the balance is even,
the great powers would actively seek the
allegiance of smaller States.
In the present context of detente between
the great powers the smaller

states have lost their sway over them.

CHAPTER

III

ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF INDIA AND
THE UNITED STATES

Introduction

The united States has been the largest
donor of aid to India
for relief, rehabilitation and development
over a long period of time.^

Economic assistance to India consisted of
grants, loans ^ and agricultural commodities.

In the United States aid has been
looked upon as an

instrument of foreign policy and has made an enormous
contribution
to her national security.

Initally American aid policy in Asia was

based on her politico-military rivalry with Russia and
China.

United

States policy has been to assist India in maintaining
her democratic
institutions.

India has received $10.8 billion in economic assistance^

of which AID $3.8 billion Public Law 490 food products $6.2 billion
and low interest developmental loans, $639 million and wheat loan
$244 million (1947-1977)

Over the years bilateral relations between the two countries
1

Vadilal Dagli, ed.

Two Decade s of Indo-U.S. Relations
(Bombay:
Co., 1969); P.J. Eldridge, The Politics of Foreign Aid in India
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); J.J. Kaplan, The Challenge of
Foreign Aid (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1967); S. Chandrasekhan, American
Aid and India's Economic Development (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1965)
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2

All development loans are repaid in U.S. dollars to AID unless
otherwise states.
3

New York Times September 27 1974 Also see Chester Bowles
A View From New Delhi, (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1969) p. 119.
,

,
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h.ve resulted fro.

ti,„e to

ti.e in so.e differences.

Paradoxically,

the acceptance of aid from the
United states has itself
been a source
of friction. Expression of
gratitude, on the Indian side,
especially
in recent years, has been ™.ted.
Instead a desire to assert
independence despite receipt of aid has
been evident.* Insistence on
proper
use of economic assistance by the
U.S. government is considered
as

interference, and Indian government
officials are all the time heard
saying that "pressures have to be
resisted."
The direction of the Indian economy
towards state control of

heavy industry, has not been well taken
in the United States.

The capi-

talist system was regarded in India as
unsuited to her needs, and hence

American criticism of dominance of the public
sector in Indian planning
was considered unnecessary.
The political implications of the aid has been
more serious.
In the fifties, American aid was unduly dominated
by considerations of

cold war, which India found highly distasteful.^

During his visit to

the United States in 1949, Nehru made it very clear that
India was not

willing to make any changes in her foreign policy in return for any
economic advantages that the

United States may offer.

In 1953, heavy

Congressional cuts were made in the proposed aid to India, as a reaction
against India's policy in the Korean war.

In 1965 again aid to India

4

Recently there have been frequent official statements to this
effect in the Indian press.
^E.I. Broadkin, "United States Aid to India and Pakistan," Asian
September 1970, pp. 664-677.
,

Survey
g

Asia,

See Charles Wolf, Foreign Aid; Theory and Practice in Southern
(Princeton Univ. Press, 1960) pp. 140-45.
,
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was reduced from 585 Allien
to S65.88 Allien because
of her failure
to take a strong anti-Soviet
stand on Hungary.'
1957. the Advisory
committee on the Mutual Security
Program endorsed the View;

m

assistance programs, a higher
priority
So,^?ri;^
should
be gxven those countries which
have joined
the collectxve secvirity system. 8

India was never too happy about
these political attachments of

economic aid, and Nehru insisted that
India would never receive aid
with strings attached.
The Russian economic aid to India added
another complicating

factor to India's economic relations with
the United States.

When in

1953 the Soviet Union started on a program of
economic aid to non-Com-

munist countries, India was chosen to be the
largest recipient of aid

outside the Bloc.

Economically, the Soviet aid was far more appealing.

It was mostly in the form of loans on very
generous

terms— 2

to 2.5

percent interest, which was almost half the rate of World
Bank and Ex-

port-Import Bank rates.

It was repayable in local currency or local

commodities over a period of ten to thirty years.

Very low prices were

allowed for commodities for which the loan was to be spent, whereas

high prices were allowed for commodities which the Soviet Union bought
in repayment.

At times, the loan was completely or in part cancelled

before it was repaid.

In contrast to the United States, who imposed

conditions on the efficient use of loans, the Soviet Union professed

"^Ibid., pp.
Q

214-16 and 218-19.

Report to the President by the President's Citizen Advisors on
Mutual Security Progrctm, (Washington, D.C.: 1957) p. 120.
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to have trust in the judgement
of the receiving government,

.^iie
most American aid went to the
less popular private sector,
the Soviet
aid was Channelled for heavy
industry, which was laying
the foundation
of the future industrialization
of the country and was
closely identified with its national aspirations.
Consequently it made a much greater
impression on the recipient country,
addition, the Soviet Union
laid great emphasis on the fact that
no political strings were attached
to Russian aid. At the Afro-Asian
People's Solidarity Conference in

m

Cairo in 1958, the Soviet representative
described Russian economic

policy in very attractive terms:
We are ready to help you as brother helps
brother.
We do not ask you to join any blocs—
our only condition IS that there will be no strings attached.

The Soviet economic policy in India was upsetting
to American

policy makers.

There was the danger of Indian economy becoming
unduly

dependent on Russian economy.

Moreover, the training of Indian youth

in the U.S.S.R. and the presence of Russian technical
personnel in India

could facilitate the spread of Communist ideology among
Indian intellectuals, who Americans feared already had a leaning towards the
left.

Cold War and U.S. Aid

The second world war brought about a radical change in the
stiTucture of international relations.

In Asia, the post-war years

witnessed a ferment among the Asian peoples long held under colonial
bondage.

9

This ferment led to national uprisings, and there was a demcind

Department of State Bulletin

,

March 1958, p. 470,
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for independence everywhere
which, eventually, had to
be conceded by
the colonial powers. Preoccupation
with Europe and with the
military

containment of communism caused the
United States during the
inunediate
post-war years to neglect almost
entirely the economic, social
and

political aspirations of the Asian
peoples.

Only after the fall of

China to the communists in 1949 did
it begin to assume some
primary
responsibility for the security and well
being of the Asian nations.
Like the united States, the Soviet
Union had no vital strategic

interests in South and Southeast Asia during
the period immediately

following the end of the Second World War,
when the Colonial Powers were
in rapid retreat.

However, the spectacular growth of communism
in the

area and also the revolution in China gave impetus
to, and conferred

enormous prestige on, the communist cause in Asia.

After 1953, the main objective of Soviet policy in
Asia was
to widen the potential areas of friction between the
new nations of

Asia on the one hand and the United States and the West on
the other.
At the same time through constant attack on colonialism and
unequivocal
support of nationalist movement, the Soviet Union won the sympathy

of the newly emerging nations of Asia and also materially advanced its

position in that area.

The communists took every opportunity to de-

noiance colonialism and made every effort to link the United States with

it.

The war in Asia had ended with the dropping of the first two

atomic bombs upon Hiroshima amd Nagasaki in Japan in August 1945.

Until

1949, the Truman administration scarcely thought of Asia at all out-

side of its special interests in China

cind

Japan.

Its major concern
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was the rehabilitation and
a defence
aerence nf
of =a k.*battered and weakened Europe.
After the capture of power by
the co^unists in China
in 1949,
the U.S. government acted
increasingly on the assumption
that the communists Who were firmly in power
were expansionist and hostile
to the
united States,
it therefore took the
decision to extend the containment
policy to Asia, basin, it, according
to Secretary of state Dean
Acheson,
on "objective possibilities" and
on the identity of interests
between
the people of the United States
and the people of Asia. The
most striking feature of the containment policy
as extended to Asia was the
absolute determination of the United
States to protect what it considered
to be its "defense perimeter" running
from thealeutians via Japan to

the Philippines.
The outbreak of the Korean war in the
early stages of the con-

tainment policy led to a reassessment of U.S.
policies in Asia.

The

North Korean attack demonstrated the need for local
military defences
to forestall similar attacks.

The United States, therefore, pursued

a policy designed to protect the freedom of the
non-communist nations

in Asia by creating sufficient defensive strength to
deter aggression

and prevent subversion.

And U.S. military policy in Asia after the

outbreak of the Korean conflict was based on the assumption of communist

determination to laiinch military aggression at anytime, anywhere in
Asia.

10

The attack by North Korea upon South Korea in June 1950 was regarded as the opening move by the Soviet Union in a series of military
agressions likely to occur anywhere in Asia. It was believed that the
Soviet Union had chcinged its policy radically from one of peaceful
penetration cind siabversion to one of open warfare. Yet this interpretation was intrinsically implausible at that time and has been
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American security was g.owi„,iy

.„

relations between the United
States and the Soviet
bloc and between
each Of these two countries
and the ^ss of
countries located chiefly
in Asia and .frica which
forced the unconnHtted
neutral group." Besides the united states had
to face the fact that
the underdeveloped
countries of Asia were li.ely
to be strongly ten^ted
to accept Soviet
economic assistance if they were
unable to obtain aid for
their economic
expansion from the United States.

Representative

A.S.J. Camahan of Missouri
states:

The^underdeveloped countries have
natural resources
that we need. As a matter of
fact, that is one of
the reasons why I think that we
must develoo that
portion of the world which has at
least twolthirds
of the world's population and
has, in terms of
natural resources, the greatest
untapped and undeveloped raw materials that are known.
.Through
the economic development of these
areas... we will
assure ourselves of two things: source
of raw
material and ^he development of markets
for our
own products.
.

William Benton, a former Senator from
Connecticut, in an address
before the Economic Club of Chicago on
nousness of the Soviet economic threat.

8

April 1959, spoke of the omiHe said:

discredited by subsequent events. According to it,
the Soviet role in
the outbreak of the Korean war was one of
acquiescence rather than instigation, resulting from a miscalculation of U.S.
intentions and
capabilities. New Republic (Washington, D.C.), 12-19 March
1956.
^^U.S. Senate, Congress 85, Session I Committee on Foreign
Relations,
Report of the Special Committee to Study Foreign Aid Program,
The Role
of Foreign Aid in the Development of Other Countri es (Washington,
D.C.,
1957), p. 74
12

U.S. House of Representatives, Congress 85, Session I, Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1957 (Washington,
D.C., 1957), p. 403.

'
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The gravest threat to the
Western world in the
emerging Soviet economic
challenqe is lht\
.
rating program of Soviet
econoSc

aid,^d^f

handled... The Rus^ia^^
are
2e playing
PlIvx'^aT'^''
for big stakes and they
know what
the stakes are. ..The promise
help without the
^^^^
united States
i:;:^os"s!?3^°"^'^'°^^

The soviet point of view was
clearly expressed by
Khruschev in
the Twenty-First Party Congress:
Our country builds its relations
with all states
on principles of complete
equality and collaboration without any conditions of
a military or political nature... The Soviet Union
gives aid on
fair commercial principles.
The Socialist countries help the underdeveloped
nations to create
their own industry while the United
States seeks
to sell consumer goods which
have no sale on
the home market.-'-'*
The Soviet Union was determined, as
Khruschev told a group

of visiting U.S. Congressmen, to "win
over the United States... in the
field of peaceful production.

.. (and)

prove the superiority of (its)

system. "ISNeedless to say, the object of
Soviet aid and assistance to
the underdeveloped nations of Asia was to
make sure that they stayed

outside the U.S. sphere of influence and, if
possible, to put them
under Soviet influence and obligation.
»

The shift in Soviet policy attracted the notice of
Secretary of

State Dulles who chid the Soviet leaders for "picking"
the less developed
areas of the world as "targets of their guild" after having
been "baulked

8

^^ Address by William Benton before the Economic Club of Chicago,
April 1959.
14

^
Ibid.,
Vol. 106 (1960), p. 15325.
.

"^Ibid., Vol. 105 (1959), p. 5601.
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in their efforts to
extend their influence
by
lorce.
' force

•

„e
He

wamea his

countrymen that thev
hey must "^r^
act on the assumption
that the present
soviet policies did not
mark a change of tactics. "16
in Offering assistance
to the underdeveloped
countries of Asia
<and elsewhere, the Soviet
Union seems to have
heen guided hy two ma.or
Objectives, one objective was
to convince them of
the peaceful char-

acter Of soviet intentions,
thereby encouraging their
neutralistorientation; and the other
objective was to demonstrate
to then, that
it had more to offer than the
West fpr their transition
to a nodem.

industrialised society.

It sought to discredit
the excessively :„ili-

tary approach of the United
states to the problems ofSouth
and Southeast Asia as evidenced by the
establishment of the SEATO. and
by contrast, to emphasize the economic
and cultural orientation of
its own
attitude to those problems.

The foreign-aid program of the
United States on the other hand
tried to achieve two main objectives:
the first objective was an economic

objective to develop the economies and
improve the standard of living

of the underdeveloped areas; and the
second objective was a political
objective-to strengthen the forces of freedom
and democracy, and to
weaken the forces of Soviet and other forms of
totalitarianism.
The scantiness of the economic assistance
provided by the

United States gave an opportunity to the Soviet
Union to warn the Asian
nations against the harmful effects of western aid.

It alleged that

l^Address by John Foster Dulles before the Illinois Manufacturers
Association, Chicago, 8 December 1955, Ibid., Vol. 106 (1960).
p. 15329.
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the united States wanted to
prevent the industrial
development of young
nations in order to keep the.
in their traditional
role as exploited
suppliers of food-stuffs and raw
materials.

The soviet Union concentrated
its aid mostly in the
unconnnitted
Asian countries, which were on
account of their appalling
poverty,
memories of western colonialism, and
eagerness to accorr^lish rapid
economic development, particularly
susceptible to the Soviet offer of
help.
Superficially it offered its aid without
strings attached,

and traded on the fact that U.S. aid
was concentrated in countries

which were a part of its defence program,

"^^at the United States

offers is assistance, while we offer
collaboration on mutually beneficial conditions, free of political intent,
above all any military

involvement

"-^^
.

Dulles then Secretary of State believed that
the idea behind
the Soviet economic campaign was "to subvert
and communize" the nations

that were its "targets."-^®
The ascendancy of the communists in Indo-China threatened
all

of Southeast Asia and made urgent the creation of some
machinery for
its common defence, thus making way for the Southeast Asia
Treaty

Organization (SEATO)

.

In forging the SEATO, the United States believed

that through combined strength and vigilance it would be possible to

safeguard the region against open armed aggression.

At the same time

it realized the need to respect the views and opinions of those Asian
17

^'New York Times, 4 January 1958.
18 U.S.A., Congressional Record

,

Vol. 102

(1956), p. 3357.
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nations

Bu^a, Ceylon, l„aia ana
Indonesia, which preferred
not

to join the regional security
arrangement.

As Secretary of state

John Foster Dulles said:

While we think of the danger
that stems from international communism, many of
them (Asian states) think
fxrst of possible encroachment
from the West aS
'''''
^^''^^
wiS
with the
ihf regional security arrangement.associa;er
That cnoice
choice
the United States respected. 19
The prestige of SEATO has suffered
owing to the unwillingness
Of neutralist Asian nations like
Burma, Ceylon, India, and
Indonesia
to participate in it. These nations
look with suspicion on the
SEATO.

They regard it as a cover for the
perpetuation of colonialism.

The
fact that SEATO has only three Asian
states participating in it and

that there are five non-Asian states
is another glaring weakness of
the SEATO, and this has lent some credence
to the communist stand that
the alliance represents an outside threat
to the peace of Asia. 20

The Eisenhower administration was so
preoccupied with the mili-

tary aspects of the containment policy that
it failed to take into
account the political repercussions of that policy
upon its friends
and the "uncommitted" nations of Asia. The rearming
of Pakistan as a

member of the SEATO, for instance, had disastrous consequences.

It

alienated India and forced it to devote huge sums to a counter
balancing
rearmament policy, thereby prejudicing its domestic development plans.
It also made Afghanistan look to the Soviet Union and be more amenable

19 U.S.A.

Congressional Record

,

Vol. 102 (1956), p. 5497.

20 New York Times, 11
April 1956.
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to Soviet influence. 21

Purpose of u.s. Aid

over the years since the Marshall
Plan, the U.S. foreign aid
program has gone through many
substantive changes as well as
several
changes in name. But for convenience,
it could be said that there
have

been three phases: in the 1950's,
"foreign aid was justified
primarily
as a national security measure,
needed to strengthen allies and
to build
up low-income countries so that they
would be less vulnerable to communist invasion or takeover."

it was seen as a relatively
short term

undertaking.
In the 1960's-the second phase-the
trend was more towards

strengthening a number of countries against
internal subversion, but
there was also a trend towards development as a
goal in itself.

These

were seen to be economic, social, and political
components of develop-

ment-all leading towards the target of self sustaining
growth.
21_

.

Professor Hans J. MOrgenthau, however seems to feel that
the
United States has paid an exorbitant political price for
insignificant
military advantages in South and Southeast Asia, for according
to him,
the SEATO has not added anything material to the strength
of the West.
Besides being "militarily hollow and politically pernicious," the
SEATO,
says he has imposed upon the United States additional liabilities,
both
economic and political. The Asian allies of the United States have
made no bones about their intention to use the SEATO as a means to draw
freely on the treasury of the United States. Since whatever economic
and political support these allies receive can never be enough, they
are in a position to threaten the United States and to say that they
would look for support elsewhere. Pakistan, for instance, has repeatedly
complained that the United States has not supported it strongly enough,
and on this score, it has not hesitated to look for support elsewhere.
Hans J. Morgenthau, The Impasse of Am. P.P (Chicago, 111., 1962), p. 263.
.

22

Robert A. Asher, Development Assistance in the Seventies
Institution, 1970, p. 4

,

Brookings
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As time went on, however
wever, it
i-iy^^r^^r,.
became increasingly
apparent that
so:. Of the less developed
countries (LOC's) even
if the. approached
self sustaining growth, were
not undergoing the
same development pro-

Large sectors of their
populations were benefiting
little, if at all,
from What was happening and
income disparities were
getting worse instead better, in spite of vast
industrial investments.
In

1973, setting
the stage for the present (third)
phase of the U.S. foreign
aid program,
which has assumed a quite different
focus,
a special report to
congress in 1975, the Agency for
International Development (AID)
described the "new directions" in these
terms: "Earlier development
strategies assumed that economic growth
would seen 'trickle down' to the

m

poor masses.

In fact, while the large mass
of the poor in some countries

benefited from development to some degree,
many of the very poorest
were either no better, or even worse off
than a decade earlier.

Re-

cognition of these trends and their serious
implications has led to a
shift in our development assistance strategy ...

"^-^

AID thus pragmatically set about retooling
itself to focus on
"the poor majority."
to

U.S. bilateral development aid now related mainly

:

Food and Nutrition; For example: increasing agricultural
production
through digging wells and constructing dikes, providing new seeds,

providing agricultural equipment and technical assistance.
23

Implementation of the "New Directions" in Development AssistanceReport to the Committee on International Relations on Implementation of
Legislative Reforms in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, July 22, 1975,
p.
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SSEulatiH^LSSdj^^

P..

^^^^^ ^^^^^^

^^^^^^^^

r^laria ana in draining swa^s,
provision of ^aicaX
supplies, paying
sala^ Of a doctor; assisting

faMXy guidance associations;
training

counselors; providing
contraceptives.

gducatio^and

Hu^

Kesource_OeveloHn^ Por
exa:nple: training primary
school teachers; assistance
with project for use of
radios in education
in ^untainous country;
provision of equipment for
education; training
local officials in development
management.
In other words, American
economic aid has moved progressively

from programs with strong political
and security overtones to a
program
that is much more directly humanitarian
in nature.

Why Aid to India
In the annual Congressional and
public debates over what Americans

would call "foreign economic assistance"
a variety of claims are put forward to justify these expenditures to
American tax payers. By helping
India's economic development it is
suggested that the United States may

bring India into closer agreement with
America's approach to current
international questions.
We will, of course, continue to seek common
ground
with India on international questions. But we
know that such agreement carries no price tag.^^

Besides, American economic assistance program was conceived as
a moral obligation which, the United States, as the richest
nation in
24

Chester Bowles, A View from New Delhi (Bombay: Allied Publishers
1969), pp. 135-142.
Ibid.
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history are duty-bound to assume,
in the Kennedy administration
emphasis was put upon long
term

economic aid to underdeveloped countries
in general and India in
particular.
The President himself had long been
a strong advocate of economic aid to counteract Soviet influence
rather than military aid and
alliances which he considered to be
relatively ineffective instruments
of policy. The 1961 Foreign Assistance
Act marked the transition from
the "decade of defense" to the "decade of
development." The annual

report to the Congress on the Foreign
Assistance for the fiscal year
1962 stated:

The United States' foreign assistance effort
of the
1950s emphasized building up of the defensive
strength
of the free nations. In the 1960s the program
will
reflect the decisions made by the administration
and the Congress to place new emphasis on economic
and social development the first steps towards the
decade of development,^^
To meet the changed nature of Communist threat, it was declared

with the introduction of the Act of 1961 that it is the piirpose of
the United States through assistance program "to help make a historic

demonstration that economic growth and political democracy can go handin-hand. to the end that an enlarged commxanity of free, stable and self-

reliant countries can reduce world tensions and insecurity. ^
This attempted use of non-political arguments in favor of aid

was caused by the realization that ant i -Communism as raison d'etre

United States

'

of

foreign aid did poor service to American propaganda efforts

26

Report to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the
Fiscal Year 1961 p. 2
,

27

Report to the Congress on the Foreign Assistance Program for the
Fiscal Year 1962, p. 2
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in the cold war.

People
Pie likp
ixke rv,o<.4.
Chester Bowles had
long advocated a
re-

w.t. SUCK ex.:.,

^^^^^^

^^^^^^^^

co^unis.. need to feel hungry
.sians, .uyin, f.ie„,3,
etc.^«
Of non-politicaX

ar^nts

.He use

was also induce.

the success of soviet
economic policy which was
largely f.ee of political
connotations
Howeve. there was no change
in the .asic objective
of fo.ei^ aid-to serve
0.3. policy interests in the cold
war. To achieve this,
the ad^nistratxon of the aid pro^aM
was reorganized under a
single centralized

authority-Aio-under the direct
Jurisdiction of the Secretary
of state
to tie it more securely with
foreign policy objectives.

The failure of several countries
to use aid productively and
achieve the rate of growth
expected did dishearten several
of its advocates.
India did accept several
economy-strengthening proposals
developed by the World Bank and
endorsed by the United States.
In June
1966 the government devalued the rupee
and overhauled and liberalized
the complex foreign trade and
exchange control system, enabling
priority

industries to obtain vital imports.

new emphasis.

Agricultural development was given

Fertilizer procurement was increased 85
percent over the

1965 level and steps were taken to encourage
domestic and foreign firms
in fertilizer production and distribution.

India also proposed to

quadruple its rate of investment in family planning.
28 U.S.

Con gressional Record , 86th Congress, March 11,
1959, p. 3478.

29 Proposed

Foreign Aid Program
ment, FY 1968, p. 120-21.

,

Agency for International Develop-
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The X9e2 Sino-lnaian «a.
had fo.cea increased
defense e>,enaiture
xn India fro„ 2.S percent
of ,r=ss national
product to an esti„.ted
four percent. The Indo-Pa.i.tan
conflict in 1965 increased
the drain
on India's limited resources
and reduced those available
for economic
development. As a result of the
Indo-Pakistan hostilities, the
United
States suspended new development
assistance until stability in
the subcontinent could be reasonably
assiired.
,

The soviet union negotiated an
arms-aid agreement with India
in September 1964, which covered,
among other things, the supply
of
supersonic MIG fighters, missies, transport
aircraft, light tanks, and
.

naval equipment on deferred-payment
basis, as well as the building
of
a MIG con5>lex in India. ^0 i^^ia
was greatly impressed by this in
view
of the refusal of the United States to
supply India with some "high performance" F-104 supersonic fighters. 31

These had been requested to

strengthen the defence capability of the Indian
Air Force to enable it
to intercept enemy aircraft operating from
bases in Tibet in the event
The Soviet Union is reported to have agreed later
to supply India
four to submarines and several squadrons of
sophisticated fighter-bombers,
SU-7, as well as several hundred air-to-air and
ground-to-air missiles'
and five fighters or destroyer escorts. This caused
heart-burning in
Pakistan, which contended that during President Ayub Khan's
visit to
MOSCOW in April 1965, he did not press for the cancellation
of existing
contracts for arms supplies to India on the assurance that there
would
be no new deals. When President Ayub Khan visited Moscow again
in the
latter part of 1967, he tried to persuade the Soviet Union to curtail
its military aid to India.
Soviet leaders told him, however, that they
felt "India has to be able to defend itself against China." The Statesman
(Calcutta)
8 March 1968 and 15 April 1968.
,

^^The Pentagon tried to convince India that it could do without the
costly F-104s to match the Chinese air striking power. It was pointed
out that the fighter aircraft is possession of the Indian Air Force,
including Vampires cind Gnats, could be made more effective by fitting
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Of another Chinese attack.
Although the United
a State*;
btates wr^„i^
would not supply
f-104s, it was
villin, to assist In.i.
, .^.tain extent in
.„i,ain,
i.3 defence potential. However,
in contrast to the
Soviet „nio„33
not «iiiin, to extend
^Xitary assistance .e.on.
t.e s^ o. ,eo ^iXion=4
to enable ^^^^i

^to^^eet^p^^^^

them with side-winder missile*:
n
ized that the importanrttiig
°^
^"l"
for ^^eT^^""^"*
the acquisition Wt foreign
™"
™<=h
=°
supfrsoSj ^?
facture planes of that v2iety
'°
?he M?G^r.'' ™s ^"^^^
thus expected to
give India a capability
in
P^^'-^^y ^°
i^no^!
important
field.
Times_of_India (Delhi),
3 June, 1964.

^

32 It

should be noted, however thai- =+•
aggression on India in Oc;ober
l962,^e UniSd

*.

•

s'Z

T"'^^

^''^''^"^
^^^2, which w" wide";
in th
the American Press, led to the
conclusion
that the Soviet
n^on was unwillxng at that stage
Unxon
to alienate China. But, wiS t^I
^^^^
the end of 1962!'i:dLtln of
rch^ge" in
'^^-r^^^
^"^^^^^ ^^^^^ available. See Pravda, 5 November 1962.

Pu^IisS

LT^To

f

^™

34,

The US Government agreed, in September
1964, to provide an immediate credit of $10 million for the
purchase of defence artLSs
/""^"^^ services to be financed from this credit to the
Tll7^r^.T'
replacement and modernization of plant and
equipment in ordnance factories.
In addition, a credit of $50 million,
as well as military grant
assistance for such items as air defence
communication equipment for the
border roads, was also given to India. As this
assistance was to be in
Jcmd, It was not possible to assess its
value financially. The assistance was discontinued after the outbreak of
fighting between India and
Pakistan in September 1965. Times of India (Delhi), 22
September 1964.

m

The prospect of continued American military assistance
to India
the latter 's effort to meet the Chinese challenge became
a matter
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The US Government had long held
xa tne
the vi*.w
view that a second
y
Chinese assault
on India's border was unlikely.
Besides, it was not
unmindful of the
repercussions in Pakistan that a
higher volume of military
aid to India
might produce.

Both the united States and
the Soviet Union, have,
however.

Offered .nilitary assistance to
India to enable it to develop
its defence
potential,
since the second half of 1964,
when the United states decided
to adopt a "harder line" towards
Co^nunist China, it has wanted
India
to assure a leading role in South-East
Asia as an instrvMent of the
anti-COTMunist containment policy.36

Hubert H. Huinphrey. the Democratic

Vice-Presidential nominee in 1964, states
in an interview to the New
York Times: "The only coun terbalance
to the Chinese power is a
coalition

of serious concern to Pakistan. President
Ayub Khan was, however assured
by President Kennedy that the limited
assistance which tl^e UnUed stated
-""not pose any threat to Pakistan and t^ft the"
would be no curtailment
wo^rbe"L'°
f
of the even greater US aid that had regularly
been receiving. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy
(London,
1965), p. 664.

36 The US
roving ambassador, Averell Harriman, during
his visit to
India in March 1965, assured the Government
of India that if Communist
China launched a nuclear attack on India, the
United States would come
to Its rescue.
Along with Great Britain and the Soviet Union,
the United
btates also agreed
a disarmament conference at Geneva in March
1968
to give a guarantee of protection against
attack by the nuclear Powers
to all nations that agreed to sign the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty.
But this can scarcely be considered reassuring, for
any help that the
United States might extend to India in the event of a nuclear
attack

m

would come only after the damage has been done and not before
it.
What
has added to the perils of India is the possibility of Pakistan
acquiring
nuclear weapons from Communist China. There is little possibility of
the People's Republic of China producing enough nuclear arms in the
near future that will give it strength enough to challenge on the
actual battle-field the might of the United States. It may, therefore,
have no hesitation to pass on to its friend Pakistan whatever nuclear
arms it has with a view to blackmailing India at second hand.
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Of powers with India as its main
force.

In looking at Asia we should

always consider the role of India, what
we expect from her and what
she
can provide. "37 similarly. Representative
Frank S. Thompson of New

Jersey regarded India as "crucial" for
Asia.

He said: "If India goes

down, all Asia may go down, and if Asia
is lost the cause of freedom

itself may be lost. "38

senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky,
a

former US Ambassador to India, likewise felt
it to be of the utmost

importance that India, the "largest Non-Communist
nation", should
succeed.

He pointed out that "a watchful Asia will
compare the re-

sults in free India and Communist China, to see
whether the living

conditions of millions of human beings are improved
most effectively

through India's voluntary methods or through coercion of
Chinese commTinism."39

in fact most competent observers in the United States

appeared to hold the opinion that the success or failure of India in
emerging from the Asian revolution

would, in all probability, determine

whether or not all of Asia would eventually fail under Communist influence .

3'^New

York Times, 13 September 1964.

38

°USA, Congressional Record, vol. 104 (1958), p. HOC.

3^Ibid.

,

p. 4613.

"^^India's greatest difficulty in meeting the demands of the "revolution of rising expectations" is its inadequate food production and its
inability to derive from its agriculture the capital needed for industrialization and economic progress. This has compelled it to seek additional foodgrains from other soxirces.
In this respect the United States
has rendered invaluable help by supplying it with foodgrains over the
years under the P.L. 480 programme. However, the United States can no
longer be taken for granted as a supplier of food. One reason is that
America no longer has a surplus of foodgrains. Stocks have been drawn
down to such an extent that, for the first time since the Second World
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Like the united States,
the Soviet Union also
looks upon a
strong and independent India
as an important means
to frustrate the
Chinese attempt to extend
influence in South-East
Asia, .s a matter of
fact, soviet strategy towards
the underdeveloped areas
in Asia and its
fear of Chinese predominance
in those areas make it
imperative for it
to maintain close relations
with India. Moreover, by
1964, the rift
between Moscow and Peking had
become so complete that the
Soviet Union
did not hesitate to publicize
what it had been doing to
help India in

defending itself against the threat
of another Chinese attack.
The united States views Soviet
assistance to India against
the background of the deepening
Sino-Soviet schism.

Soviet aid to India

is exprected to increase Chinese
discontent.

War, farmers are being asked to put
additional acres under foodqrains in
-fitments. Also, demand for foSgraLs
frorin^-"'f
from Indxa has mounted much faster than
estimated, so that there is ^^e
feeling that P.L. 480 has helped to inhibit
rather than enc^age sel^!
sufficiency. The reluctance of the United
States to continue indefinitely its role of supplying foodgrains to
India became clear when President
Johnson authorized the shipment of only
900,000 tons of foodgrains to
India after an "agonizing" delay of over a
month after additional foodgrams had been requested by India to tide over its
food crisis. The
US government also made it clear that it
expected other nations to
match the American effort to meet India's food
requirements. New York
Times , Weekly Review. 1 January 1967.
"

"^^The original Soviet objective of seeking a diminution
of Western
influence in Asia continued to engage the attention of Soviet
diplomacy
the sixties; but to this was added the objective of the
containment
of Chinese Communist influence.
In response to the new situation, the
Soviet Union further intensified its policy of extending moral and
material support to the non-aligned countries. It gave with a liberal
hand every kind of economic and military assistance to these countries
and made every effort to bring them closer to itself. It also avoided
taking sides in any dispute where one Asicui coxintry was pitted against
another.
In the Afghan-Pakistani dispute over the Pakhtoon demand
for a separate state, it did not openly side with Afghanistan as it had
done before.
In the Indo-Pakistani conflict of September 1965, it adopted
a posture of neutrality.
It was, however, anxious to improve the

m
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in the fail of 1965, India
faced the greatest
drought. The
united states authorized a
„0 ^lUon fertilizer loan in
Oece^er 1965
to help India with food
production in 1966-67. .
loan
,,,,
was authorised in early 1966
for the purchase of raw
„.terials and

spare parts essential to economic
development. 42

Puture loans were

made contingent on continuation
of efforts to improve
stability and
peaceful relations in the subcontinent
and also on improved
policies

designed to accelerate economic and
social growth. 43
Although huge food shipments by
the U.S. continued to "tide
India over," President Johnson in
his Message on India Food
of February
2, 1967, said that the United States was
pressing not only for inter-

national coordination of food aid through
the World Bank consortium but
also for a total comprehensive program
of aided self-help in domestic

ui^ed°wLh^thr^/"''"
as^^ll

af in Lla

"'^
°'

^

"^^ ''^"^-^'^ ^°
=l°=-ly
°"
""^^ subcontinent'

42

PY i967!''p?°TS5

^^^^^^^^^ Program, Agency for International Development,

^^fter the fighting broke out between India and Pakistan
in the
fall of 1965, the United States concluded that
future aid to India and
Pakistan must be related rather directly to progress
towards securing
the peace between them, since without peace economic
development is not
possible, and without economic development stability
is uncertain.
America made this quite clear to both India and Pakistan.
She suspended
all military aid the sales deliveries to both countries
when the fighting
broke out last fall. Although she relaxed her policies slightly
on sales
of limited and selected non-lethal military items, her embargo was
otherwise still in effect. Since 1971 war embargo has been total. Commodity
loans of $50 million for Pakistan and $100 million for India was due to
satisfaction with the progress made at the Tashkent Conference and thereafter.
Department of State Bulletin, April 25, 1966, p. 669.
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food production, with
self-suf
urriciency
ficiencv as the goal.

-0,

PuBXic

.43.1

Commitments under

4S0. an. B.po.t-x„po.t
Ban.

,,,, ^^^^^^^

^lUon

in aaaiUon to u.s.
cont.i.„.,o„3 to
inte^ationa. l.„ai„,
agencxes which also assisted
in India.

These prospects dimmed,
after the March civil
disturbances
in East Pakistan, when an
estimated nine million
refugees fled to .astern
India.
The Indian Foreign Minister
visited Washington in
.une and Prime

Minister Gandhi in November
to convey India's position
to the U.S.
government. The U.S. government
decided to provide 350
million in grant
refugee relief assistance as
well as a .20 million
development loan to
help Offset the strain to the
Indian
econon..

By the outbreaic of

hostilities U.S. grant aid for the
relief of refugees in India
totaled
over ,89 million. Some $250
million more had also been
requested from
congress for future refugee and
East Pakistan relief programs.
However, when there was an outbreak
of hostilities on December
3,

1971, the U.S. declared that India bore
heavy responsibility for

this.

AS the crisis deepened American
sales of military equipment to

India was terminated, and economic
assistance worth over $80 million

was suspended, 45 even though some
assistance continued.

U.S. Economic Assistance and Pakistan

Under the pressure of the Cold War, the United
States sought to

build up the military strength of its allies and
potential allies though44.

United St ates Foreign Policy 1971

p. 113.

4^ Ibid.

,

report by the Secretary of State
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out tH. „o.Xa.
substantial

Pakistan

™iUta^

."iUta^ assistance

the onX.

county i„ sout. ..u

aia f.o. the United
states.
to Pakistan was

^ae

...e.ve

The decision to ,i
give

in 1954, when the
developing

Military crisis in Indo-china
had raised the widespread
fear that the
united States would sooner or
later have
to face a

^litary showdown

in Asia.

This decision greatly complicated
America's relations with India.
This was, however, sought to
be dispelled by President
Eisenhower, who
declared that if the aid was misused
or directed against another
country
for aggression, he would
"undertake immediately in
accordance with (his,
constitutional authority appropriate
action both within and without
the
U.N. to thwart such aggression."
The primary American objective in
giving military assistance

was to strengthen Pakistan against
the Communist menace

-

to contain

soviet expansionism as well as to deter
any surprise attack by the Soviet
union. But the attention of the Pakistani
government was more directly
focussed on the balance of forces in the
Indian peninsula and notably

on the bargaining leverage of Pakistan
vis-a-vis India on the question
of Kashmir. '^^
The attitude of the United States is somewhat
different.

It had

imposed an embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan and
India after the out-

break of the Indo-Pakistani conflict in September
1965.

This ban was

46

Despite Eisenhower's pledge, no effective steps were taken by the
US government to prevent Pakistan from using US arms either in
the Rann
of Kutch early in 1965 or during the Indo-Pakistani conflict in September
1965.
India's protests against the use of US arms by Pakistan were
virtually ignored by the US government.
47

The Government of India, however, seized upon American military
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to suppx,

3p„e pa..3

.o.

^^^^^

^^^^^^

suppX, woula be treated
separate!,, ana strictly
on its ^rits.48
we have seen in the
preceedin, chapters that
President Ni.on
haa continued ^litary
assistance to Pakistan even
durin, the IndoBangladesh crisis, since x^DX
1951 Paki<5-t-;,n
Pakistan has received a
total of $4.5
billion aia fro. the United
states, she has provided
„„re than 200
million in relief and econonuc
assistance to Pakistan since
the e„a
of the oece^er 1971. The
Onitea States has provided
lar^e-scale
technical and economic assistance
to Pakistan including
program designed to help proviae the foreign
exchange necessary to i,^le„ent
the

country's development plans. '^^

Magnitude of Aid
^"

magnitude of American aid received is
very

^° rationalize its refusal to accept the UN resolution
on
on'^Kashl^^^'n^
Kashmir, USA Congressional Record
vol. 104 (1958),
,

p. 832.

48

""^^^^ military aid to Pakistan, with the ban on
supplies'^of
supplies
TJZ^^weapons, is regarded by Pakistan
of lethal

as a severe blow,
°" ^ ""^"-^^ ^^^^
The latter
stipulation "^^^terpreted
TJ"^as a device to keep Pakistan
on a short leash
so that the United States could veto the
continuance of fresh hostilities
even if it could not prevent their outbreak.
Pakistan reacted by boycotting
the meeting of the SEATO military advisers
in April 1967 two days after
the US policy was announced. During the same
month, Pakistan, for the
first time, publicly asked for the cessation of
the US bombing of North
Vietnam.
Ibid .
8 March 1968.

f

,

49 Background

Notes: Pakistan Feb. 1977, Department of State Publication 7748, Office of Media Services, Bureau of PublicAf fairs
.
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large.

During the first Plan period,
the role of foreign aid
was
quite n^dest. In subsequent years,
however, the trade deficits
widened
considerably, and there was a sharp
increase in foreign borrowings.
Since the beginning of the fourth
five year plan, however,
there has
been considerable decline in the
volume of her trade deficits
and there
has therefore been a reduction in
the utilization of external
assistance.

Since 1968 the utilization of net
assistance had declined by alnost
half.
Table 1 gives the details of the
inflow of foreign assistance

between 1968 and 1972.

Table

1

Inflow of Foreign Assistance;
Gross and Net

Items

1.

II.

Gross disbursements of which:
(a) PL 480 food
(b) PL 480 nonfood
(c) Other food
assistance

Total debt
servicing of
which
(a) Amortization payments
(b) Interest
payments

1967-68

1968-69

1196

903

856

791

778

285
57

131
27

128
42

57
32

43

45

55

19

36

31

333

375

412

450

450

211

236

268

290

284

122

139

144

160

166

863

528

444

341

328

1969-70

1970-71

1971-72
Estimates

52

III. Net flow of

assistance
(I-II)

Source: Government of India, Economic Survey, 1971-72, p

.
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The import of foodgrains during
these years has al
a decline.

r

ooagrams

Production and Imports
(million tons)

I

ear

1962-63
1963-64
1964-64
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
1970-71

Production
54.9
66.9
82.0
72.3
74.2
95.1
94.0
99.5
107.8

Imports
2.1
0.7
5.1
7.5
10.4
8.7
5.7
3.9
3.6

Source: RBI, Report on Currency and Finance,
1970-71, p. 69.

However in the past two or three years since 1971, the monsoon
has been inadequate over large portions of India.

A few areas have been

completely without rain for even one full season, but in many areas the
rains have come late, have been sparse, or have not behaved in the usual
manner.

Severe drought conditions in India have combined with other

factors to produce a situation that could be described as "an unprecedented

national crisis

.

"

The food surpluses that India had built up during the

five good monsoon stammers prior to the liberation of Bangladesh were gone.

The upward swings on the production graphs during the green revolution's

euphoric years in the late 1960s were now pointing downward.

Since 40

percent of India's electrical power comes from hydroelectric plants that
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depend on mini:aal water levels that
are not always being
maintained,
there has been an even more acute
power shortage in the country

than

was predicted, which has in turn
curtailed production of fertiliser
plants and many other industrial
enterprises.
India's situation is

more desperate due to cessation of
its long standing aid connections
with the United States.
Then too, because of the euphoria of
the green revolution and
its hopes for "self-reliance, "tnerican
assistance to India is at present

extended through the following three agencies:
1.

U.S. Agency for International Development

This agency was created on November

3,

1961, to bring American

economic assistance under a unified administration.

both development loans and grants.

The USAID gives

Grants have been made for malaria

eradication, smallpox eradication, higher education,
the National Pro-

ductivity Council, craftsmen training, dairy development,
community
development, crop production, and a number of other projects.

The

principal activities of USAID (agriculture, capital projects, education,
food resources and regional development, health and family planning,

labor and management

)

indicate the comprehensive scope of its backing

for India's developmental efforts.

The developmental grants do not

involve repayment.
Loans extended to India by USAID are repayable in dollars.
order* to avoid an excessive foreign exchange debt service burden to

India, the terms of the loans are set at a long period. Repayment is

scheduled over 40 years including a ten year grace period.
2.

Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) Program

In
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India has received large
quantities of foodgrains, cotton
and
other agricultural coxn^odities
under the Pl-480 program.
Almost twothirds Of all U.S. assistance to
India since fiscal year
1951 comes
under the Food for Peace Program.
The only difference between
India's
,

purchase of foodgrains under PL-480
and normal commercial purchases
IS
that the purchase is made in rupees
nearly all of which cannot be
converted and spent outside of India.

Eighty-seven percent of the sales

proceeds under PL-480 go towards the economic
development of India.
One-third of the proceeds are given as grants,
a larger portion is
loaned to the Indian government for development
projects and 6-9 percent

of the total is loaned to private industry.

The remaining one-eighth

of the total supports U.S. government agencies
in India.
America's supplies of foodgrains under PL-480 on
concessional
terms has helped maintain the stability necessary for
peaceful and

democratic economic growth.

In 1966 PL-480 was given a major overhaul.

The new program was designed to achieve a transition from sales
for

local currencies to sales for dollars, effective from December 31, 1971.

Fertilizer

:

Apart from financing fertilizer imports, the United

States has provided large credits to help finance the construction of
two fertilizer factories at Trombay and VisaJchapatnam.

The Trombay

plant commenced production in 1965 and the VisaJchapatnam factory in 1967.
The two factories presently produce gertilizer sufficient to increase
India's food production by a total of 1,350,000 tons every year.

In

December 1968 the United States extended a loan to help finance an
expemsion program which would make Trombay one of the larger fertilizer
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projects in the world by
1972.

^SliS^^ltur^^^

The U.S. has helped
establish

eight agricultural universities
in ;.dhra Pradesh,
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra, Mysore, Orissa,
the Pun 30b, Ha jasthan,
and Ottar Pradesh
Each received the cooperation
of an E.erican
agricultural university.
Apart from producing highly
skilled graduates the
universities are
playing a notable part in
promoting agricultural
research.

Exchange of personnel,

:

More than 400 American
agricultural

scientists and other specialists
have served in India, sharing
their
skills with their Indian colleagues.
irrigation:

The United States is aided
nine major irrigation

projects which by the end of 1970
were expected to irrigate nine
million acres. These projects, which
received loans and grants totaling
Rs. 214 crores from rupees
generated by the sale of PL-480
agricultural

commodities are: Bhadra, Chambal, Damodar
Valley corporation, Hirakeed,
Kakrapar, Kosi, Mahi Right Bank Canal,
Nagar junasagar, and Tungabhadra.
Five of these projects used construction
equipment financed by a U.S.

dollar grant of $7.9 million.

The U.S. has also made available Rs. 126

crores for minor irrigation projects.

Water resources development:

Despite the successful conclusion

of these and other large irrigation projects,
the need has become apparent
for additional and more widely spread sources
of water and for better

utilization of the water sources available.

One result has been the

proliferation of power pumps fed in many cases from hydroelectric
or
thermal projects constructed with U.S. assistance.

Forty thousand tube

wells and 200,000 other pxinpets were added to rural resources in 1970.
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I:^roved seeds

.he U.S. has assisted in
the development and

:

popularization of hybird

:naize and

hybrid ^owar.

The Rockefeller

Foundation has played a leading
role in this project.
States is also helping mdia

The United

in the breeding, testing,
and popularization

of high-yielding varieties
of rice, wheat and pulses.

Agricultural research

:

Prom that portion of PL-480
sales pro-

ceeds Which is reserved for U.S.
governn^nt uses, the Agricultural
Research service of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture has extended
230
grants to finance research in 68
research institutions located in
all

parts of India.
Education

:

Engineering

-

The U.S. has provided equipment
for

five engineering colleges at Guindy,
Honerah, Kharagpur, Poona and

Roorkee.

Grants from Pl=480 funds have helped
establish 14 regional

engineering colleges at Allahabad. Bhopal,
Durgapur, Jaipur, Jamshedpur,
Kozhikode, Kurukshetra, Mangalore, Nagpur,
Rourkela, Silchar, Surac,

Tiruchirapalli and Warangal.
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur

—

This institute,

which graduated its first class in 1965, is being
developed into one of
Asia's premier technological universities.
can universities aids it.

A consortium of nine Ameri-

Nearly 30 American professors serve on

the faculty. the faculty.

The U.S. aid program has supplied a considerable

amount of equipment to the institute, including an IBM 1620 computer
system, one of the largest functioning in India.

Power development

:

In the field of power development India has

received more assistance from the United States than from any other
country.

Thirty of India's power projects have been assisted by the
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unite, states,
in

^th aoUa.s

so.e p^o^ects t..
„„itea states .as e.ten.ea
loan,
an. xnaian currency
ccve.in, eithe. thei.
enti.e cost

or the .ajor part of it.
xn loans and grants of

;^erican aia for the rest
has heen lar,el,

„pees .erivea f.o. the sale
of agricultural

products supplied to India
under the U.S. Pood for
Peace <Pu.lic Law
480) program.

Transportation

:

The United States has
provided dollar grants

and loans totalin, ,317
^llion to help India develop
its transportation
system.
In addition a yjT^T:
grant or
of Rs
:>n ^^^^^
^
Rs. 20
crores from
PL-480 funds has
been extended for road building.
U.S. aid to Indian railways
totals
5259 million,

important U.S.-aided project is
the diesel locomotive
factory at Varanasi. The factory
has an annual capacity oi
150 locoftn

motives
The united States has extended
loans totaling $77.2 million to

three Indian firms to expand their
production of motor vehicles. U.S.

grants totaling $2.9 million for improved
navigational aids installed
at several airports to facilitate
faster and safer domestic flights.
3.

The Export-Import Bank
The Bank authorizes loans, guarantees and
insurance for facili-

tate the foreign trade of the United States.

and are repayable in dollars.

The loans are in dollars

In determining interest rates, the Bank

considers its own cost of borrowing money.

The current standard

Interest rate is 5.5 percent per annum.

Other Projects
The U.S. has been assisting in a number of projects designed
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has extended loans for assisting
in several aspects of
India's fa.il.
Planning program. The industrial
projects which have received
U.S.
foreign exchange assistance
include a rayon tire-cord
plant at Kotah,
and aluminum factory at Renukoot,
factories manufacturing
chemicals
and Plastics at Bo:^ay, Calcutta,
Mettur and Thana, a paper
mill at
Amlai, a rayon factory at Kalyan,
a pulp factory at Fort
Songhad, a

Plant manufacturing forgings at Poona,
a bearings plant at Jaipur,
a
coal mine ropeway at Jharia and two
coat washeries at Dugda and

Patherdih.

The U.S. is extending considerable
assistance to India

in developing the country's mineral
resources.

Some half a dozen U.S.

experts are assisting the Geological
Survey of India in conducting

reconnaissance geology of the potential
phosphate bearing areas, detailed mapping, chemical analyses and
beneficiation.

Another major U.S .-assisted effort is the Orissa
iron ore project.

This included the development of the Kiriburu
iron ore mine in

Orissa, the development of the Visakhapatnam
port to enable it to handle

large ships and the construction of railway lines
to link the mine with
the port.

By exporting several million tons of iron ore to Japan
the pro-

ject helps India earn considerable quantities of foreign
exchange.

Indian Rupee Settlement Agreement
On February 18, 1974, Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S.

Ambassador, signed the Indian Rupee Settlement Agreement on behalf of the
U.S. government in New Kelhi. India.

This brief ceremony ended over

Slsee Hearing before the subcommittee on Near East South Asia of
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15 years of consideration of ways and
.eans of dealing with the
rupee

question.

Four American presidents had
grappled with the proble.
and some even had special reports
prepared. And in some respects
the
final agreement reached is more
favorable
than the reconuaendations

proposed in some of the previous
inquiries into the matter.
In its simplest form the
agreement calls for the settlement

Of the Indian rupee debt owed to
the United States.

The agreement in

no way affects the dollar debt
India owes and continues to repay

faithfully and on time.

This agreement calls for a writing
off of

a $2.2billion worth of the
approxiamately $3.3 billion rupee account

to be made available for the Indian
government for particular develop-

ment programs in specified amounts over a
specified time period.

The

remaining more than $1.1 billion worth of
rupees is available to the
U.S. for its own uses in India and Nepal.

Changing Perspectives

Precisely because foreign assistance programs are so
vital
to a nation '.s interest, they must reflect the current
circumstances,

and not those of the past.

They must respond to the ideas which move

men in the emerging nations, and also take account of the growing

wealth of other advanced countries.

In a message to the Congress in

March 1967, President Johnson emphasized the six guiding principles on

which U.S. aid activities were to be based in the future.

On the

basis of these principles he proposed the foreign Assistamce Act of

the Committee on Foreign Affairs
2nd session, Jcmuary 29, 1974.
^ -^

,

House of Representatives, 93rd Congress,

Department of State Bulletin, March

6,

1967, pp. 378-79.
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T.e ^ct made it very clear
that the development
30. was primarily
the responsibility of the
developing countries
themselves,
it also
emphasized multilateralism,
i.e.
an effort to get other
doners to
enlarge their cormnitments.
The United States was
also to encourage
regional economic development,
through cooperative projects,
like the
Asian Development Ban3c, by
investing in areas concerning
agriculture,
health and education. The Act
was also to see that U.S.
aid programs
have the least adverse effect
on her balance of payments.
Care was
taken to see that aid activities
were efficiently administered.
1967.

,

It is evident that the U.S.
was moving into a new era

-

one

'

of emphasis on negotiation and
transition to greater responsibility
on the part of her friends and
allies.

President Nixon later pro-

posed new legislation, dividing his
legislative proposals into two
parts

-

an International Security Assistance
Act, and an International

Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act.

The purpose was to

distinguish more clearly than in the past among
the objectives toward

which U.S. aid is directed: her short term
security interests, and her
long term development and humanitarian interests. ^5

The emphasis again

was on letting the lower income countries play more
central roles in

solving their own security and development problems.

In the case of

development assistance, this means working within a framework
set by
international institutions to the maximum extent possible.

Because of the changed structure of world affairs
the greater strength of countries other than the U.S.

~

~

namely,

there was a need

^^ U.S. Foreign Policy
1971, a report of the Secretary of State, p.
Foreign assistance programs have also been greatly slashed by the
235,
Congress, from time to time.
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o. the part of the

^rican ,ove.™e„t

to loo.

..^.^y

i„.o Ker

o™

self interest.

do^nant

The unite, states Is
no longer the overvhel^„,i,
preeconomic power in the worla.
she is now only the
first a:.n,

equals
in the past few years
Ainerioan national enthusiasm
for the
Whole prooess of forei^
assistance has neatly
di^ninished.
The ordeal
Of the Vietna^se war tended
to deflect attention fron,
the prohle,.
Of M.oh Of the rest of the world,
a„a has .nade her question
her own
capabilities, she is also preoccupied
with the problen. of her own

domestic economy.
The cold war strategy of which
U.S. forei^ aid policy was
a

part has been discarded after the
detente with China.

The United States

has thus gradually adopted a new
approach to foreign assistance that

takes into account the changes that have
taken place in the inter-

national environment, and the valid
cirticisms that have been made
of its own current programs.

There has been a greater

emphasis on the

role of trade and investment in the
international development process.
The lower income countries are asked to
expand their exports to be

able to afford the imports needed to promote
their development efforts,

and to lessen their need for concessional foreign
assistance.

^"^

Conclusion

These pages make it abundantly clear that American economic
and military aid has played a major role in the formulation of
U.S.
56
57

Department of State Bulletin

,

February

Department of State Bulletin

,

October 5, 1970, pp. 369-78.

5,

1973, p. 133.
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policy.

x„ .act it Ha. .ee„
an

i„.,_,„,

^^^^^^
successive aa^.i.t.ations in
the last three decades
have n«ae ,ood
use to manipulate world
events
events.
Th^
r^v^
The programme
of aid, despite its
humanitarian overtones sought
ugnt to lay
TPl^7 the u
basis ^for the construction
of a system of societies
open
pen to poixtical
Doli^-io^i m
manipulation and to the
•

•

pressures of free enterprise.

•

The economic justification
for aid

was neatly dovetailed into
the humanitarian and
strategic aspects.
The united States has endowed
India with an enormous amount
Of aid. Aid is a source of
embarassement to the recipients
who do
not want to recognize the inevitable
strings behind it.
it has had
a major influence on the course
of U.S. relations with India,
it has
conditioned India's response to world
events.
Despite the differences
over aid, U.S. economic assistance
continued to be given to India.

Washington could not ignore India's
geographical position, size, the
nature of her government and institutions.

There was a vague but

natural sympathy in the United States for
India.

Most of the U.S.

aid has been given under bilateral agreements
and not through inter-

national agencies, the United States has been
able to exercise some
amount of control and use it as a political
weapon, often forcing aid-

receiving countries to pursue policies favourable to
it.
While hard-headed businessmen plan for the production of
bigger

quantities of armaments, ignorant U.S. diplomats
and Moynihan in India - speak of peace.

- like Bowles,

Keating

Ambassador Kenneth Keating

said in New Delhi in March 1972 that of the two basic considerations
that motivated the United States one was a purely humanitarian reason,
"a moral obligation to assist developing nations" and the other was the
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belief "that the world
will be a mr.^^
wxll
more peaceful place
if each and every
nation can provide social
iustice ;,nri
:ustice
and ^
economic progress for
its people.
India's relations with
the United
unirea states
st^^c. u
became sour when
Washington decided to withhold
xa rne
the ?87.6
$87 fi million
n
economic aid that was
in the pipeline in December.
nicer, 1971 on
•

on the ground that
India attacked

Pakistan. Washington did not
stop the aid in the
pipeline to Pakistan.
The U.S. action ignored
India's stand and held
he. responsible for the
war in the siibcontinent
n q state
c4-=4.« rv
The U.S.
Department's bureau of public
affairs claimed that the aid
was suspended because India
did not comply
with the resolution on Bangladesh
passed by the U.N. General
Assen^ly.
Willia. Rogers, the U.S. Secretary
of state said in January,
1972 that
if Washington were to provide
very substantial amounts of
foreign aid
and the aid receiving nations
got involved in warfare, aid
would go
down the drain. In India's case
he said, "we have stopped foreign
aid
for the moment and we are going
to take a hard look before we
renew
.

aid."

With evident sarcasm Rogers said
that he was pleased that Indira

Gandhi had said "they are going to do
more in terms of self-sufficiency.
The United States weary of aid programmes,
had been looking for
an excuse to cut off aid to India.

Senator Everett Jackson, a senior

democrat, said in January, 1972: "I think we
have spent enough and got

very little in return.

I

am willing to drop India."

U.S. displeasure

with India was shown when the WorldBank's assessment
of India's requirement of $1,250 million for 1972 was not accepted by
the United States,
although all members of the consortium had approved it.

After the gross

indifference shown by Washington, New Delhi did not want U.S. AID to
operate in India and tihgtened its stand on the use of PL -480 funds.
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xn 1973, x„.i..s attitude
change, ana a satisfactory
solution for the

disposal of the accumulated
PL-480 funds was found.
As far as India was
concerned n
^uncernea,
U.S. aid as a normal
way of
c;

supporting econo:„ic development
came to an end in 1971,
although the
Planning Co„Mission envisaged
that under normal conditions
India would
require some Mnd or other of
foreign aid till 1980.
Massive economic
aid seems like a thing of
the past, and its effectiveness
as a political weapon has been blunted.
l„ the 1970 's aid has
not been used by
big nations as a lever to influence
the small ones.
Summing up India's
attitude towards aid, Indira Gandhi
said, "We want to do without
aid....
It is not U.S. aid alone we want
to do without, but all aid....
The

fiver-receiver relationship is never a
happy one.

we still need help

but without strings."

A new philosophy of aid was

bom

when the United Sates reached

an understanding with China and the Soviet
Union in 1972.

The talk of

containing communism and saving democracy became
as innocuous as the
Internationale, U.S. has taken a realistic approach
now, that develop-

ment assistance can play a part in boosting U.S.
trade, money, and investments in the countries of the third world.

In 1973 U.S. AID was

renamed the Mutual Development and Cooperation Agency (MDCA)
Some liberal leaders like Senator fulbright. Chairman of the

Senate Foreign Relation Committee believed that "the disorder in our
financial house" was largely due to the accumulated effects of many

years of over-commitment abroad, including the foreign aid programme.
He said he thought that it was the zealous determination to control and
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shape the destinies of much
of tne
the world that k
^
had
brought the United
States to a state of financial
exhaustion.
The united States resumed
direct aid to India in
August, 1978
after a seven year break,
signing agreements for
three loans worth .60
million.
The agreements cover two
loans, of ,30 million for
medium
sized irrigation projects in
Gujarat, and $28 million for
the import
of anti-malaria insecticides,
and a grant of ,2 million
for the application of science and technology
to rural areas.

The united States suspended direct
assistance to India in 1971
following the outbreak of a rebellion
in Bangladesh which eventually
led to war between India and Pakistan
and the break-up of Pakistan.
The two loans are repayable over 40
years with a 10 year grace
period, and will carry a two percent
interest in the first 10 years and
three percent in the next 30 years.
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CHAPTER

IV

SOME IRRITANTS IN INDO AMPPTP

^

RELATIOM..

Indo-U.S. relations were
reasonably good until 1971,
and reached
a low point during the
last eight Nixon-Kissinger-Pord
years. The inability Of the united States
and India to wor. out a
mutually acceptable
relationship has been one of the
central features of .odern
Asian politics,
occasional episodes of cooperation
between the world's two
largest
democratic nations, such as occured
when they were motivated by
a similar
antipathy to China for more than
a decade after 1959, have
been overshadowed by the tension and antagoism
that accompanied the Korean
and

Vietnam wars, American emphasis on
military alliances in Asia, and
India's
close relations with the Soviet Union.
These erupted into open hostility

during the Bangladesh upheaval in 1971
when India occupied by nearly ten
million refugees from East Pakistan,
invoked the principal of Bengali

self-determination and dismembered its hostile
neighbour.

American sup-

port for Pakistan's national integrity
won widespread support in the
United Nations, but the Nixon administration's
attempt to use the nuclear-

powered carrier Enterprise as an instrument of
gunboat diplomacy was a
dismal failure.

Relations, between the United States and India
came to

an all time low for some time after 1971.

President Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi periodically asserted their
desire
for friendly relations, but such proforma statements
were again overshad-

owed by acts regarded as hostile by the other country.

New Delhi main-

tained that the reference to Kashmir in the joint communique signed
by
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President Nixon and Chou-En
lai in Shanghai
5i,=„„t
in February 1972 was
interference in india.s internal
affairs. -The United
states regarded .e„
Delhi's Silence over Morth
Vietnam's 1972 invasion
of South vietna.
coupled vith its condemnation
of ..erican bor^ing as
another example of
India's one sided reaction
where Con^unis. is involved,
it also regarded
Mrs. Gandhi's allegations
in September 1972 that
CIA manipulation of opposition parties was behind
widespread antigovem^ent
disturbances as an
atte-pt to bla^e America for
conditions arising out of her
government's
failures.

m

The congress party in India has
denounced Secretary of state
Kissinger and the CIA over the agency's
involvement in the Chilean military coup, which ousted Dr. Salvador
Allende Gossens from the presidency.
The party also said that "some
foreign powers may think this is a
potential place for another experiment in
Chile,
yet Mr. Kissinger visited

New Delhi in October 1974, and for the
first time publicly acknowledged
the end of the previous "cold war" approach
to India.
He also assured India that the Central
Intelligence Agency would

not interfere in the political situation there.

Mr. Kissinger's visit

was largely designed to lift relations between
India and the United
States, since resentments lingered in India, due to
Washington's support
for Pakistan before and during the 1971 war that resulted
in the creation

of Bangladesh.
Indo-U.S. relations have been confused because of a split of
•""

2

New York Times

,

September 27, 1973, p.

New York Times

,

November

3,

1974, p. 6.

3
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opinion in Indian government
^
circles on the
cne issue
issue.
a group of Indian
Officials vie„ the no bixUon
U.S. assistance to
Xn.ia in the sixties
With stron, aversion,
because the. conside. it
haa st.in,s attache.
Indian officials in Washington
failed to respond to the
Po.d Administration's readiness to assist
India in copin, with her
food e„er,ency.^
"Mrs. Gandhi was against
;^erican food aid at bargain
prices." On the
other Side was a group of
officials, who were bent on
improving ties with
the united States, and were
worried about leaning too far
towards the
soviet union. This group includes
Foreign Minister Singh, the
staff of
the Indian Embassy in Washington
and some of «rs. Gandhi's
closest advisers.' Those opposing such
ties include several key figures
in the
'

congress party and the more militant
left-wingers among Mrs. Gandhi's
supporters. Mrs. Gandhi seemed to be
siding with the hostile group,
she
distrusted the United States and was far
more fearful of it than of the
Soviet Union.

Her distrust stemed from such factors
as United States

support of Pakistan during the 1971 war
that resulted in the formation
of Bangladesh; lingering resentment over
American aid which Indians view
as humiliating.
In this chapter we shall deal
with some of the issues, which have

upset relations between the two countries
significantly.

These issues

did not develop into any major conflict,
but were responsible for the
3

New York Times

.

September 27, 1973, p.

3.

4

Ibid.
5

C. Subramaniam, Ashok Mehta, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, all of whom
were her cabinet members. Nandini Satpathi, a young woman M.P. from
Orissa, and Dwarka Prasad Mishra, the powerful Chief Minister of Madhya
Pradesh-
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attitude Which decided .a:or
problems

U.e

U.S. economic assistance,

Indo-Pa.ista„ relations, the
Indo-PaWstan war in X971, and
Indo-M,erican relations in general.

CIA

The toppling of governments unfriendly
to Washington by helping

opposition political parties has
been a favourite sport of the
CIA.
Never before 1972 had an Indian
prime minister warned the nation
of the
grave danger posed by the CIA. Indira
Gandhi criticised the CIA on two
occasions in 1972 and said that its
activities were "on the increase and
we must continue our vigil.

After the war with China in 1962, New

Delhi had sought the CIA's assistance for
the limited purpose of getting

information on China.

But after the New York Times disclosures
on the

CIA's invovement in the overthrow of governments
in Asian and Latin American countries. New Delhi has kept a close
watch on its activities in
India.

A cabinet minister has said that New Delhi had
evidence that the

CIA had helped a political party in Bombay."^

assisted some other political parties also.

The CIA is believed to have
It had collected information

of India's nuclear programme, and in 1965 procured for
the dosier on

Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri a comprehensive report
of the analysis

of Shastri
6

's

blood.

The Statesman

g

,

What worried New Delhi more than the theft of

August 14, 1972.

7

See T.V. Kunni Krishnan, India and America, The Unfriendly Friends
(Connecticut:
Inter Culture Associates), p. 46,
8

Ibid.

,
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cUnicaX .epo^^s was t.e influence
t.e CX. sou^.t
economic and political
institutions in India.

to Have

t.e social

The scare a.out t.e
CIA

Showed how distrustful New
Delhi was of the United
States, and the denunciation Of the CIA indicated
how openly critical
official New Oelhi
was Of Washington.
instance of the financing
of anti-co:.unist parties by the CIA was revealed
in May 1973 when the

^

Newjork^ re-

ported that Craha. Martin, the
U.S. a^assador in Italy
in 1970 and later
axnbassador in South Vietnam,
had urged the CIA to restore
its secret financing to the conservative wing
of the Christian Democratic
party in
Italy and give $1 million to it.
The request was turned down.
But the
report said that until 1967 the CIA
had been regularly financing
the
Christian Democrats on the ground that
it was only countering the
Soviet
support to the communist party. India
suspected that the United States
had a hand in the overthrow of the
government of President Salvador

Allende in Chile in September 1973.

Indira Gandhi warned Indians from

time to time of a similar danger of
collusion betwen certain elements in

India and the outside forces which wished
to topple her.

A more serious threat to India than these alleged
activities
aimed against Indira Gandhi's government was
the arming of nations un-

friendly to India by the United States.

New Delhi was worried about

Washington's decision to sell $4 billion worth of arms to
Iran, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia.

The appointment of Richard Helmes, a former chief of

the CIA, as ambassador to Iran, together with the proposal to induct

about 11,000 U.S. personnel into Iran was a dangerous portent especially

when the King of Iran had said that "we must see to it that Pakistan
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does not

fan

to pieces."

mai.

fearea that apart fro. the
i„sta.iUty

the U.S. anns deal would
create in West Asia, some
of the anns raight be
used against her in a future
war.
However the rapproch^ent
between
India and Iran in 1974 and the
close ties established between
the. after
Indira Gandhi's visit to Teheran
in May, 1974 have .ade Iran's
intentions
less suspect in New Delhi. The
rift between Pakistan and Iran,
which
came about as a result of Bhutto
hobnobbing with Colonel Gaddaffi
of
Libya when, the Shah of Iran disliked,
has helped India to get over her
fear of Iran's military build-up.

The U.S. made an unusual move in naming
Daniel Moynihan as am-

bassador to New Delhi.

It was unusual because Moynihan was
known to be

a critic of Nixon's policy on India.

He was a member of the U.S. delega-

tion to the United Nations in December 1971 and
had strongly criticized

Washington's policy towards India.

A week after the war, he had said

that what happened in East Bengal "was done by
stupid and arrogant men in

power"
did.

and it would have been surprising if India had not
acted as she
In the appointment of Moynihan, a cross between
Bowles and Gal-

braith, some observers detected a ray of hope.

But others noted that

Bowles and Galbraith had found it hard to dispel areas of darkness
in

Washington as far as India was concerned and Moynihan did not find the
task easier.

Allegations were made by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in his recent
i^ook

A Dangerous Place

,

to the effect that the CIA contributed money to

an Indian political party, in one instance making the payment directly
to Indira Gandhi.

Mrs. Gandhi, who later became Prime Minister, was
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president of the Congress
Party at the time
that
•-nat the
cne tunds
fund. were said to
have heen transferred
to her to heip
defeat the co^unist
,over„.ent of
Kerala state in i,5S.
.he co^unists were
.eaten h. an aUiance
headed

Mr. candhi.s partv in
an election that .ear.

she has denied the
aiXe-

nation,

.ccordin, to Senator Moynihan,
who was a^assador to
.ndia fro»
1973 to 1975, another contribution
was ™ade to the party
in an effort to
unseat a co„™^ist governnent
in West Bengal state.
It is unclear when
the alleged transfer was
supposed to have taken place;
the con^unists
won west Bengal elections
in 1967 and 1969. were
defeated in 1972 and
regained power in 1977. ^.
„oynihan stood by these allegations
even
When questioned by the Indian
Foreign Minister, Atal Bihari
Vajpayee,

during a visit to Washington recently.^

„.s. Gandhi has however denied

these allegations.-

Indian Reactions on
American Involvement in Vietnam

Before peace descended on Vietnam in
January 1973 for two decades
India and the United states had found
themselves in opposite camps over

the war in Vietnam.

India had been more or less consistently
critical,

often mildly, sometimes sharply, of the
U.S. involvement in the Vietnam
war.

The United States could not understand how
India, a poor and weak

nation to which it had given large sums of money
as aid and shipped huge
quantities of food grains in times of dire need, could turn
around and
9

Robert Trtambull, "Moynihan Charges on C.I. A. Aid Stir Calls for
Inquiry in New Delhi," New York Times May 8, 1979,
p. A-10.
,
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attac. the benefactor.

Indira Candhi observed
in February 1972
that

India wasnot,iven "to display
.latitude in any tangible
sense for anything." ° She .ade this
remark half-hu.oro.sly,
half-seriously when she
was as.ed whether India felt
obliged to demonstrate
gratitude to Moscow
for supporting her on
Bangladesh. What made India
criticise the United
States was not lack of gratitude
but an overpowering sense
of revulsion
against the senseless war the
United States waged in Vietnam a war
Which imperilled the freedom of Asian
nations and brought unimaginable

destruction but which Nixon liked to
call "one of the most unselfish
missions ever undertaken by one nation
in the defence of another. "^^

'

The objective of the United States in
South-East Asia has been
the containment of communism as well as
the economic exploitation of
the wealth of the region.

Nixon had said in 1954 that Washington
should

fight communism in South-East Asia, because
the rubber and tin of the
area were important to the United States.

But in Vietnam these objec-

tives were observed, what the United States wanted
to have was political

control of the area, and the Vietnam war had nothing
to do with territory, trade, or access to raw materials

. "^"^

President Kennedy was the one who finally got the United
States

hopelessly involved in Vietnam.

He had fumbled the Cuban invasion and

perhaps wanted to show that he could lead the United States to victory
10

To C.L. Sulzberger of The New York Times

.

^""Radio broadcast on February 24, 1973, reported by The Times

don, February 26, 1973.

Louis Keren, The Times

,

London, May 11, 1972.

Louis Keren, The Times

,

London, May 11, 1972.

>

Lon-

182

at least in Vietnam.

When Mehru .et President
Kennedy in Washington to-

wards the end of 1961, he
appealed to the President not
to send ^erioan
soldiers to Vietnam and enlarge
the war.
"The President talKed a
good
deal .ore about Vietnam, but the
Prime Minister remained
unresponsive.""
The President, against the
advice of Nehru, undertook a
major military
build-up in south Vietnam, but at
the time of Kennedy's death
in November 1963, their number had increased
to 15,500 as a result of the
policy
of "one more step", each new step
promising the success the previous
one
had promised but failed to deliver.
The U.S. generals in Vietnam always
made- Washington believe that
the war was being won by the United
States.
the secretary of defence, said:

In 1962 Robert McNamara,

"We are winning the war."

m

March

1963, the defence department announced that the
"comer had definitely

been turned towards victory in Vietnam."
India's criticism of the United States became
rather muffled when

her ties with China were imparied in the early 1960
's.

On April

1,

1965,

however, India and sixteen other non-aligned nations
appealed to the

United States to "start such negotiations as soon as
possible without

posing any preconditions so that a political solution" may
be reached.
Lai Bahadur Shastri, the Indian Prime Minsiter, criticized the
escala-

tion of the war in Vietnam and said that the proposals Johnson had made
to solve the Vietnam war were inadequate.

On April 29, 1965, he said:

"There is hardly any point in the offer that he (Johnson) has made.

The

14

Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days
Boston, 1965, p. 525.

,

Houghton Miffin Company,
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first thing is that the bo:.tin,
.ust stop."

mai.

build-up and the fearsome bo^in,
of North Vietnam.

In June 1965. the

New yor. Times appealed to
President Johnson to give
serious consideration to What it called "the
appeal fro. Indian Pri.e
Minister
shastri

for another pause in the bombing
of North Vietnam."

son would not listen.
increased.

But President John-

The tempo of the troop build-up
and the bombing

The number of U.S. troops in
Vietnam in August, 1965 was

125,000 and by December 1966 it rose to
400.000.

The United States

realized too late that its real enemy
in Asia was not international
communism but militant nationalism.
Until mid-1966 India had avoided sharp
criticism of U.S. policy
in Vietnam.

She had hoped to keep good relations
with the United States,

but the deliberate escalation of the war
and the toal disregard of the
human life changed New Delhi's attitude.

In a radio broadcast in July

1966 Indira Gandhi expressed strong disapproval of
the bombing of the

Hanoi-Haipong fuel depots.
end and said:

She wanted "the bitter and bloody war" to

"Recent events have regrettably added to the grave
danger

of escalation that might embroil the world in a larger
conflict.

can be no military solution in Vietnam:

peaceful settlement.

There

there is no alternative to a

The parties must be brought to the negotiating

table within the framework of the Geneva agreement

""'"^
.

A week later

she was more forthright in her condemnation of the United States.

During

her visit to Moscow, the joint communique issued by the Soviet Union and
India on July 16, 1966 called for the immediate cessation of the bombing
15 ^
The

Statesman , July

8,

1966.
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o. «o.th veitna..

Washington iodged what
was aescribe. as a
strong protest against the reference
to the .nitea states
in the joint co»unig.e
ana particularly objectea
to the woras "aggressive
<:iyyiressxve actions
acti„„« of. imperialist
and reactionary forces
•

.

in October 1966

maia was even .ore blunt

in her criticise of
the

united States.

At the inauguration of
the tripartite meeting
of Tito.
Nasser ana Indira Ganahi on
October 21, 1966. the Indian
Prin,e Minister
Observed that the brutal ant tragic
war in Vietna. should be
ended before
it destroyed the entire country
and spread and engulfed
the world. She
suggested the holding of a peace
conference simultaneously with
the halting of the bombing, followed
closely by cessation of hostilities
"on all
sides throughout Vietnam." she
asked Britain and the Soviet Union,
the
two co-chairmen of the Geneva
conference to convene a conference and

bring the parties to the conference
table.
In 1967 India again appealed to
the "peace-loving people and

government of the United States"

to stop the bombing of North Vietnam

"unconditionally and indefinitely" in order to
shift the Vietnam issue
from the battlefield to the conference table.

In their numerous refer-

ences to Vietnam, Nehru, Shastri, and Indira
Gandhi had seldom named the

United States as the aggressor.

The usual appeal by India was that "the

bombing of North Vietnam should stop" and not that "the
United States
should stop the bombing of North Vietnam."

India referred to the with-

drawal of "foreign troops" without mentioning the United
States.
United States took objection even to this mild criticism.
16 ^
The

Statesman

,

February 21, 1967.

It chided

The
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India in February 1968 for
being inactive as chairman
of the ICC in policing Can^odia-s border to
prevent infiltration into
South Vietnam.
Cazr^odia had requested the
ICC to investigate border
violations and New

Delhi's refusal to strengthen
the con^ission to patrol
the border between
Cambodia and Vietnam was resented
by Washington.
But New Delhi tried to maintain
a flexible stand on
Vietnam, and
her criticism was not influenced
by ideological considerations.
She did

not hesitate to voice her disapproval
of U.S. escalation of the war,
nor
did she fail to welcome American
peace moves. When President Johnson

announced on March 31, 1968 the suspension
of bombing, India most heartily welcomed it.
Indira Gandhi hailed Johnson's
"courageous initiative
contained

in a speech of historic significance"
and welcomed "Hanoi's

positive response to

it."'''^

President Nixon, Johnson's successor entered
the White House with
the pledge that he would seek an honourable
end to the conflict in Vietnem, but Nixon took the war to Cambodia by bombing
the country secretly.

From 1971 onwards India's reaction to the U.S. policy
in Vietnam became
stiffer.

The days of meek protests were over.

In April 1972 Indira

Gandhi described the situation in Vietnam as a classic example
of old

colonialism yielding place to new intervention.
When peace descended on war-ravaged Vietnam in 1973, India's two-

decade-old role as chairman of the ICC came to an end.

U.S. displeasure

over India's attitude made Washington keep India out of the new international supervision and control committee.
17

,
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desire to have India in was
frustrated by Washington

m

Pakistan as Irritant
Indo - U.S. Relatione

Fro. the beginning, the
United staes .oved closer
to those countries Which appreciated its
values, motives and policies.
It

found that
the fight against co»,unis.,
Pakistan would be a more
faithful friend
than India. President Tru:^n
said in 1953, "Pakistan's
friendship for
the west may become an important
factor in giving stability
to the neareast. At the same ti^e Pakistan
is a valuable ally in
South Asia because
of its strategic location in the
Indian ocean and its control
of land
bases in Central Asia."

After Eisenhower became President,
Truman's thesis was translated
into action.

In May 1954 the United States and
Pakistan signed a mutual

aid and security agreement.

It made Pakistan a close ally of
the United

States and a part of the Dulles dream of
containing the Soviet Union by

building a defensive line stretching from
western Europe to Japan. India's
refusal to become a part of this defensive line
and be a partner in the

crusade against Moscow irked Washington.

Nixon described the pact with

Pakistan as an "opportunity to build a counter-force
to Nehru's neutralism
18

New Delhi noted that 8 of the 13 participatns at the Paris conference which dealt with a crucial area of Asia were non-Asians.
Japan,
with a stake in the region, was also left out. A Japanese
official said
a country like India had greater responsibilities and
interests in the
region than many other countries participating in the conference. When
the question of site for the conference was under discussion, the North
Vietnamese were said to have suggested Paris. When Washington objected
to Paris, Hanoi proposed New Delhi. The U.S. objection to New Delhi
was even stronger and in the end Paris was accepted.

indi^ leader's own backyard."

in the

He also said that
U.S. policy

Should be based "not on any
fear of angerin, Mehru.""
.He U.S. ar^s
aid to Pakistan and the
deliberate do™-,radin, of
India by Washington
made Nehru distrust the United
States.

The debate in the United
Nations over the Kashroir
issue in January 1957 Showed the basic
U.S. resentment against
New Delhi. India was
upset by the persistent U.S.
attempts to help Pakistan,
and side with
her on the Kashmir issue.
Although the United States gave
military aid
to Pakistan and supported her
in the United Nations, it
could not ignore
India.
Nor could India go without U.S.
assistance at that time. President Eisenhower is said to have
stated after his visit to India
and Paki
Stan in 1959, "There seems to be
something in the chemistry of humans
that often determines on their first
contact whether or not any two

easily become friends or are mutually
repelled.
I

From the very beginning

conceived for President Ayub Khan a warm
affection which still endures
We have already seen in the previous chapters
how the United

States has tilted in favour of Islamabad, or
equated India and Pakistan.
This tilt becomes clearer through the Anderson
papers.

The Washington

columnist Jack Anderson brought into open President
Nixon's pro-Pakistan
policy.

These papers are the true copies of the notes of minutes pre-

pared by U.S. Defense Department Senior officials in the
secret meetings
of the White House Special Action Group during the fourteen
day Indo-Pak
19
20
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war in 1,7..

.He ^eetin, „.3

o.e.

„e„^ Kissinger

.„a was

related to the Indo-Pakistan
war in 1971.
Mr. Kissinger always
opposed Washington's policy
based on the

syste. Of Military alliances
and on the proposition
that deterrence o,
aggression required the largest
possible grouping of powers.
He was

sKepti-

oal Of the effectiveness of
the military alliances
sponsored by the
united states in Asia. He said
that Pakistan's motive for
obtaining U.S.
ar.s was not security against
a co™„unist attack but
protection against
India. 2^ He thought India had
"the benefit of a well-trained
civil service and Of an experienced leadership
group" and that of the new
nations
India perhaps was in "the best position
to resolve its choices wisely

and piirposefully.

2

After he became the chief of the national
security council under

President Nixon, he found as other U.S.
policy planners had found earlier,
that Pakistan could be used in furthering
U.S. objectives in Asia.

His

secret statement, supporting Pakistan and
denouncing India, made in De-

cember 1971 after Pakistan had bombed Indain
airfields, come as somewhat
of a surprise to many who had known him earlier.

He was not the author

of the policy towards India, but he became a strong
advocate of it.

new element was secrecy.

The

In an era dominated by multi-dimensional mass

communication systems, a fair amount of secrecy in diplomacy is
necessary.
See Appendices 1,
22

.
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.

Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice

1960, p. 66.
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ana t.e WUsonian

.U.^

open .ipi.„..,

UttU

.eXev.„ce.

How-

ever, Kissinger made a
virtue of secrecy.
in 1971 .i.on was t.e
strategist and Kissinger
.as his tactician
He seemed to have
convinced himself that
for a short-term
o.^ective

Nixon.s pro-Pa.istani stand
was correct, and he
.ecame a wiUing instrument of Nixon in his effort
to thwart India's moves
on Bangladesh,
xt
was the White House - more
specifically President Nixon,
who on December
1971
authorized
4,
a statement which said:
"India hears the major
responsibilities for the hostilities
that have ensued. "^^

After India declared unilateral
ceasefire, Nixon claimed that
it
was his pressure on the Soviet
Onion, which in turn put
pressure on India,
that brought about the ceasefire.
He said that the United
States "in

communication with the Soviet Union,
played a constructive role" in
ending the war. 25 New Delhi considered
this as one of the most perverse
statements that came out of the White
House on the crisis in December
1971.

Indira Gandhi stated that when the
battle in Bangladesh ended,

"it was we who decided unilaterally
on a ceasefire," but the White House

kept repeating the claim

that Nixon had saved Pakistan from being
over-

run by India.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistan President,
also believed that
Pakistan was saved by Nixon.

He told C.L. Sulzberger, the New York Times

columnist on foreign affairs, that the enemy's
onslaught against West

Pakistan would have continued unabated if the United
States had not given
24

New York Times

,

April 27, 1972.

Interview with Time magazine, January

3,

1972.
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a fir. ulti^tur,.

"The Soviet .nion," said
Bhutto, ".naerstood the
signal ana then pressed India to
accept a ceasefire. I
know that this is
true.
I have just been in
Peking and chou-En-lai
confirmed this to n,e."

Besides Chou-En-lai, Bhutto, and
Nixon, so.e leaders in India
also believed that the U.S. and the Soviet
Union had a hand in the
ceasefire.

Atal Behari Vajpayee, the president
of the Jan Sangh party
suspected that
India declared the ceasefire as
a result of pressure from
Moscow. But
the Indian government has all along
maintained that the ceasefire decision was entirely its own.

The U.S. moves against India in 1971
revealed to the world more
dramatically than ever before the gulf that
separated official Washington

from New Delhi.

During this period, for the first time
India opposed

stoutly and, what was more, openly U.S. attempts
to intimidate her.

The

united States overlooked the genocide committed
by West Pakistan in East
Bengal on the plea that it was an internal affair of
Pakistan.

It turned

a deaf ear to India's complaint that the massive
influx of refugees into

India from East Bengal was a grave threat to her economy and
political
stability.

India was worried not so much by the threat of war by Paki-

stan as by the upheaval inside East Pakistan and its repercussions
in
India.

Kissinger himself had said a few years earlier that, "...some

states feel threatened not only by the foreign policy of other countries

but also, and perhaps especially, by domestic transformations" in other
4.
countries.
•

26

When the war broke out, even against the advice of the CIA, the
26
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.

Kissinger, American Foreign Policy
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White House insisted thatit- v.^.^
that xt
had
to seize Pa.istan-held

te„ito^

against India on this ground.

oonvmcng

evidence that India
wanted

in Kashmir and Justified
its .oves

It refused to divulge
the nature of the

evidence,

when Kissinger was as.ed
if he wanted the public
to taKe on
faith alone a ^ajor justification
for U.S.

policy, he replied: "that
is

correct.... „e will not produce
the evidence since it
would co.pron,ise
"^"^
Other things.

Nixon's mood, his pique, even
his political philosophy
do not
fully explain his opposition to
India in 1971. There are
other factors.
A major justification for the
policy was the necessity not to
upset his
efforts to befriend China. He found
that Pakistan was not only less
complex and more easy to work with than
India but also useful in his
search
for a detente with China, just as
earlier Presidents had found Pakistan
more useful than India in the cold war
against the Soviet Union and
China.

Pakistan had expressed the desire to be a
broker between Wash-

ington and Peking even as early as 1964.

Bhutto had said on August 21,

1964 that nothing would give Pakistan "greater
satisfaction" than to see
a rapprochment between China and the
United States and that "we will be

willing to undertake whatever limited role we can
play in this matter."
One of the immediate reasons for Nixon's coldness
towards India
in 1971 was his desire to have the support of Pakistan
in establishing

contact with China. 28

Nixon's firm support to Pakistan against India in

1971 underlined, among other things, his desire not to jeopardize
his
27
28

The New York Times

,
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Report to Congress

,

President Nixon, February 1972.
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Visit to Pe.in. on 1972.

ui.on himself ha.
instructed Ceor.e Bush,
the
U.S. representative at
the United Nations, to
he fir. against
India.
Bush na.ed India as the
aggressor and said:
"There is guite
clear aggression, it is
obviously quite clear."

pe_

The Anderson papers disclosed
how while official spokesmen
of the
U.S. government were maintaining
that the United States was
following an
even handed policy towards India
and Pakistan,
President Nixon gave orders that U.S. policy be tilted
in favour of Pakistan.
Another revelation
was that the United States government
was seriously considering
provision
Of military supplies to Pakistan
through third countries. The
Nixon ad-

ministration was therefore criticized for
being anti-India.

The White

House was pleased with the performance
of George Bush, the U.S. representative at the united Nations, with its
strong anti-India bias.

In the

United Nations American and Chinese
representatives worked in close co-

operation and there was great jubilation in
Washington and Peking when
the general assembly voted in favour of a
ceasefire.

President Nixon

telephoned George Bush to express his deep
satisfaction at the outcome of
the general assembly discussion.

The U.S. efforts in the United Nations

to brand India as the aggressor were frustrated by
the Soviet Union.

Nixon said that he regretted the failure of the Soviet Union
to join the
vast majority of the membership of the United Nations who called for
an

immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of forces.

Both the United States and

See President Nixon's annual report (1972) to the United State
Congress.
30

Lok Sabha Debates, March 16, 1972, vol. xi, no. 4, column 351.
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China wording in harmony and
with the enthusiasm of a
new friendship .ade
bluff manoeuvres against India's
land and sea frontiers.
The U.S. and

China "found themselves virtually
co-belligerent. .when they backed
Pakistan... "^^ AS the fighting
in East Bengal went
against Pakistan and
Yahya Khan's troops were driven
to the wall, both Washington
and Peking
asked India on December 10 to have
an i^^ediate ceasefire on
the same day
.

the Nixon administration instructed
Turkish pilots in Libya to be
ready
to fly American jet planes to
Pakistan, when Nixon ordered
the task

force to sail into the Bay of Bengal,
his intention was probably not
only
to brow-beat India but also save
East Bengal from being overrun
by
India.

During the war Washington was silent about
the dispatch of the

Enterprise and the helicopter carrier Tripoli
marines,

7

destroyers and frigates

had moved into the Bay of Bengal.

- a

,

with a battalion of 800

force of 6,000 officers and men -

The U.S. ships were to be used,

according to Washington reports, to evacuate
Americans from East Pakistan.

When the ships steamed into the Bay of Bengal, only
17 Americans were in
East Bengal.

The real intention of the United States was revealed
when

Jerry W. Fried Hein, a Pentagon spokesman"^"^ said on December 12
that the
U.S. fleet also served to establish an American presence there.

James

Reston said that the President supported Pakistan because he saw "in the

subcontinent the power struggle between China and the Soviet Union.
31
32
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The White House then
cnen stopped
stonno^^ all
=.n ^
economic assistance to India,
vhile Pakistan continued to
.ooeive it in spite of public
protests. The
White House tried to manipulate
a situation through the
United Nations
and other diplomatic pressures
to stop India from liberating
Bangladesh.
However due to Soviet assistance
and her repeated vetoes in
the Security
council, all United States - Chinese
attempts were made fruitless.
On
the instructions of the White House,
the United states representative
in
the Security Council, George Bush,
branded India as an aggressor and

tried to put the entire blame
oiic on
vju her
xier.

me

Thf^ r7ni+-ori
c+.=>+.^^
united States

not, however, stop the birth of Bangladesh.

government could

Mr. Nixon's tilt towards

Pakistan only increased the credibility gap,
and damaged Indo-American
relations.

Jack Anderson in these papers has taken the President
to task
for his conduct during the Indo-Pakistan war.

In column after column

he has accused the White House for using deceitful
methods towards India,

employing duplicity in diplomacy and snobbery in political
behaviour

Indo-Soviet Treaty

On August 9, 1971, India and the USSR signed a treaty of peace,

friendship and cooperation for a period of 20 years.

Even though the

treaty had been in consideration for almost two years, the situation in

Bangladesh and the impending United States-China thaw had promoted the
mutual desire of India and the 'USSR to challenge the new orientation in
35

m

See his columns
the Washington Post during the fourteen day
Indo-Pakistan war which started on December 3, 1971.
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A.nerican foreign policy.

It «as a response to the
announcement of the

secret Kissinger-Chou talks which were
held in Peking during July
9-11,
1971.
There seemed to
u be
De a neea
need tor
fnr- a
a ^i,~.i^r^^4.diplomatic counter-weight "against"
the United States and China.

With the start of the 1970
place.

's

two kinds of changes began to
take

The first was the announcement of the
Guam doctrine by Nixon in

February 1970.

The two parts of which are relevant
here are:

first,

"...we will maintain our interests in Asia
and the commitments that flow

from them... the United States will keep all
its treaty commitments," and
second, "a direct combat role for United States
general purpose forces

arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into
external aggression or

when there is an overt conventional attack.

In such cases we shall

weigh our interests and commitments, and we shall consider
the efforts of
our allies in determining our response."
The two parts are reconciled by the valid assumption, supported

by subsequent events, that for its own benefit (any benefits for South
East Asia being incidental in this context) the United States was going
to downgrade those of its interests in the area which could only be de-

fended by the use of conventional land forces in favour of those of its

commitments and interests, such as the defense of Japan against an overt

Chinese attack, which may justify the use of unconventional weapons.

The

United States was thus extending to post-Vietnam Asia the philosophy it
had already applied to other parts of the world, that American interests
are better defended from the American fortress than from American bases

spread all over the world.
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The 1970 's saw a second major
change, and that was the
brief
Slno-soviet effort to deescalate
the border dispute between
them.
This

gave rise to the triangle between
Washington, Moscow and Peking,

with
Snerioan experts speculating when the
Soviet Union would make a
pre-emptive nuclear strike upon China, it
was inevitable that Washington
and

Peking should draw closer together.

Peking and Washington were drawn
to-

gether by their mutual opposition to
Moscow.

The United states would not

even hesitate to scuttle all its commitments
in South East Asia to win
the major objective of tilting the global
triangle against the Soviet

Onion.

These commitments were incurred only as part
of the game of con-

taining China in South East Asia was only a subsidiary
aim which was

important because China was regarded as second to
Russia.

Since China

was now coming forward as the biggest bulwark against
Russia, the United
States saw the possibility of fulfilling the highest aim of
United States

foreign policy throughout the post-war period, that of building
a decisive combination against the Soviet Union by contemplating a Sino-Ameri-

can alliance.
India had therefore to make certain adjustments in her foreign
policy.

American reasons for wanting a rapprochement with China are not

Asian either in origin or aim, they are global.

This brought Russian

and India interests into a closer congruence than they were ever before.
No one can predict the future development of Sino-Russian relations.

But all authoritative pointers indicate a continuing conflict,

probably leading to a major clash.
36

36

Pran Chopra, "New Duet for Old:
stan Standard, January 21, 1971.

Nixon's efforts for a new relation-

The CAll of the Region, The Hindu-

197

ship with Chi,na is in anticipaton of some
such development,

m

the

future, India and the Soviet Union may have
to consider the Sino-Soviet,

Sino-lndian and Indo-Pakistan frontiers to be
closely interrelated, each
part equally sensitive to developments on any
one of them.
India's Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, in
presenting the Treaty
to the Lojj Sabha on August 9, 1971, described the
treaty as a "deterrent

to any powers that may have aggressive designs on
our territorial integ-

rxty and sovereignty." 37
The Treaty has been signed in a context which unified the
local

and more immediately relevant aspects of the new configuration of
inter-

national diplomacy.

In this way the Treaty prohibits the Soviet Union

from giving any assistance to Pakistan which militates against Indian

interests.

On the other hand it committed the Soviet Union to close and

active interest in seciaring the return of the Bangladesh refugees to
their homes.

However the Treaty does not prohibit India or the Soviet

Union from trying to establish normal relations either with China or
Pakistan.

But it does seem to prevent them from taking these relations

to such lengths as may amount to providing assistance.

38

There was a wide range of reaction in the Indian Press.

The

Hindustan Times in an editorial stated:
In our judgement the Government has over-reacted to
the prospect of an Indo-Pakistan conflict, the
37
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For a clearer analysis of the Treaty see Ashok Kapur, "Indo-Soviet
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possibility and scale of Chinese
intervention in anv
such event, and the American
attitude towards P^istan
China's global interests do
not centre

on PakiSn
''^""'^ ^^^^^^ ^° launch
or
traniVt'
trans-Himalayan war to pull
Islamabad's chastnuts out
of a revolutionary fire.
Were it to do so India ^
has
^^^^
^°
threat
thre^rlid
And in'S^'^^^
the remote possibility of
their beina
overwhelmed, the super powers,
especially the Soviet
union could not afford to stand
by idly
t^eir o^
global interests.
In other words, in a
situation^
real crisis Soviet support would
have been forthcoming without a treaty. 39

off

m

L

The Indian Express in its editorial
struck a happier note.
stated:

The Indo-Soviet Treaty purports to be
a treaty between
equals, not between a big power and a
client state
and in keeping with India's policy of
non-alignment
whose value as a "factor in the maintenance
of universal peace and internal security" the Treaty
specifically stressed. 40
The Hindu stated:

While this strengthening of ties with Moscow is to
be welcomed, there is one important point which New
Delhi should not lose sight of. Apart from the unwisdom of putting all eggs in one basket, it will
be foolish for India to get into a situation where
it will have to consider every enemy of Russia as
its own enemy.
If circumstances have created a
compulsive reason for New Delhi to sign the Treaty
with India, the other rising Asian Power. The
Pakistani threat of war is a problem for the immediate
present and the Treaty will no doubt help India to
meet that threat. But the bigger and more important
problem for India - possibly the most important is economic development and assistance from the advanced
Western countries and Japan has been and will continue
to be invaluable in this sphere.

The Hindustan Times

,

New Delhi, 10th August, 1971.

I

The Indian Express , New Delhi, 10th August, 1971.

The Hindu

,

Madras, 10th August, 1971.
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According to the opinion of

see

Inidans .uch criticise
o, the

indo-soviet Treaty could have
been averted, or easily
„et if sardar
swaran sin,h, the Indian foreign
minister and his advisers
had not .ade
two serious mistakes.'*^
First they should have never
claimed that the Treaty had
been under discussion for over two
years and that India would
be ready to sign
Similar pacts with other countries
in the region.
Second they should not
have accepted that part of the
joint statement dealing with
the problem
of Bangladesh. There was no need
for a joint stateinent after
the Treaty
was signed.
It tended to strengthen the fear
that the treaty will work
to the disadvantage of India just
because it is the weaker of the two
parties.
The reaction in the American press was
as varied.

The New York

Times stated:
The Soviet-Indian Friendship accord signed in
New
Delhi, strengthens the Soviet influence in the
second
most populous nation in Asia and the world at the
expense of the United States. It could increase the
danger of a local war leading to a big power confrontation on the Indian subcontinent .. .By signing the
treaty with India, Kremlin has compromised any credit
it may have had in Islamabad thus reducing the
possibility of becoming a mediator, a role it played
so successfully at Tash Kent after the 1965 IndoPakistan conflict. The United States government is
in no better position to serve as conciliator having
cast its lot so firmly with the Yahya regime.
The running theme in most of the editorials was almost the same.
42
43
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The Chris tian Science Monitor
observed:
In allying itself with India
in a 20 years friendshin

m

at China.
the diplomatic chess game, the
treaty
IS to some extent a countermove
to Washington's
rapprochement with Peking. But apparently,
it also
intended to avert the danger of the
big powers
being drawn into a war on the Indian
subcontinent.^^

The Washington Post stated:

For Delhi the treaty, at least its timing,
reflects not
a design for aggression but a passionate
reaction to
American support to Pakistan. .For Moscow our
hunch
is that the Kremlin has taken advantage
of India's
distress to consolidate its own position in
Delhi.
.

The Baltimore Sun also stated in its editorial
that India in

signing its treaty with the Soviet Union was acting to
deter Pakistan.
The United States policy of continuing military aid to
Pakistan, occurring along with the policy of seeking
normal relations with the mainland China, is a factor
in the developments that have brought India and the
Soviet Union together in a well dramatized public
embrace ... The United States, long a major supporter of
India, is cast, unhappily, and perhaps imprecisely,
on the side of Pakistan and China. This is an unnatural
position for the United States which in fact should and we believe does want to maintain close and friendly
relations with Indian and to preserve, at least, normal
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union... The soberminded diplomats must hope that India in signing its
treaty with the Soviet Union is acting to deter Pakistan
rather than to get ready for war.*^^
The United States authorities maintained a stiff upper lip over
the Indo- Soviet Friendship Treaty.

The administration thought that this

was a Soviet and Indian response to the Washington-Peking "ping-pong
44
45

46

The Christian Science Monitor
The Washington Post

,

,

(editorial), August 11, 1971,

(editorial)

,

August 10, 1971.

The Baltimore Sun, August 11, 1971.

201

uprisings in the littoral states has
enhanced the strategic importance
of
the ocean. The goal of all states
involved is not "control of the
Indian
ocean," but rather political influence
on its shores. It thus
appears
to be a skirmishing ground.

The real threat to peace in the
Indian Ocean is from the main

super powers - the Soviet Union, United
States, and Britain.

American

moves seem to be more hostile, particularly
after the United States decision to dispatch the seventh fleet into
the Bay of Bengal.

Washington

and London actually fear the increasing
Russian naval presence in the
area.

American apprehensions are based on the increasing
budgetary pro-

visions

for Defense by the Soviet Union, and the repeated
visits of

Russian naval ships to the friendly coast in the Indian
Ocean territory.

New power alliances are being made.
•

The British sponsored five-power

defense agreement and the Anglo-American plan to set up a communication
centre at the Diego-Garcia island are the most important pointers.
the pro-western dictatorships in this area has also started.

Arming

American

arms to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Australia and the British decision to
sell naval equipment to South Arabia falls in this category.

On the

larger scale the United States is trying to divide this area into spheres
of influence.

These politico-military postures are a threat to peace in

the area.

The United States, looking after abandoned British bases (if not
propoerty) has an old sea plane tender, and two destroyers at Bahrein.
It has two large communications stations in Ethiopia and Australia, and
is building an austere mid-oceanic facility at Diego-Garcia.

It

.
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periodically exercises elements of the
seventh fleet in the region, as
part of what is called operating
experience in a new theatre.
The Russians have no naval base in
the Indian Ocean, but they

have increased their presence gradually.

In contrast to American policy

the Russian attitude is to seek naval
cooperation with the littoral states

of the Indian Ocean family.

This cooperation may turn out to be
strate-

gic importance, but for the present there is
no evidence of any hostile

activity.

At present neither super power has made major basing
investments
in the region.

The United States has a decided military advantage
in

the case of a U.S. -USSR confrontation, and ic can be expected
that the

USSR will attempt to even the odds in the next several years.

On the

other hand the political effect of this uneven military position is by
no means so easy to calculate.

Thus when the U.S. Enterprise task force

moved into the Indian Ocean during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, the
Soviets moved a much smaller squadron into India.

ployed its ships as a shield protecting India.

The Soviet Union de-

The Indians welcomed

this, as the action of a faithful ally - and its political impact was

greater than would have been its military importance had the conflict
widened.

Neither side used force, but in terms of political effect, the

USSR "won."
Naval displays are more than bluff and more than archaic symbolic

counters on a chess board, but they are less than the decisive increments
of a conflict.

They are part of a pattern in which some forces committed

for limited gains, and others are held in reserve with a coalition of
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potential forces should the conflict
widen.

All powers would use their

fleets to sustain their allies, and
where possible to e^olden the
enemies
of hostile regimes.

Professor Wilcox suggests that the Indian
Ocean will become even
more active as a skirmish zone when
conflicts in the littoral states
present opportunities and problems of security
management.'*^ These problems he suggest further will probably be
"internationalized" with great

power participation either direct or indirect.
The role of Russian naval power in the Indian
Ocean can be consi-

dered in several ways.

There is firstly the strategic use of that
power

in terms of the need to counter United States
SLBM capability.

The Rus-

«

sians having seen the deployment of Polaris A-2 and A- 3
submarines in the

Meditarranean are determined not to be caught in the Indian Ocean.

The

Russian naval presence can also be seen as a kind of 'backup' to
India's
role of containing China.
supplies.

It is also designed to interdict western oil

There is a possibility of Russians blockading or sinking wes-

tern oil tankers.
As a result of all this, the littoral states, are for the first

time beginning to see the Indian Ocean as a meaningful political entity.

Many of the littoral states are concerned that the Indian Ocean should be
neutralised or that it should become a "zone of disengagement."^^

In a

49

See Wayne Silcox, 'The Indian Ocean, and the Great Powers in the
1970 's,' in collected papers of the study conference on The Indian Ocean
in International Politics Department of Extra-mural studies. University
of Southampton, 1973.
,

^°See Lok Sabha Debates Vol. 2, No. 6, May 31, 1971 (New Delhi:
Lok Sabha Secretariat) Col. 168; Also Lok Sabha Debates Vol. 65, No.
November 19, 1970.
,

,

8,
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speech on

8

Septe^er 1970 at the Lusaka
Non-aligned Conference, the

Indian Pri.e Minister declared:

"We would like the Indian
Ocean to be

an area of peace and cooperation.

Military bases of outside
powers will

create tension and great power rivalry. "^^

;^ong the resolutions adopted

by the Heads of the non-aligned
state was one relating to the
subject
"Adoption of a Declaration calling
upon all states to consider and
respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of
peace from which great power
rivalries
and competition as well as bases, conceived
in the context of such rival-

ries and competition

-

whether army, navy, or air force are
excluded.

The are should also be free of nuclear weapons."
(Resolution, 8.6)
In a statement in the Parliament on November
22, 1974, the then

External Affairs Minister, Y. Chavan, said, "The
government reiterate
their deep concern and misgivings at these developments
which are inconsistent with United Nations resolution declaring the Indian
Ocean as a
zone of peace."

Talking of the entry of the United States naval force

in the Indian Ocean, Mr. Bupesh Gupta^^ in the Rajya Sabha accused
Dr.

Kissinger of "gunboat diplomacy" and wondered if Kissinger had informed
the government of India, of his government's intention of sending the

task force into the Indian Ocean. ^"^

The United States explanation is

that after 1973 's West Asian war the United States is publicly committed
to maintaining a naval force in the Arabian Sea to protect its interests
^^

Indian Express

,

September 10, 1970.

52

Leader of the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India Rajya Sabha is
the Upper House of the Indian Parliament.
53

Ravmdra Varma, "Power and Politics

Affairs Reports

,

13(1)

January 1964, pp.

in the Indian Ocean, Foreign
3-6.
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and the oil lanes leading from the
Persian Gulf.

According to earlier

plans the United states was to send a
task force every three months
on a
rotational basis.
As the principal country, on the shores
of the Indian Ocean,

India has vital interests in keeping the ocean
an area of peace

-

free

from big power rivalry, a naval arms race, and
from military bases.

Large scale naval manouveres only aggravate the
existing tension created
by the establishment of military bases.
The super-power decision making is vitally influenced
by certain

generalized concepts about the nature of the world and the nature
of the
struggle in which they are engaged.
those of

'

Foremost amongst these concepts are

the total balance of power' and the 'power vacuum'.

The opera-

tionalisation of these concepts leads to a situation wherein neither
side

prepared to remove or scale down its presence in the Indian Ocean

for fear of 'creating a power vacuum,' and "destabilising the balance of

power"
Until the United States and USSR alter their conceptual frame of

reference nothing much will be achieved.

The situation is made more com-

plex when concepts coincide with interests, for e.g. the Russian presence
in the Indian Ocean and the Russian support of India.
54

During the budget session (1972-73) of the Parliament the problem
in the mind of most members of Parliament was the eight Task Force of
the United States Seventh Fleet which was dispatched to the Bay of Bengal
at the last stage of the Indo-Pakistan war. The panic caused by the sudden United States presence in the Indian Ocean was relieved only by the
reassuring news of the arrival simultaneously of elements of the Soviet
Pacific Fleet closely following the furrows of Enterprise.
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Declaration of Emerge ncy in India,
July 1975
In 1966, two years after the
death of her father the Congre.
;ss

party chose Mrs. Indira Gandhi, because
the party members apparently
thought she would be easier to manipulate
than a man.

Three years later

Mrs. Gandhi remade the party in her
own image, and since then has
ruled

like an autocrat.

In the nine years since she first
became the Prime

Minister, Mrs. Gandhi has steadily tightened
her hold on Indian politics.
In July, 1975, she declared a state of
emergency and began arresting

thousands of its opponents.

American newspapers unanimously condemned Prime
Minister Indira
Gandhi's mass arrests of opposition leaders and other
dissidents.

While

the New York Times observed that in India, "there was something
in the air

perilously like euphoria." 56 Mrs. Gandhi's image was badly tarnished in
the American press and she lost credibility.

Several newspapers saw

hypocrisy in her statements and have drawn parallels with the comments
of Mr. Nixon before his exit.

Only Mrs. Gandhi they point out has gone

beyond what the American President said and did.

In an editorial the

Christian Science Monitor wrote
She may honestly feel that her antidemocratic measures
are in the interests of preserving democracy, but
as one who has been quick to judge the actions of
other governments from outside, she ought to be particularly sensitive to the ominous impression conveyed by
her crackdown on dissidents. What the world sees in
India now is a leader convicted in court, staying in

^^Angus Deming with Loren Jenkins, "Making of an Autocrat," Newsweek

July

7,

56

1975.

New York Times, September

8,

1975,

,
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office through judicial grace while
appealing the
conviction, and using her position of
power to suppress
the voices against her. This does not
look like
democracy leadership to the world. 57
The New York Times proclaimed forthrightly
that "For all practical purposes Prime Minsiter Indira Gandhi is today
the dictator of

India."

58

At the same time the paper has raised the
question that is Mrs.

Gandhi claims popular support, why couldn't she have withstood
the challenge of civil disobedience without taking repressive measures.

However,

United States officials were ordered by Secretary of State Kissinger
to
make no comments on developments in India

,

which was officially called

an "internal matter" for Indians. The Times of London said that "While

allegations against Mrs. Gandhi of trying to set up a dictatorship had

earlier seemed excessive she has now taken a step leading exactly in
that direction."

59

In France a front page editorial in La Monde said

that Mrs. Gandhi's suppression of her opponents "reflects the Prime Minister's personality and character."

60

It added "Negru's daughter believes

herself invested with a historic mission and a legitimacy that defies
democratic rule."

51

The paper struck a note that was echoed in other

editorials, that India can no longer claim

moral superiority over other

countries in her political actions.
57

58

•

.

.

Christian Science Monitor

New York Times

,

.

June 26, 1975, p.

1.

^^Ibid.
60

The New York Time s, June 28, 1975, p. 1.

^''Ibid.
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LeMonde declared, "Its declarations
of democratic faith are

no

less hypocritical than its discourses
on the freedom of peoples
when

Sikkim and Kashmir were annexed pure
and simple.""

The annexation of

Sikkim and the explosion of a nuclear
device were also cited by The Times
of London as evidence of India's
disregard of international conduct
under
Mrs. Gandhi.
In its comments on the political
developments in India, the Balti-

more Sun conceded that:
By making herself, at least for now a dictator,
Mrs.
Gandhi has gone ahead where Nixon stopped short.
She
has failed a serious test of devotion to her
people's
freedom. Without rule of law, India could not have
the democracy Mrs. Gandhi proudly discussed in her 1975
New Year's message.

The Washington Post headlined its lead story saying "Gandhi
Assumes

Dictatorial Rule:

Arrests Mount.

"^^

The Post also published an anlysis by Walter Schwartz of the Man-

chester Guardian saying:
Indian Prime Minsiter Indira must have been seriously
rattled to arrest Jayaprakash Narayan and Morarji
Desai - her political seniors in more ways than one,
and to put them behind bars is to have played her last
card.^^
She was accused by several other columnists for Hitlerite and

Stalinists activities.
62

William Buckley, Jr. of the Boston Globe wrote:

The New York Times

,

June 28, 1975, p.

^^Ibid.
64
65

66

Baltimore Sun , 27th June, 1971.

Washington Post

,

27th June, 1971.

Washington Post

,

30th June, 1971.

1.
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Mrs Gandho. whose father refused
to condemn Krushchev's
bloody suppressions in Budapest
in 1956 early this yLr
congratu ated the Vietcong on
their victory In
China
It cannot therefore be safely
assumed that
'"^^^ ^^^^
distinguished father winces
at totalitarian excesses. 67

AH

'

Mrs. Gandhi's retort is we are
astonished that American
newspapers should lecture us on democracy
while showing
all friendships earlier to Ayub Khan's
military dictatorship in Pakistan and new communist
China. ^8

The Globe quoted Mrs. Gandhi as saying:

Today (Americans) had the cheek to come and
say that
"you are destroying democracy". We are not
interested
in what these countries say. We are interested
if
they are fair in their judgments, if they stick
by
what they say. If they believe in democracy and
that
other countries should be democratic, let then
speak
up against ever authoritative regime in the world.
But do we hear any talk today, while there is euphoria
in the West about China? Is there any form of democracy in China? But nobody has a word to say.

Today those who are criticising us, if the country
was to be weakened they would say, "oh well we always
said that democracy wouldn't work in a country like
India and that is all. "69
However, four months after the emergency was declared, Mrs. Gandhi's

critics, including those in Washington, are taking a second look.

William

Smith Chief of Time New Delhi Bureau gave his assessment of Indian democ-

racy under the emergency.
Despite New Delhi s undeniable lurch towards totalitarian rule and its suspension of certain civil
liberties, India remains strictly speaking a democracy. .Even though some 30 opposition members are
in jail or under house arrest, Parliament continues
'

.

67

68
69

Boston Globe
Ibid,
,

.

.

Ibid.

,

September 15, 1975.
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to function
.Most observers agree that
these matters
of no great interest to the
majority of India's 600
million people, who are more
concerned about the
fact tha the government has
completely halted inflation down from 31% in September
1974] and that
India s three year old drought
has ended (experts now
project a bumper grain crop this
fall)
Indians wul
long debate whether Mrs. Gandhi
was justified in proclaiming the emergency, but the Prime
Minister has
won widespread support for seizing
a rare opportunity
to ram through a score of social
reforms. ^0
.

India, Un ited States and the Bomb

India in May 1974, announced its first
nuclear explosion 328
feet under the great Indian desert.

The Indian Atomic Energy Commis-

sion said the bomb was designed for peaceful
purposes.

This 'peaceful'

nuclear blast woke up critics in the international
community to the idea
that there has been a misuse of foreign aid and
foreign exchange resources
of a large order.

secretly
comments

It almost seemed as though the whole thing
was prepared

and done suddenly.

m

Western nations.

This surprise nuclear test stirred angry
72

The national decision, i.e. whether to make nuclear weapons or

not is decided by concerns of national interest.

The traumatic experience

of the Indian government, during the massive Chinese invasion of Indian

territory in 1962, the Pakistani aggression in 1965, and the Bangladesh
episode in 1971, indicated to her the importance of planned military
70

William Smith,
1975, pp. 28-29.

'The Emergency:

m

Pakhran, a village
72

A Needed Shock,' Time, October

Rahasthan, India.

See New York Times
'Some Questions and Answers on India's Test
of a Nuclear Device, May 27, 1974, p. 2.
,

27,
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preparedness in the future.

Problems of national security
have since

been accorded a high priority.

So while Washington and
Moscow were

trying to manage their political
relationship and to carry on an
institutionalized dialogue to control the
strategic arms race, India with

the

fourth largest military force in the
world was contemplating the Bomb.^^
Early in 1968, after considerable
hesitation, she refused to sign the

nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

By the beginning of 1970 press
reports

were saying that, under pressure from
Parliament and the pro-bomb lobby,
her leaders were considering cost estimates for
a bomb program, and during
the summer the Atomic Energy Department announced
a ten year program

which included

plan to develop rocket and space technology,
guidance

a

systems and radar and missile tracking stations ."^"^

And in May 1974 she

announced the first nuclear blast.

A number of factors combined to bring about a change of
policy.
Local conflicts were beginning to gain world wide significance,
leading
to direct involvement in one form or another by the super powers.

Since

the super powers have the technological and industrial base, and the re-

sources to corner the world's strategic market, they can influence the

capacity of most other countries for self defense.

India gradually began

to realize that in any future confrontation affecting India's security,

she would be powerless to prevent the overriding super imposition of
73

.

.

S.L. Wxlliam, The US, India and the Bomb Baltimore John Hopkins
Press, 1969, provides a useful siirvey of India's nuclear debate; George
H. Quester, 'India Contemplates the Bomb,' The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists January 1970, has many insights regarding recent developments in
India's nuclear policy.
,

,

74

See statement of Dr. V.A. Sarabhai, Chairman of the Indian Atomic
Energy Department, in Indian News Embassy of India, Washington, D.C.,
June 5, 1970.
,
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great power interests.

China is seen as the bigger,
even though long

ter. threat, while Pakistan
figures as the .ore active
and i:^ediate one
India had confined ner national
security ai.s to the defense
of her own
territory, limited to conventional
ir^ediate level requirements
of defense,

India was not content with
perpetuating this 'lower power,'

status Which implied seeking the
shelter of a great or even
middle power
umbrella, and therefore of having to
surrender her sovereignty.

There has also been a growing awareness
that India's national
interest may not always coincide with
that of the super powers.

After

the 1962 Sino-lndian debacle, India
realized that in the future she could

not solely rely on American support and
hardware, as America had its com-

mitments to Pakistan under SEATO.

Hence in future' for military assistance

and weapons, it would have to depend of Russia
and her own plants.

Then the Chinese explosion of a nuclear device in
1964, even
though it did not pose an immediate threat to India,
created diplomatic

tension between the two countries.
eral countries in Asia.

The explosion made its impact on sev-

North Korea, North Vietnam, Cambodia were already

within the sphere of influence.

A great admiration for the Chinese nuclear

explosion was noticed in Pakistan, since it regarded that the Chinese nuclear bomb would be to its advantage in its rivalry with India in the

context of India, Pakistan and China, Soviet system of interaction.
The Chinese bomb is an Asian bomb, and India's hope of posing as
the liberal alternative to China in Asia would be jeopardized if she

could not prove that she is not only as technologically advanced, but
also as determined as a nation.
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Even though China's possession
of the nuclear bomb did not
give
it any decisive advantage in its
strategic position, it was felt
that it
had definitely helped it to secure inununity
from aggression.

India thus

thought it necessary to strengthen its
position both economically and

militarily in order to counter the growing
danger posed by the Chinese
nuclear threat.

This was done in spite of the pressure
put on by the

United States of India, that it should not go nuclear.
The bomb thus became a 'mantra'.

It was felt that if India de-

cided to make the bomb, it would not merely heighten the
morale of the
."^^
nation, but also transform the attitude of its hostile
neighbours

It

was asserted that there would be no economic breakdown, and that
the very

proclamation of India's intention to become a nuclear power would lead
other countries to take India more seriously, and contribute significantly to its internal stability.

It was envisaged that India's nuclear

energy program could be accelerated without neglecting the development
of its conventional forces, and a balance growth of both nuclear and con-

ventional forces, and a balance growth of both nuclear and conventional

weapons was considered as the most profitable objective for the defense
of India.

Another factor was the public opinion in India.

According to the

Institute of P\ablic Opinion in New Delhi, in 1968 over 75 percent of the
Indian public was in favour of taking the decision to produce nuclear
75

'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy," The
World Today September 1971. A.G. Noorani, "India and Asian Security,"
The World Today March 1970. Dilip Mukhergee, 'India's Defence Perspectives,' International Affairs, Octover 1968.

See Ashok Kapur,
,
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weapons.

The central theme is thus 'power'
and not 'defense'
•

-

and

deterrence not so much for the defense of
the motherland as for the acquisition of power, in the international
arena.

help India step into a new role of 'power'.

The bid indeed was to

With the likelihood of

Japan, West Germany and Israel to go nuclear,
India had to recast her

present national security policies.
India had been in a position to explode a nuclear
device since
late 1964, but was deterred by the vigorously, though
privately expressed,

disapproval of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Besides, India's

continuing dependence on shipment of food grains from the United
States,
made it hard for her to run the risk of offending America.

Another argu-

ment was the chance of nuclear proliferation, and the possibility that
Pakistan too might initiate a nuclear weapons program.
Critics in the West wondered how a poverty stricken country like
India could afford the luxury of a nuclear test.

dicated disappointment at the Indian test.

American officials in-

Referring to India's chronic

poverty and shortage of food, one Washington official said,

how this is going to grow more rice."

76

United States, a review of aid to India.

"I don't see

The blast also prompted in the
77

"If there isn't some cost to

India for doing this" an official said in a reference to possible curtail-

ment of United States aid, "other countries will go ahead."

78

The Indian reply is that long range needs must be balanced against
76
77
78

Quoted from New York Times

New York Times

,

,

op. cit

May 27, 1974, p.

,

2.

Quoted from New York Times, op. cit

,
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iimnediate pressures, that hunger
will not vanish overnight,
and that

nuclear energy in the long run will
help India feed herself.
TO the next often repeated criticism,
that India has foresworn

her moral stance of the nineteen
fifties against nuclear weaponry,
the
Indian reply is
The government has not ruled out the
development of
nuclear weapons. Besides the nuclear test
was in line
with India's diplomatic policy on arms control,
and there
are no contradictions between the nation's
statements
and actions.
India signed the 1963 treaty banning tests
of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. But
she refused
to sign the 1968 nuclear treaty designed to
thwart the
spread of weapons, asserting that it discriminated
against
non-nuclear powers had in effect failed to ask the
super
powers to make major sacrifices. India then had the
freedom to pursue her nuclear experiments .80
The New York Times also quoted the India press saying that
"the

western nations and the Soviet Union are being somewhat hypocritical
because they have stocks of nuclear arms, whereas India has merely exploded
a small device.^''"

Critics had the apprehesion that the nuclear experiment may have

violated the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, but the experiment was
carried out underground, while the Treaty prohibits explosions in the
atmosphere, under water and in outer space.

Besides" India did not sign

the Non-Proliferation Treaty which therefore is not binding on her.

In

the process therefore, no bilateral or multilateral agreements were violated.

The Indian government justivied the experiment by saying that it
79

80

New York Times
Ibid .

^"""Ibid.

,

May 27, 1974, p.

2.
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was designed ,o. such peaceful
purposes as »i„i„,

,,,,,

However, it did have political
and strategic reasons,
too.

J

CONCLUSION

The forcoin, chapters

.naKe

it evident that there
are a

n^er

Of "interest clusters"
e^eddea in the «.erican
involvement in South
*3ia.
one o, the historical
reasons for the ^erioan
concern with
south Asia lay not in the
region
itself, but in its
relationship to

the broader ,lohal balance
of power.

Bntil the ^^d-lseO's the
balance

of power issue remained a
key factor underlying
c.s. assistance both
to India and Pakistan, and
the U.S. attitude towards
Soviet influence
in these two states. The
,965 Indo-Pakistani war was
a critical turning
point for the U.S.; the U.S. then
stood aside as the Soviets
assu„,ed
the role of regional peacemaker
at the Tashkent Conference in
,966.
By
that time, American involvements in
Vietnam had deepened, and south

Asia's potential for disintegration,
and its relevance to the cold
war
had declined substantially.

Generally speaking, international relations
are intergovernmental relations.

Each government's public posture reveals
its inner

calculations, their relative coercive capability,
the self-interest of

nations and the elite who speak for them.

The "middle" and "small"

powers also play the game of power politics as
best as they can, de-

pending on options and constraints implicit in the
international situation and the ingenuity of their policy makers.

They are participants

in power politics even when they claim to be non-aligned,
for non-

alignment is nothing other than a "tactical principle" designed to

obtain the greatest possible advantage from a given power configiiration.

217

218

The great power having
global
udj. interest.,
interests, is concerned
y
with the
balance of a much larqer
arger intfir-na+--i^
t
international system to whose
preservation
the security interests of
its small ally may at
times, become irrelevant, ^erican foreign
policy towards India is
merely the application
Of this global strategy, and
India figures only in so
far as she IS
<=

S(
seen

—

as an available xiisL-iTument,
instrument, or an unnecessary
unnpnoao=.v.„ obstacle
..
in the execution of that strategy.
.

Thus in terms of South Asia's
salience to America's then
accepted
"vital and global interests,"
developments which might directly
or indirectly affect the security and
welfare of the U.S. through a
connection
to the central U.S. -Soviet balance,
India and South Asia generally,

faded rapidly as critical sectors in
the mid-1960

's.

In recent years

South Asia has become peripherally important
as European, Japanese and

American dependence upon Persian Gulf oil
has increased.

This interest

would expand were India to develop an
interventionist capacity in the
Gulf, or enhance its ties with important
Gulf states.

Another interest deriving from broader, global
concerns, is the
role of India and Pakistan in the nuclear proliferation
process.

Were

one or both of these states to acquire a military nuclear
system of
substance, the U.S. would be affected in a number of ways.

If American

ties with Pakistan have been characterized by a concern with the
security

and autonomy of a long time ally, those with India are considerably more

diverse.

India's democratic traditions, its economic development, cul-

tural and academic groups, all have been important assets for a large

number of Americans.

American foreign policy towards India has for its basis two main
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Piua^s.

The first

piUa. happens

to he ^.iUtar. pa.it.
hetween Xn.ia

and Pakistan, and the second
is economic aid through
which the United
States tried to prevent the
Soviet Union fro. achieving
a dominant

position of influence in India,

.ajor obstacles in establishing

Closer links between India
and the United States were
the divisions of
the cold war, the unconditional
U.S. support to Pakistan,
India's
Closeness to the Soviet Union,
her faith in non-alignment,
and her
opposition to military alliances
sponsored by the United States.
Even

after the doctrinal rigidities of
the cold war have dissolved and
nonalignment has become respectable in
the United States the two countries
did not come closer till recently,
what has kept them apart is the

fundamental psychological cleavage between
them which came into bold
relief in 1971 when President Nixon
gave unconditional support to
Pakistan.

Since 1971 marks a watershed in the
relationship between

the two countries, the crisis in the
subcontinent in that year and its

impact on India's ties with the United States
are carefully traced in
the work.

After the short term objective of entering into
a dialogue

with the Chinese leaders was achieved, Nixon was able
to relax.

After

his visit to Peking, he wrote friendly letters to Indira
Gandhi, to

which she sent appropriate replies.

In July 1972, he sent John Connally,

a close confidant, to India to talk to Indira Gandhi and tell her
that

the United States had no ill will towards India.

In November 1972,

Nixon authorized U.S. participation in the World Bank proposal for debt
rescheduling to India.

India and the United States agreed that they

would cooperate on economic matters and leave political differences
aside for a while.

In August 1973, Henry Kissinger stated that he
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wanted India and the United States
to move towards a more mature
relationship, by removing many of the
irritating legacies of the 1971
policies, and in this effort the then
U.S. ambassador Daniel Moynihan
of course played a major role.

India occupies the most central and
dominating position of the

subcontinent.

This region of some 800 million people
constitutes a

sizeable portion of the world's population.

It makes a difference

whether the people's of the South Asia work out
their problems amicably.
For a number of years the United States tried to
play the con-

flicting role of a balancer, supplier and mediator.

These efforts faded

after the 1965 war as the relevance of the region declined
since the

Vietnam war.

American interest in the subcontinent has been character-

ized by diversity, diffuseness and a high degree of indirectness, which
the subsequent chapters will clarify.

These interests have been numerous,

they interact and influence each other to a high degree, and they often
are dependent upon extra-regional considerations.

With the passage of

time global and regional variables have changed, so have the relations

between these two countries.
Indo-American relations have for decades been characterized by
tensions over issues in both regional and global affairs that are often

based on serious differences in perception and interest.

India's voting

pattarns in the United Nations, and the country's "tilt" towards the

Soviet Union formalized in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.
India has achieved hegemony in a region which while not of crit-

ical importance to so called vital U.S. interests, is of concern to many
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Americans for strategic
egic, political,
no]ii-ir>=,i
economic and humanitarian
reasons.
The U.S. recognition of
India's regional hege^ny
need not imply the
abandonment of egually legitimate
^^erican interests in, for
instance,
the stability and security
of Pakistan, nor is it
to he expected that
Indian and ^erican viewpoints
and objectives will always
overlap.
Yet
if the world's two largest
democracies can transcend the
resentments,
moralizing, and ideological
hostility of the recent past,
more cooperative relations between the U.S.
and India will contribute to
the aim of

political and economic stability in
the South Asia area.
Defense and military concerns play a
critical role in shaping
India's relations with its neighbors
and with outside powers.

India

has substantial military industrial
assets and a growing nuclear poten-

tial that enhances its geopolitical
importance,

since 1971, India has

increased the size of its frigate destroyer,
and submarine fleet and

India may be expected to play a small but
significant role in the Persian
Gulf and Indian Ocean areas which have gained
in strategic importance

along with the increased European, Japanese and
American dependence upon
the Persian Gulf oil.

President Carter did select India as one of the few stops on
his

winter 1977/78 foreign tour and P.M. Desai came to Washington in
the
summer of 1978.

Mr.

Carter enunciated most of the cliches

~

India as

the "largest democracy" in the world, the importance of democracy and

economic developments for all people and the natxire of the two countries
shared interests and obligations.

One of these indirectly recognized the dominant role of India
in South Asia, and gave some weight to the argxament that India was a
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countr. Of .lobal i„po.ta„ce.
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Key sentence. „e.e as
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the two countries
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he''
^he
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non-aligned
^^^^
countries. But each of „!
>^^=Peots the others conception of its inLrn!^«=P°-ib"ities
and the values
that
do
in

"i^rS^^*^-

f

s^arr'oiJdf

i"^hS\L-£-~-^^
balance of payments, technology
and other questions
welcome your playing this
world wide leadership "i;

i

The second document emerging
from President Carter's visit
was
the "Delhi Declaration" of
January 3, 1978, signed by Carter
and Desai.
Studies of strategic power in
world politics commonly assign
to
India the status of a middle power
of some regional significance,
but
little more. Two questions are central:
1)

Is

India an emergent power, in effect
a country of substantial

strategic importance now, and of even
greater potential importance?
2)

If so what are the policy implications
for the United States?

Skepticism concerning India's role in the world is
enhanced by
the economic crises that have become a way of
life in the subcontinent,

exacerbated by birth-death rates, that will lift India's
population to
one billion by the end of the century.

In addition to the economic

factors that are thought to reduce the country's effectiveness
in main-

taining logistical support for a modern defense force, critics note
that
India did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

;

became a nuclear

power after the testing of an atomic device in the Rajasthan desert in
1974; has fought four wars with immediate neighbors in 30 years (Pakistan
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in 1947-43, X^es, .aX.„cea
in

pa«

the Ba„,la.e=H .i.e.atlo„
„a. o.

1971 - carried out with precision
but by a iar,e maian
force against
a .uch smaller, isolated
Pakistani Ar^y i„ Hast Bengal,
.3 for the
.

Sino-Indian border
r war of 1962,
iPf;-?
a*.
it
was a debacle for India
from any
point of view.

western perceptions of India
take into account the factors
outlined above, add the longstanding
left-socialist inclinations o, see

of

India's leaders; recall the
political, social, and economic
instabilities of the country (exemplified
by the Emergency of Indira
Gandhi,
1975-77)

and conclude that India is par
excellence, a country that should

devote concentrated attention to its
internal problems of political stability, social change, regional
integration, and economic growth.
India,
in this perspective has only a modest
role to play in the realm of world

affairs

Criticism from outsiders has not deflected
India from its recognition of itself as a major nation that has
achieved great power status.
Great power status can imply regional, continental
or global influence.
At a minimum it means regional hegemony, which
India in large part has"
acquired.
grasp.

The next stage

—

dominance in Asia

—

clearly is beyond its

Extra-regional influence however is possible for India, and indeed

now is exercised with moderate success.

India's regional hegemony has

been slow in coming, for it was dependent upon the acquisition of a number
of capabilities.

India has had to develop an awareness that these capa-

bilities exist and acquire the will to exercise power in such a way as
to achieve or maintain hegemony over regional competitors

Regional hegemony or dominance thus implies the existence of local
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Military preponderance over
neighbors through the spectrum
of forces, the
availability of non-military
instruments of pressure (including
inducement and economic coercion)
,

the ability to influence
the consequences

following upon domestic political
weaknesses in rival regional
states,
and a strategy of diplomacy that
places regional dominance above
other
Objectives.

A state such as India, by virtue
of its size, resources
and geographic location finds itself
a great power in regional
terms,

whether or not it seeks the label, and
despite the fact that all of its
capabilities for regional dominance are
not yet full secured.

The acquisition of extra-regional
continental or global influence

will require other capacities.

For India, it demands a firm regional

base in South Asia, since local hegemony is a
prerequisite for broader
ambitions.

The most important geopolitical factor of the
subcontinent is

the central, dominating position of India.

This region of some 800

million people constitutes a sizeable portion of the world's
population.
It makes a difference whether the peoples of South
Asia Work out their

problems and differences amicably and effectively.
India is one of the very few of the "poorer" nations of the world

with a substantial indigenous military manuf act taring capability.
fully comparable to China in this regard.

It is

This has several political

and strategic consequences.

India is on the verge of entering the arms export market in a

certain way.
(50

There already has been one major sale to the Persian Gulf

tanks to Kuwait)

,

and attempts to sell MIG's or spare parts to Egypt.

India is beginning to design and construct a number of military items from
scratch.

India's armed forces are large and more than adequate to meet
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most threats to Indian security.
For a number of years the
United States tried to play the
conflicting role of a balancer,
supplier and mediator. These
efforts faded
after the 1965 war, as the
relevance of the region to U.S.
interests was
thought to have declined as
involvement in Vietnam grew. At that
time
the soviet union took up the
initiative holding out offers of
supplies
and weapons to both states, if
they agreed to forge a common front
against
China. Pakistan refused, as it
declined to yield its position on Kashmir,
and China became its leading weapons
supplier for a number of years. In
all of these activities, the superpowers
were concerned primarily with

using India and Pakistan as counters to the
other superpowers or to China.
In terms of its relations with Pakistan,
the minimum tests of

India's emergence as a great power would seem
to be constituted by the

following
1)

To maintain its military domination over Pakistan,
but with

an increasing reliance upon an Indian technology and
resource
base.
2)

Successfully to deter or prevent external powers from building
up Pakistan's military machine to the point where it could
attack India with confidence.

3)

To accomodate the genuine fears and concerns of Pakistan, thus

reducing Pakistan's motivation for opposing India.
It is a truism but appropriate to point out, that American in-

terests in South Asia are characterized by diversity, diffuseness, and a

high degree of indirectness.

By this we mean that these interests are

numerous, that they interact and influence each other to a high degree,
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and th.t they often

a,:e

dependent upon extra regional
considerations

With the passage of ti.e
global and regional variables
have changed.
Traditional subcontinental and
border rivalries especially
with Pakistan
and China re-nain active, but
Pakistan now is developing
closer ties with
Iran, Turkey and the Arab
world with ^^ssible stronger
links with the
U.S.S.R. to be forged in the
future.
India in turn is in the
process
of

negotiating improved accords with
the People

^s

Republic of china,

over-

all subcontinental disputes are
declining in intensity in part
because
of a recognition of India's
standing of dominance.

The termination of the 1975 state
of emergency in India and the
restoration of full democratic freedoms
were greeted with considerable

public support in the United States and
helped the stage for the development of a more cordial and closer
relationship between the United states
and India,

while differences remain, leaders in
both countries express

confidence that these can be amicably managed.
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